Politics, Trade and the Sale of Indian Tea to Tibet: 
Failure of Dumping of Indian Tea to Tibet During the Late Qing and Republican China Period

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Since the late Qing dynasty, the sales volume of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet kept dropping, resulting in a sales crisis for it in Tibet a fear of the occupation of the Tibetan tea market by Indian tea due to its convenient traffic and low prices. During the dull sales of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet, Britain took various means, and even used military force to make Indian tea enter Tibet, whereas Indian tea was not sold in Tibet on a large scale, but only sporadically. The position of Chinese tea in Tibet was never shaken as was supposed by some at the time or later. The attempt for Indian tea on which Britain placed high hopes to be sold in Tibet was frustrated by the conflict between the central government and the Tibetan local government, the longstanding preference of the Tibetans for Sichuan brick tea, etc. The attempt of the British colonists to dump Indian tea into Tibet failed. In the meantime, with sea transport and price advantages, Yunnan tea made up for the reduction of Sichuan brick tea, and took up half of the Tibetan tea market.

Keywords: Tibet, Indian tea, Sichuan brick tea, Yunnan tea

RAISING OF THE ISSUE

Since the late 19th century, the dumping of Indian tea to Tibet was the main cause behind the sharp shrinking of the sales volume of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet, which is a view usually held by domestic and overseas scholars. Chen Yishi’s Indian Tea Dumping in Tibet and the Countermeasures in the Qing Dynasty was an early article concerning this issue, but it was focused on the Qing government’s measures for frontier tea reform in face of the frontier tea dumping crisis in the late Qing dynasty, and referred little to the sale of Indian tea in Tibet (Chen 1983). Afterwards, Dong Zhiyong wrote about the impact of the sale of Indian tea to Tibet, and thought that around the Revolution of 1911, Indian tea was sold in large quantities in Tibet and occupied most of the Tibetan tea consumer market, resulting in a gradual reduction of the tea sold from Mainland China to Tibet, and having serious political and economic consequences for Tibet (Dong 1993). In recent years, this view has been challenged: British scholar Patrick Booze thinks that the sale of a large quantity of Indian tea to Tibet from the late 19th century to 1959 is a pseudo-proposition, and in fact, the tea trade between British India and Tibet did not break the monopoly of Sichuan and Yunnan tea in Tibet. Booze points out that the decreasing sales volume of Sichuan tea in Tibet in this period was mainly attributed to the continued civil wars in Sichuan and Xikang Provinces, an exaggerated threat of Indian tea by officials of the Qing government like Zhao Erfeng, an improper management of Sichuan brick tea, etc.
other than the dumping of Indian tea to Tibet. (Booze 2011). This view of Booze was proposed by other scholars before, but there was no article for a systematic discussion of this issue.\(^1\) Undoubtedly, Booze’s view overturned our common sense about the sale of Indian tea to Tibet to some extent. There seems to be no new literature resorted to, especially Chinese historical literature, and most Chinese materials used by him were quoted from other sources.\(^2\) However, the issue raised by him is very valuable, and worthy of in-depth discussion.

From the China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty signed in 1894 after the Longtu Mountain battle to the second British invasion of Tibet in 1903, the Qing central government and Tibetan local government refused to execute the clause on tea import into Tibet stipulated in the treaty. Britain used this excuse to wage a second invasion of Tibet in 1903 and 1904, and forced the Tibetan local government to sign an unequal treaty in Lhasa. After the signing of the renewed Lhasa Treaty in 1904, the tax exemption for trade between British India and Tibet took effect. Based on the literature I have accessed, the quantity of Sichuan tea sold to Tibet was reduced greatly in this period, and all reports on Chinese newspapers and magazines expressed a deep concern about the monopolization of the Tibetan tea market by Indian tea.

All treaties on India-Tibet trade signed after 1894, and even the Younghusband expedition’s entry into Lhasa, aimed at opening up the Tibet market for Indian tea, and these treaties even included a specific clause on tea. However, what has been confusing to scholars is that the dumping of Indian tea to Tibet did not occur, and traces of Indian tea could hardly be seen in Tibet.

There are no records available on the sale of Indian tea in Tibet. People such as You Tai, Resident Minister in Tibet of the late Qing dynasty, Ekai Kawaguchi, Japanese monk who had been to Lhasa, and Huang Musong, Wu Zhongxin, Liu Manqing, Xing Suzhi and Shen Zonglian, officials who entered Tibet during the Republican China period, and British figures who moved about in Tibet, including Charles Alfred Bell (October 1870 – March 1945), Hugh Edward Richardson (December 1905 – December 2000), and Edward Colborne Baber (April 1843 – June 1890), in their notes, memoirs, investigation reports, works, etc. rarely mention the sale of Indian tea in Lhasa, Shigatse, etc. Even after the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, no record on Indian tea in Tibet has been found in various memoirs and files, and no tea shortage in Tibet is seen from people’s records then.

If Prof. Booze’s view were tenable, after the signing of the Lhasa Treaty in 1904, especially after the Revolution of 1911, the quantity of Sichuan brick tea was reduced by at least half, while Indian tea was not dumped to Tibet. In this situation, no record on a Tibet tea shortage was seen in various literatures. Then, then we would ask: how did the Tibetans who loved tea so much make up for the unavailability of Sichuan brick tea? Why didn’t they accept Indian tea? Prof. Booze did not explore these aspects in depth, yet they serve as the key to the issue.

**BRITAIN’S COVETING OF TIBET AND ATTEMPT TO SELL INDIAN TEA TO TIBET**

The British imperialists’ coveting of and penetration into Tibet was a deepening process. After the foundation of the British East India Company in 1600, their expansion in the South Asian Subcontinent began. In 1772, when a war broke out between Bhutan and Bihar State in India, the British East India Company took this opportunity to attack Bhutan, and gained the privilege of deforestation on the south slope land of Bhutan. In 1826, the British East India Company seized the Assam region from Myanmar through the First Anglo-Burmese War. In 1835, Darjeeling was rented from Dremojong as the base to enter Tibet and a trade transfer station. In 1861, the British defeated Dremojong, and obtained the railway right in throughout Dremojong; then, the middle segment of the India-Tibet road was opened, and the British had direct access to the Tibet border from Darjeeling. In 1865, British India defeated Bhutan, which begged for peace by ceding territory, and then the road from Bhutan to Tibet was also opened. By the mid 19th century, the British integrated India (including today’s Pakistan and Bengal), Myanmar, Sikkim and Bhutan into their sphere of influence gradually through several wars, and went deeper into the area south of the Himalayas. Since then, the British power reached the Tibet border directly English 1985).

In the early days, Tibet practiced an free trade policy for the neighboring countries on the south piedmont of the Himalayas, and imposed no restriction on foreigners entering Tibet for trade and other
purposes. In 1791, Gorkha waged the second invasion of Tibet, and Emperor Qianlong appointed Fu Kang’an as Senior General, who led his troops to Tibet and Gorkha, and beat back the Gorkhas in the following year. After the war, the Qing government formulated the Imperial Regulations on Tibet Management to strengthen the management of Tibet and guard against foreign aggression, stipulating that “If foreigners are going to visit Tibet, the border battalion officer shall check their number, and report to the Resident Minister in Tibet; such foreigners shall be inspected by officials in Gyantse and Dhingri before visiting Lhasa.” These regulations imposed restrictions on foreigners’ access to Tibet, and in particular, made westerners difficult to enter Tibet again. It was not until Prime Minister Li Hongzhang signed the Yantai Treaty with British Envoy Thomas Francis Wade on September 13, 1876 after the incident of A.R. Margary in 1875, that the British were allowed to enter Tibet. However, the Yantai Treaty was objected by all classes of Tibet, so the plan of the British to enter Tibet was not actually implemented. This situation was not changed until the China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty (1890) and the renewed China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty (1893) was signed after the Longtu Mountain battle in 1888.

According to literatures, the British entered Tibet around the late 18th century initially, and George Bogle was the first British visitor to Tibet. In 1774, he was assigned by the first Indian Viceroy Warren Hastings to look for a possibility of trade in Tibet so that cotton yarns and other British commodities could enter the markets of Tibet and northwestern China in exchange for gold, wool and medicinal materials of Tibet (Cammann 1951:26). After Bogle visited the Panchen Lama’s estate in Shigatse (he was not allowed by the Tibetan local government to enter Lhasa), he advised Hastings to establish trade contacts between Assam and Tibet based on his own observations though no substantial trade agreement was reached (Markham 1876:58-60).

In 1783, Hastings assigned Samuel Turner to Tibet to seek for opportunities of trading with Tibet on the pretext of congratulating the Tashilunpo Monastery on successfully finding the incantation of the Panchen Lama. However, the Qing government and Tibetan local government refused Turner’s request to meet the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, and Turner returned with nothing achieved. After his return, Turner recorded the trading conditions between Tibet, and Mainland China, Bhutan, Nepal and Bengal, and made a special mention of tea in his report. He said that after tea was transported from Mainland China to Tibet, some was resold by Tibetan merchants to Bhutan (Turner 1800:382-384). In addition, while Turner was in Shigatse, he also got to know that Russia began to contact Tibet. These messages made the British more eager to establish trade connections with Tibet. But the Imperial Regulations on Tibet Management put into effect in the 58th year of Qing Emperor Qianlong’s reign (1793) eliminated the possibility for westerners to enter Tibet from South Asia.

In the 19th century, with the expansion of the British power in South Asia, the British became increasingly interested in opening up the Tibet market. In 1831, B.H. Hodgson, member of the Royal Society of Arts, conducted a detailed investigation on Tibet’s resources and market during his survey in Nepal. He thought that Tibet was abundant in musk, Rheum officinale, sodium borate, wool, mines and other resources, and was an ideal trade target for Britain because Tibet was not self-sufficient in food and some other aspects (Gill 2000 78-82). This was just the time when the power of the British East India Company reclaimed by the British queen, when all British merchants wanted to seize raw materials and expand the market for industrial products in the trade with Tibet.

After its foundation in 1600, the British East India Company always monopolized Britain’s foreign trade. Their tea trade with China was the most important item, from which they made enormous profits. Accordingly, the British East India Company had no intention to plant tea themselves. However, since the early 19th century, with the gradual cancellation of the monopoly, the British East India Company’s profits in the tea trade with China dropped sharply. Then, they managed to plant tea themselves. In 1840, the British Assam Company began to plant tea as a trial. After the 1850s, the plantations run by the British in Assam and surrounding areas planted tea extensively, and with an increasing planting area, from 4,000 acres in 1859 and 100,000 acres in 1874 to 530,000 acres in 1905 (Roy 2011). In the meantime, large-scale tea planting began in British colony Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka), with a planting area of 4,700 acres in 1878, 100,000 acres in 1885 and 300,000 acres in 1895. Therefore, India and Ceylonese tea replaced Chinese tea in the British market. (Forrest 1967:94). With the growth of the British tea output in South Asia, the British
made increasingly strenuous efforts in the sale of Indian tea to Tibet, and placed great hopes on its sale and other British goods to Tibet.

In 1884, according to the provision that the British were allowed to open up traffic between India and Tibet in the Yantai Treaty, and the Special Treaty on Tibet Path-finding signed between China and Britain in 1876, Bengal State Treasurer Colman Patrick Louis Macaulay led a mission to explore the road to Tibet in Sikkim, and then this road broke ground (Bhatt and Bhargava 2006:23). In this visit, Macaulay interviewed a junior official of Tibetan local government in Gamba (today’s Gamba County, Shigatse), who thought that the greatest barrier to Indian tea’s entry into Tibet was monks of monasteries, because they had tremendous commercial interests in tea trade. Having tasted the Indian tea brought by Macaulay, he said that he loved it, and drank two cups in a row. In addition, when Macaulay’s party stayed at the Tashilunpo Monastery in Shigatse, his attendants gave Indian tea to the monastery, which was welcomed by monks (Macaulay 1995:74). Macaulay’s report indicated that Indian tea could open up the market in Tibet, reflecting that Indian tea was not popular in Tibet then, because the officials and monks tasting Indian tea obviously drank this tea for the first time. However, these two incidents strengthened Macaulay’s confidence in the sale of Indian tea to Tibet. He thought that numerous tea lovers lived north of the border, there were many tea plantations south of the border, and potential business opportunities existed (ibid:89-91).

Since British traveler Edward Colborne Baber visited Dajianlu (today’s Kangding City) in 1878, he firmly believed that the geographic environment impeding India-Tibet trade could be overcome, because he found the use of Indian rupee banknotes, and British and Indian goods at a bazaar in Dajianlu. For example, dinner dishes often bore portraits of Napoleon the Third, the Prince and Princess of Wales, Mr. Gladstone, etc., with English letters from A to Z embedded on edges. He even found buttons of British military uniforms, and bottle openers whose use was unknown to the Tibetans at this bazaar. For this reason, he thought, “Such goods were cheap and diversified enough to demonstrate the convenience of India-Tibet trade; the extensive use of rupee banknotes proves the extensiveness of India-Tibet trade……. Although de facto India-Tibet trade existed, the British government has not established formal trade relations with Lhasa that is closest to India. If diplomatic and trade relations are not established (directly with the Tibetan local government) as soon as possible, there will be no hope for Assam tea on the Tibet market.”(Baber 1882:200). He further analyzed that the resistance to the sale of Indian tea to Tibet was mainly from the Resident Minister in Tibet of the Qing central government, and the conservative power of the Tibetan local government, because those were groups with vested interest in the sale of Mainland China tea in Tibet. If such resistance was lessened or broken down by diplomatic and other means, there would be great hope for the sale of Indian tea to Tibet.

In the mid to late 19th century, the international situation the Himalayas in South Asia and Central Asia was more complicated, and both Britain and Russia were involved in the fight for this region, and wanted to monopolize and control it. The British Empire, the strongest country of the then world, had already occupied Myanmar and Bengal, and wanted to take a share of Sikkim and Bhutan, and include them in its own sphere of influence. At that time, the 13th Dalai Lama was very close to Russia, and wanted to use the Russian power to strengthen his theocracy, which made Britain feel anxious and upset. The British regarded Tibet as a buffer zone between India and Russia, and also a barrier to prevent the Russians from going south, and worried that Russia’s meddling in Tibet might threaten its rule of India (Bell 1936:23). Consequently, how to occupy the Tibet market quickly, and further realize total control over Tibet with the sale of Indian tea to Tibet being a breakthrough point became a top priority for the British government.

After the first British invasion of Tibet in 1888, the defeated Qing government signed the renewed China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty with Britain in Darjeeling, India in December 1893, the Article 4 of which making a special mention of Indian tea trade: “Indian tea shall not be sold in Tibet until five years later, namely after the end of 1898.” (Wang 1957:566). However, after the expiry of the five-year period, the Qing government and Tibetan local government did not observe the treaty. They still levied a tariff of 10% on British and Indian goods passing through Yadong and Pagri, and rejected the negotiation request of the British Indian government. In 1904, McDonald who entered Tibet along with the British expedition said when talking about the reason for Britain’s invasion in his memoir, “In 1903, the Indian government decided...
to assign an envoy to Tibet to solve the international trade and border problems, because at that time, the Han Chinese and Tibetans gradually slackened about observing the Tibet-India Treaty resulting from the Tibetan expedition in 1888 and signed in 1890, so the international trade and border problems became severer.” (McDonald 1937:1&5) The Younghusband expedition invaded Tibet at the end of 1903 and occupied Lhasa in 1904. After arriving in Lhasa, the Younghusband expedition forced the Qing government and Tibetan local government to sign the unequal Lhasa Treaty, which stipulated that Gyantse, Ghadak and Yadong would serve as free trading ports for British and Indian merchants. In terms of taxation, “Except any tax under the tax rules to be formulated in the future, no tax shall be levied.” (Wang 1982:347) This treaty gave British merchants the privilege of tax exemption in Tibet, excluding tea sale.

The above unequal treaties opened the door for British and Indian products to be sold in Tibet. However, based on available literatures, the subsequent sale of Indian tea to Tibet was not as the British expected.

**CHINA’S CONCERNS ABOUT THE DUMPING OF INDIAN TEA**

Since the late 19th century, there were many reports on Indian tea in China. Until the 1940s, all articles on Indian tea published on domestic newspapers, magazines and academic journals were full of anxieties about the dumping of Indian tea to Tibet.

As early as 1886, according to the Yantai Treaty, the Qing government had to allow British Macaulay to enter Tibet. Macaulay organized a Tibet mission with over 300 members in Darjeeling, and demonstrating the feasibility of dumping tea to Tibet was also one of his main purposes of visiting Tibet. When meeting British Secretary of State for India Randolph Churchill, he said: “(If India-Tibet trade can be opened,) Darjeeling would become a trade route to Tibet and southern Mongolian, from which tea and British goods would surge into Tibet.” (Lu 1996:140) In the meantime, the Qing government expressed deep concerns about Macaulay’s visit to Tibet. Selengge, Resident Minister in Tibet, mentioned the Sichuan tea crisis potentially arising from India-Tibet trade in a report submitted to the central government:

> Tea in Tibet is supplied from Sichuan, and is well sold with a generous tax. Once trade relations are established, cheaper Indian tea will enter the Tibetan market, thereby replacing Sichuan tea. This will have a potential risk. (Wang 2015)

After the first British invasion of Tibet in 1888, the British forced the Qing government to negotiate India-Tibet trade, and sign the unequal China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty, in which the sale of Indian tea to Tibet was an important item. During the negotiation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Sichuan Governor Liu Bingzhang his view about this, and Liu Bingzhang replied, “Sichuan tea is mostly sold to Tibet, and is an important tax source for Sichuan. The sale of Indian tea in Tibet will damage Sichuan’s fundamental interests.” (Editorial Board of the Series on the Modern Economic History of China 1983:163) Since the sale of Indian tea to Tibet would damage the political and economic interests of the Qing government greatly, the Chinese side requested several times that the Tibetan tea issue be excluded.

In the 33rd year of Qing Emperor Guangxu’s reign (1907), Zhang Yintang, who was in charge of Tibetan affairs as an imperial envoy, also expressed a deep concern about the entry of Indian tea into Tibet, “Sichuan tea has always been sold in Tibet, and cost only 0.13 silver dollar in Sichuan but 2.5-2.6 silver dollars in Tibet. According to an Indian newspaper, tea transported from Ghadak to Shigatse in the 32nd year of Qing Emperor Guangxu’s reign (1906) was worth 320,000 rupees, and would become salable because it has no tax and less freight.” (Zhang 1938:1-10) He thought that Indian tea could completely replace Sichuan brick tea due to its advantage in price. In the same year, officials of Sichuan Province also worried about the prospect of Sichuan brick tea after the beginning of India-Tibet trade. “Indian tea can now be sold in Tibet, and our province would suffer heavy losses.” (Sichuan Official Report 1907:45) In Year 1 of Qing Emperor Xuantong’s reign (1909), Wang Dianzhang, Dajianlu sub-prefect, told the story about the dumping of Indian tea to Tibet he heard from Sichuan officials who had been to Tibet in a speech to tea merchants:
They (British Indian tea merchants) have planted tea trees in the whole area from the Datou Mountain on the Tibet-India border to Darjeeling. There are over 100 tea factories, with a workforce of 300-400 in each, dealing with manual or automatic production. They can make any Chinese tea, and their products are much better, as they are clean, tender and pure. For example, the British can imitate Jinyu tea – our dominant product sold to Tibet, and their product is better than ours, and will certainly replace our Sichuan tea. Their tea can be transported to Tibet via a short and flat road, and they are better doing business than we. You should improve your product immediately, and avoid making counterfeits. (Sichuan Official Report 1909)

Although his speech had some exaggeration, it expressed the crisis awareness of Sichuan officials, i.e., Indian tea could replace Sichuan brick tea in Tibet because it was better and had traffic convenience.

After the Revolution of 1911, there were much more such reports. During this period, the sales volume of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet dropped sharply, resulting in a panic among tea merchants and officials. Most of the reports attributed the dull sale of Sichuan brick tea to the dumping of Indian tea (Frontier Studies 1936). In 1937, When Liu Wenhui, Chairman of the Xikang Province Establishment Committee, met tea merchants from Ya’an, Yingjing, Tianquan, etc., the representative of tea merchants talked in his speech about the reason for the decline of Sichuan tea. “In recent years, Indian and Yunnan tea have been selling well in Tibet, so firms in Sichuan have all suffered losses, and several have gone bankrupt.” (Liu 1937:300) An article in 1939 described the impact of Indian tea on Sichuan brick tea in greater detail:

Sichuan tea is transported from Ya’an via Kangding to Tibet, all by manpower and animal power, with a daily traveling distance of tens of kilometers. It takes about half a year for a round trip. When the renewed China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty was signed in 1893, turning Yadong into a trading port. The railway in India has a direct access to Gyantse on the Chinese border, and the British has thus dumped India tea to Tibet via Yadong, which is highly competitive on the Tibetan market for its low price, and making frontier tea unsalable. (Chen 1939:8)

Then, how was Sichuan brick tea sold in Tibet from the late Qing dynasty to the Republican China period? Was it affected by Indian tea? How did the rumor about Indian tea’s monopolization of the Tibetan tea market arise? Based on the literatures available, this is roughly as follows:

Since the early Qing dynasty, over 500,000 packs of south-route frontier tea were sold to Tibet every year. During the Republican China period, according to an official statement from the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Nationalist Government, 500,000 packs of tea were sold from Dajianlu to Tibet, of which 40% were sold to Tibet (west of the Jinsha River). Furs and medicinal materials in Tibet were used for exchange mainly (The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 1941). After the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the sales volume on south-route frontier tea was halved.

The Nationalist Government, Xikang Provincial Government, scholars and news media attributed the reduced sales volume to the “dumping of Indian tea” (Liu 1946). Nevertheless, a more important reason was the soaring prices, which increased the operating costs of tea merchants greatly. The raw tea purchase price in the tea producing area in 1948 was ten times higher than that in the previous year, and kept rising (Ya’an Branch of the Joint Office of the Four State Banks 1948).

According to files of the Republican China period, Kangzang Company was the strongest advocate of the Indian tea threat theory, and linked it to the frontier crisis, and national survival. Kangzang Company was a tea monopoly firm during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and all its shareholders were major merchants and officials in Xikang and Tibet, with the main purpose of getting loans. From 1939 to 1942, Kangzang Company run by merchants under the supervision of the Xikang Provincial Government monopolized Tibetan tea sale. During this period, since Kangzang Company held down tea prices, the enthusiasm of tea growers was reduced greatly, tea output dropped sharply, and the quantity of tea sold in Tibet dropped to over 200,000 packs. Due to its monopolization, Kangzang Company conflicted with other tea merchants inevitably soon after its foundation (Yu 1911:2). After the restoration of free trade in 1942, the quantity of tea sold to Tibet rose to over 300,000 packs (The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 1941).

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When Sichuan brick tea underwent the crisis due to the sale of Indian tea to Tibet, Yunnan tea rose instead. Yunnan tea was quickly accepted in Tibet since the Qing dynasty, and partly replaced Sichuan brick tea in Tibet (Liu 2017). By the 1940s, Yunnan tea entered Kham (the eastern part of Tibet), and took up almost half of the tea sales of Kham. In the early 20th century, with the opening of Yunnan-Burma Railway, and the completion of the Calcutta-Kalimpong Railway, and in particular, due to the tax exemption of British and Indian goods sold to Tibet as stipulated in the unequal treaties signed after the second British invasion of Tibet, a lot of Yunnan tea was transported to Tibet by sea. According to the statistics of the Consulate-general of the Nationalist Government in Calcutta, 35,000-40,000 packs of Yunnan tea were transported to Tibet by sea per annum (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1940). After Yunnan tea arrived in Kalimpong, merchants would blend some Indian tea in it to reduce costs (Long 1936). During the War against the Japanese, Burma was occupied by the Japanese army, and the international traffic route was blocked, so the road between Yunnan and Tibet became the main route for Yunnan tea to enter Tibet (Liu 2017).

FRUSTRATION OF THE ATTEMPT TO DUMP INDIAN TEA TO TIBET

Before the Tibet-India Treaty was signed in 1892, Indian tea could not enter Tibet freely. During the China-Britain negotiation in 1890-1892, both sides contested on the sale of Indian tea in Tibet many times. For fear of the impact of Indian tea on Sichuan brick tea (the Qing government cared very much about this, and set a special ban in the treaty), the Qing government stuck to the bottom line without concession, almost breaking off the negotiation. Finally, the British government had to compromise, and agreed that Indian tea would not be sold in Tibet until five years after the opening of the Yadong Customs. However, in 1899, after the expiry of the five-year period, neither side agreed on this issue. Despite repeated requests of British India, the Qing government did not concede, and thus Indian tea could not enter the Yadong Customs. That is to say, in the ten years from the opening of the Yadong Customs in May 1894 to the Younghusband expedition’s entry into Lhasa in 1904, Indian tea could not be sold in Tibet openly and lawfully. In April 1901, the Indian Tea Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the Bengal Government, stating that they had prepared hundreds pounds of tea at the tea plantations in Darjeeling, and consigned them to Tibetan merchants in Kalimpong for transport to Tibet, but the Tibetan merchants did not dare to do this for fear of punishment by lamas and Tibetan officials. Therefore, Indian merchants expected the British Indian government to open up Tibetan tea market as soon as possible to put Article 4 of the renewed China-Britain Tibet-India Treaty into practice.5 The predicament of the sale of Indian tea in Tibet can thus be seen. After 1904, although British and Indian goods entered Tibet in large quantities, Indian tea was still not approved officially for sale in Tibet, and could only be smuggled in small batches. The author has, by referring to the Tibet-related files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during 1904-1924, found that the British government cared little about tea trade, but more about the purchase of Tibetan wool and its transport to India. In contrast, the Qing government and Tibetan local government cared particularly about the sale of Indian tea to Tibet. This explains why the Qing government insisted in the 1892 Tibet-India Treaty that Indian tea be not exempt from import tariff, while the British Indian government made a concession. In April 1908, Zhang Yintang and Ernest Colville Chllins Wilton signed the Amended China-Britain Tibet-India Trade Treaty in Calcutta, India on behalf of both sides, which had no specific provision on tariff and the sale of Indian tea in Tibet, and both sides agreed to otherwise negotiate this issue later. In September of the same year, Bagchi Company in Kalimpong delivered four boxes of Indian tea to an agent in Gyantse, which were detained by the Yadong Customs, and returned to the agent. In July of the following year, seven pack-animal loads of Indian tea for the British commercial commissioner in Gyantse were captured by the Yadong Customs, but were released through negotiation. This was the first batch of Indian tea entering Tibet officially (Liu 1997:96). On March 6, 1909, Lianyu, Resident Minister in Tibet, submitted a report to the central government on port opening and customs setup in Yadong, Gyantse and Ghadak, saying “Indian tea is now mostly smuggled into Tibet via Ghadak without inspection.”(Gu 1982:4697) However, Ghadak was distant from Lhasa, and the road was in bad condition, and adverse to the import of bulk tea.
During the 20 years of existence of the Yadong Customs (1894-1914), no tariff was imposed on British and Indian goods except Indian tea entering Tibet, and only imports and exports were inspected (Li 2000: 55 &137). British and Indian merchants could not enter Tibet north of Yadong for trade, and things could only be traded in Kalimpong, and then transported by Tibetan and Han merchants to Pagri in Tibet. Accordingly, Kalimpong in Sikkim and Pagri in Tibet were the trading places of imports. It can be said that Yadong served just as a gateway in these 20 years.

In addition, the Tibetan local government always resisted Indian tea resolutely, and prohibited Indian and Sikkim merchants from transporting tea to Tibet. A letter by a British official in Sikkim to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the British Indian government on March 20, 1909 stated, Tibetan officials monopolized India-Tibet trade, and disallowed Sikkim merchants to trade with Tibetans directly; Tibetan officials forced down prices to purchase British and Indian goods, and then sold them in Shigatse at high prices for high profits. This official complained that these acts violated the provisions on free India-Tibet trade in Articles 2, 9 and 20 of the Amended China-Britain Tibet-India Trade Treaty. In terms of taxation, the British political commissioner in Sikkim reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the British Indian government on October 28, 1908, stating that the Tibetan local government set up a customs pass in Pagri, and imposed a tax of 10% on all goods passing through it except wool and yak tails, which affected the entry of Indian tea into Tibet greatly. What impacted the sale of Indian tea to Tibet most was the trade monopoly of wool, leathers and yak tails by Tibetan merchants. These three commodities were main exports of Tibet, and most needed by Britain. The British government always wanted to exchange tea for wool, etc., but this plan could not be put into practice, mainly because Tibetan wool trade was monopolized by the family of Kham tycoon Pantsang, who could set prices freely to exclude competitors. Therefore, Alastair Lamb also thought that the two trade treaties of 1908 and 1914 had little impact on India-Tibet trade when talking about their effect (Lamb 2017:562).

Another important reason for the resistance of Indian tea by the Qing government, Tibetan local government and monasteries was their worry about Britain’s meddling in Tibet. Charles Bell once mentioned that if Tibetan merchants in Yadong transported Indian tea to Tibet for sale, they would be punished by Qing officials in Tibet and the Tibetan local government. In addition, in the late Qing dynasty and early Republican China period, Sichuan brick tea’s share of the Tibet market was replaced partly by Yunnan tea. Although Yunnan tea was mostly transported to Tibet via India and Sikkim by sea, Tibetan nobles and monasteries could still make a profit by reselling tax exemption certificates. They were unwilling to do business with the British, because they worried that this might break their monopoly of the tea market, and weaken their political power and economic interests in Tibet.

In August 1900, Tsybikoff, a Russian Briat Mongolian assigned by the Russian Geographical Society to Tibet, examined the Lhasa market carefully. He said, though there were many kinds of commodities from Britain and India, and even Germany, Italy and Japan, tea was mostly from Mainland China (Tsybikoff 1993:119-120). In August 1904, the Younghusband expedition’s interpreter McDonald saw many foreign commodities on roadside stalls when visiting Barkhor Street in the old town: gauzes, wool fabrics, silk, soaps, candles, cannonballs, matches, corals, Indian boots, etc (McDonald 1937:5 & 18). However, he did not mention tea. If there were Indian tea on the Lhasa market, he should have mentioned it. Charles Bell served as British official in Tibet and Sikkim since 1905, and was familiar with Tibetan customs and the history of India-Tibet trade. As he recalled, “Goods from India to Tibet were mostly cotton products, followed by furs, hardware, furniture, corals, gems, tobaccos, dried fruit, white sugar, rock candy and household goods, such as matches, needles and soaps.” (Bell 1936:144) It can be seen that even Charles Bell did not include tea in Indian commodities sold in Tibet.

In 1939, Wu Zhongxin, Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Nationalist Government, entered Tibet to host the enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, and Zhu Shaoyi stayed in Lhasa for half a year as an attendant, and kept detailed records about Lhasa in this period, including some accounts on commerce and economy:

There are numerous commodities on the Lhasa market, in which silk fabrics, carpets, porcelain, brick tea, horse gear, Khata, etc. are from Mainland China; leathers, horses and sheep from Mongolia; corals, amber
and small diamonds from Europe; rice, sugar cubes, musk and cigarettes from Sikkim and Bhutan; cloth, indigo, copperware, corals, sugar, pearls, spices, medicinal materials and some Indian artworks from Nepal; red flower and dried fruit from Ladakh; spices, dried fruit, fox furs and metal horse gear from Xikang……

There are seven Peking stores in Lhasa, with a capital of hundreds of thousands of silver dollars each, selling silk fabrics, porcelain, etc.; there are about 150 Nepalese stores, mostly with a small capital, dealing with groceries; there are also numerous non-local merchants and local peddlers running temporary roadside stalls.

Brick tea from Mainland China includes Sichuan and Yunnan tea, where Sichuan tea is from Kangding, and Yunnan tea enters Tibet partly via the Xikang south route and partly via India. (Zhu 1947:107-108)

Zhu Shaoyi observed tea sale on the Lhasa market in the late 1930s in great detail. Based on his records, tea sold on the Lhasa market mainly included Sichuan and Yunnan tea, which was partly sold to India, whereas Indian tea was not mentioned.

Until the democratic reform in Tibetan and Yi areas in Sichuan in 1956, Garze was still the hub of transit trade, from which Sichuan brick tea was transported to Tibet, and British and Indian goods from Tibet were transported to Kham continuously (Zhang 2009:9 & 43). All merchants dealing with British and Indian goods were Tibetans, dealing mainly with heavy woolen cloth, cigarettes, aluminum kitchenware, watches, pens, etc., but there is no record on Indian tea in literature (Yang, et al 2009:5).

In 1956, the Ethnic Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress organized a Tibetan ethnic minority social and historical investigation team for an investigation in Tibet. During 1958-1962, the National Ethnic Affairs Commission of the State Council, and the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences organized another investigation, and completed the Tibet Social and Historical Survey Data Series (1-6). These reports prepared by researchers from the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Minzu University of China, and local Tibetan intellectuals based on fieldwork in Tibet have provided us with valuable political, social, cultural, economic and commercial data of farming and pastoral areas of Tibet then. From these reports, it can be seen that in Tibet around the democratic reform, Sichuan brick tea, Kangxi brick tea, Yunnan bowl tea and Indian tea were all available in farming and pastoral areas. Brick tea was the most expensive, bowl tea was 50% cheaper, and Indian ball tea was the cheapest and mostly bought by the poor (Editorial Board 2009a:254). According to a survey in the 1950s, most residents in Lhasa drank Sichuan tea and Yunnan bowl tea, and records on Indian tea were rarely seen. For example, the family of Khral-pa Gsang Chasi in Medro Gongkar consumed 7-8 strips of strip tea and 15 pieces of bowl tea annually (Editorial Board 2009b:8).

Although Indian tea entered Tibet in a small quantity, the sale of Indian tea to Tibet still existed. Based on literature available, the existence of Indian tea in Tibet had three features: First, Indian tea was sold to poor families in the Qiangtang Grassland in northern Tibet; second, part of Indian tea was changed to Sichuan and Yunnan tea for sale; third, with the popularization of sweet tea, black tea used to make sweet tea was mainly from Indian tea producing areas. Let’s first look at the sale of Indian tea in northern Tibetan pastoral areas. According to a survey on Nagqu herdsman in 1958, Indian ball tea entered Tibet around 1914, when it was already popular in pastoral areas for its low price. A piece of ball tea was worth about 0.1 Tibetan silver dollar, while a piece of Kangxi brick tea worth 3 Tibetan silver dollars. However, herdsman still preferred brick tea for its taste, so poor herdsman blended ball tea with brick tea (Editorial Board 2009a:175). Rich families consumed much butter tea every day, and made butter tea from brick tea (especially large brick tea). In addition, they often drank sweet tea made from Indian black tea. In middle class families, men drank butter tea, and women drank white tea (fresh milk added to boiled water) every day; most poor families drank white tea (Editorial Board 2009a:179-182). Brick tea and bowl tea were all transported from Lhasa or Changdu, while Indian ball tea was imported directly from Kalimpong (Editorial Board 2009a:174). Since Indian tea was much cheaper than Sichuan brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea, most poor herdsman chose Indian tea.

In fact, Indian tea was sold in Shigatse and northern Tibet pastoral areas over which the Tibetan local government had weak control, and in small quantities, and the proportion delivered to Lhasa and other
central areas was less. That’s why we can hardly find traces of Indian tea in various travel notes, reports, diaries, local records, files, etc. then.

Since the 1920s, as the upper class in India, Sikkim, etc. began to learn the British habit of drinking black tea with milk, some Tibet nobles and merchants who had been to these places brought this habit back to Lhasa. In 1936, Chapman visited Tibet tycoon Tsarong’s family, and Mrs. Tsarong treated him with superb Darjeeling tea (Chapman 2004:104). Noble Bkra Shisbangphyug liked drinking sweet tea made from Indian black tea other than butter tea (Xu and Zheng 2000:56). However, drinking black tea was something new in Tibet, and rejected by the conservative power led by monastery monks. Tea used to make sweet tea was Darjeeling black tea. Since sweet tea was popular at sweet teahouses and some noble families, its consumption was very low. Sweet teahouses in Lhasa were located around the Ramoche Monastery only, and most sweet tea drinkers were small tradesmen or porters or senior officials of the Tibetan local government.

In fact, not only Sichuan and Yunnan tea were supplied to the Tibet local market, but also the tea trade between Tibet and the countries on the south piedmont of the Himalayas was always flourishing, where Tibet merchants sold tea from Mainland China to India, Bhutan, Bengal, Sikkim, etc. to make up their trade deficits with Han Chinese tea merchants.

THE SALE OF INDIAN TEA IN TIBET RESTRICTED BY THE TASTE PREFERENCE OF THE TIBETANS

The taste preference of the Tibetans for Sichuan and Yunnan tea impeded the sale of Indian tea in Tibet to a great extent. It can be seen from records of Chinese and foreigners after visit to Tibet in different periods that the Tibetans do have a preference for tea taste. While serving as commercial agent in Gyantse, McDonald sometimes entertained Tibetans with Indian tea, but he found, “The Tibetans think that Indian tea tasteless, and would add sugar to it when drinking it.” (McDonald 1937:156) This shows that Indian tea was unsuitable for making butter tea favored by the Tibetans. The observation of the Gyantse market by McDonald’s predecessor, Charles Bell, who served as commercial agent in Gyantse in 1905, also demonstrates this, “Merchants in Gyantse would open their stores every morning. I have visited this place many times. In August 1915, I went there again with my wife and the British commercial agent. My findings are as follows: Tea bags from Mainland China are displayed on the market. Alkaline earth and table salt for tea mixing are all from northern Tibet plains.” (Bell 1936:156-157) In 1867, when spy Nunn Sinha assigned by the British Indian government to Tibet for mapping entered Tibet from Gangtok, Sikkim, he felt the Tibetans’ preference for Chinese tea. He said in his records, “The Tibetans prefer Chinese brick tea to Indian tea that is relatively cheap and transported over a short distance. The Tibetans working on a gold mine told him: they thought that Indian tea was too “hot”. Whatever this meant, people always thought that only very poor ones should drink it.”(Hopkirk 1989:40)

After 1904, Britain removed the trade and tariff barrier between India and Tibet through a second invasion of Tibet, and exports of wool, borax and salt to India increased considerably. However, the Tibetan tea market was still monopolized by tea from Sichuan and Yunnan. In 1906, Captain O’Connor, the British commercial agent in Gyantse, commented in a report to the British Indian government that Indian tea could not compete with Chinese tea to occupy the Tibet market, mainly because it was not suited to the preferred taste of the Tibetans. However, he thought optimistically that Indian tea had the advantages of coming from a short distance (the distance to Darjeeling tea plantations was 1/7 of the distance between Ya’an to Lhasa), low tariff and high output, and as long as its taste was suited to the Tibetans, it would certainly replace Chinese tea. To make the Tibetans buy Indian tea and adapt to its taste, British officials even suggested setting up teahouses on major roads around Yadong to offer butter tea to passers-by freely, so as to promote Indian tea. In the meantime, the Indian Tea Association in Calcutta also presented Indian tea to the Panchen Lama, but was not sure whether the Panchen Lama would drink it. Charles Bell (1936:114) had the same understanding of this:
Before the British invasion of Lhasa in 1904, the Chinese had banned the import of Indian tea; after 1904, though Indian tea could be imported, the Tibetans still disliked it. The Tibetans thought that Chinese tea was more nourishing, healthy and tasty, so Indian tea was despised as the worst local tea. Currently, Indian tea can hardly be sold in Tibet, unless it has the same shape and smell as Chinese tea.

Liu Manqing, who lived in Tibet in his childhood, and served as envoy of the Nationalist Government in 1930, noticed while in Lhasa the Tibetans’ preference for tea taste, “The Tibetans have the deep-rooted habit of drinking Sichuan tea only, so Indian tea is yet unsalable here.” (Liu 1987:21) She also thought that Indian tea was not suited to the Tibetans due to their stubborn hobby for Sichuan brick tea.

Even in the 1940s, though the trading volume of Sichuan brick tea in Kangding was much less, goods transported from Kangding to Tibet were still mostly tea. A Kham investigation report published on Kangdao Monthly in 1943 states: “After the India-Tibet Railway reached Darjeeling, all goods imported to and exported from Tibet are gathered here; except that some tea is transported from Dajianlu, other goods are no longer connected to Dajianlu.” (Anonymous 1943)

The taste preference even affected tea choices of Tibetan-speaking people in the around-Himalaya region in South Asia. In 1900, when Ekai Kawaguchi, a Japanese monk, entered Tibet from Nepal, he drank brick tea from Mainland China all the way, showing that Indian tea was not popular in Ngari, Tibet, and the Himalaya areas of the South Asian countries. During his travel, he also met a 16-member monk caravan with 80-90 horses. They came from a monastery at the border of Ngari and Kashmir. This caravan transported dried peaches, raisins, silk fabrics and wool fabrics from Kashmir to Lhasa, and then bought tea, Buddha statues, Thangka, etc. back from Lhasa. This also shows that tea from Mainland China other than India was consumed in Kashmir then (Kawaguchi 1998:63 & 152).

Since Indian tea was not fit to the taste of Tibetans, its sales volume in Tibet remained low. Therefore, some British and Indian merchants began to imitate Sichuan brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea at tea factories in Darjeeling to cater to the Tibetans. A file of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1905 shows that some tea plantations in Darjeeling were unclear about the production process of Chinese brick tea, and could not imitate the taste of Chinese tea, so Darjeeling-imitated tea was unsalable in Tibet. In particular, Indian tea was in bulk, and unpopular in Tibet.11 Captain O’Connor, the British commercial agent in Gyantse, even suggested that Indian tea merchants sent someone to learn the tea production process in Sichuan, and then the Indian Tea Association assigned James Hutchison to explore the origin of Sichuan brick tea in 1906. Hutchison later wrote Indian Brick Tea Going to Tibet, a brochure to introduce the production process of Sichuan brick tea.12 Since the early 20th century, Indian tea imitating Kangxi brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea attempted to enter the Tibetan market with its price advantage. In the early 1940s, Kangzang Company’s General Manager Kelsang Yosi found after visiting Kalimpong that there were several tea firms for sales to Tibet run by the Indian and British in there, with two larger ones among them. One was the firm of Indian Sirang, which exchanged imitated Kangxi brick tea and Yunnan bowl tea for Tibetan wool, and made 7,500 kilograms of brick tea and 35,000 kilograms of bowl tea annually; the second was the tea plantation of British Bangka Baren, which imitated Fohai bowl tea with an annual output of 2,000 packs (Kelsang Yosi 2005:336). However, the share of Indian imitated tea on the Tibet market remained low. In 1913, Wang Chug Tsering who handled taxation affairs at the Yadong Customs said in a report that all people having tried this imitated brick tea thought that it was not as fragrant as Mainland China tea, so it wouldn’t be salable in Tibet.13

CONCLUSION

Since the late Qing dynasty, the sales volume of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet kept dropping, resulting in a Sichuan tea sales crisis in Tibet and fear of the occupation of the Tibetan tea market by Indian tea for its convenient traffic and low prices. During the slump sale of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet, Britain took various means, and even used military force to make Indian tea enter Tibet, but Indian tea was not sold in Tibet at a large scale, only sporadically. The position of Chinese tea in Tibet was never shaken.
From 1894 to 1904, the British forced the Qing government to sign a series of unequal treaties, and gained the privilege to set up trading ports in Yadong, Gyantse and Ghadak for trade with Tibet. However, due to the resolute resistance by the Qing central government and Tibetan local government, the Chinese and British sides never agreed on the sale of Indian tea to Tibet in any treaty. The attempt of the British colonists to dump Indian tea to Tibet failed.

The British dumped tea to Tibet with an original intention of exchanging cheap Indian tea for Tibetan animal products. The real attempt of the British for trade with Tibet was to get Tibet’s wool, leathers and yak tails to meet their domestic demand for textile raw materials, and thereby realize economic and political penetration into and control over Tibet. After the failed dumping, the British quickly found substitutes for tea, namely cotton fabrics, wool fabrics, soaps, needles and threads, hardware, white sugar, tobaccos, and other British and Indian products commonly seen in Tibet and Kham from the early 20th century to the 1950s. That’s why the British made a concession on the sale of tea in Tibet in these unequal treaties.

However, the sharp decline of the sales volume of Sichuan brick tea in Tibet did not result in a tea shortage in Tibet, mainly because its gap was soon filled up by Yunnan tea. The author once wrote an article on this issue (Liu 2017). In the late Ming dynasty and early Qing dynasty, due to the opening of the Yunnan-Tibet road, Yunnan tea was transported from Fohai and other tea producing areas to Tibet via Deqen in Yunnan via land. Before the Japanese occupation of Burma during World War II, the sea routes from Yunnan and Shanghai to Calcutta were smooth, so a considerable part of goods from Mainland China to Tibet were transported by sea rather than by land, thus reducing their costs greatly. The production process of Yunnan tea sold in Tibet was similar to that of Sichuan brick tea, so it could completely fill up the gap of Sichuan brick tea on the Tibet market.

The taste preference also led to the Tibetans’ love for Sichuan and Yunnan tea, and repulsion of Indian tea. The unique production process of Sichuan and Yunnan tea was the key to their unique taste. Raw materials of Sichuan tea regarded as inferior by the British were mostly old tea and tea stems. However, this tea was ideal for making butter tea with a strong flavor, which was loved by the Tibetans. Today, although different types of tea are available on the Tibet market, such as green tea, flower tea and oolong tea, Sichuan and Yunnan black tea are still the favorites of the Tibetans. In recent years, when the author was investigating the tea market in Lhasa, Tibetan retailers and individuals buying tea at several tea stores mostly wanted to buy black tea.

The sales volume of Indian tea in Tibet was very low. Bulk tea, ball tea, and imitated Sichuan and Yunnan tea were mainly consumed by poor farmers and herders in northern Tibet. Indian black tea was also available in major cities like Lhasa and Shigatse, used to make British-style sweet tea. Since the monk class resisted external sweet tea, Indian black tea did not sell well in Tibet, and was limited to the sweet teahouses near the Ramoche Monastery and some westernized noble families (Goldstein 1994:94).

After the opening of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, Sichuan brick tea was transported to Tibet in large quantities. In 1956, tea prices in Lhasa dropped by over 2/3 (Editorial Board 2005c:119). After the beginning of the Tibetan democratic reform in 1959, the Tibetan Working Committee began to restrict economic activities of private businesses and foreign merchants in Tibet due to the tight supply of materials and a currency (renminbi) depreciation (History Research Office 2005:169), and tea in Tibet was gradually run by state-owned or collective business organizations. In early June 1962, with the increase of border conflicts arising from the China-Tibet border dispute, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated, and the Tibet-India trade and traffic agreement signed by the two countries in 1954 became invalid. This was followed by China’s self-defense war against India in 1962, which terminated China-India trade contacts thoroughly (History Research Office 2005:197).

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ENDNOTES

1. For example, British scholar Alastair Lamb pointed out: “In the early 20th century, bulk trade in Tibet was still with Mainland China, and many influential Tibet big families became rich through such trade. Tea, the most important part of the Tibetan diet, is also from Mainland China; even at the peak of the crisis of the central government and Tibetan local government in 1912, the Tibetan local government had no sign of replacing Tibetan tea with Indian tea, while such replacement is a dream of the British. In many years after the withdrawal of the Younghusband expedition, the Chinese government seemed never worried about this.” (Lamb 2017:296).

2. In the literatures quoted by Booze, only the literature on Gyantse is useful. Ghadak in Ngari is remote and sparsely populated, and India-Tibet trade has remained small in scale here. The Yadong Customs is relocated in the Chumbi Valley between Tibet and Sikkim, and is the main port for British and Indian goods to enter Tibet. Booze mostly used historical literatures before the second British invasion of Tibet in 1904.

3. In Year 58 of Qing Emperor Qianlong’s reign (1793) [乾隆五十八年（1793年）], Article 29 of Imperial Regulations on Tibet Management [《钦定藏内善后章程二十九条》] was issued. In Collection of Historical Literatures on the Relationship between Tibet Local and Central Governments since the Yuan Dynasty (3), edited by China Tibetology Research Center, First Historical Archives of China, Second Historical Archives of China, Archives of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and Sichuan Provincial Archives. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House, 1994, p.813.

4. Tibetan men took copper buttons as a vogue then. In 1950s, photojournalist Chen Zonglie of the Tibet Daily witnessed on streets in Lhasa, “Men had a plait, and wore a high-collar white shirt, with a bright round copper button at the neckline.” (Chen 2005:19)


Commonwealth Office (III), internal data, History Institute of the China Tibetology Research Center, 2005, p.74.


14. For example, a report on Nagqu pastoral areas in the early 1960s states, “Before liberation, richer herdsmen purchased tea and guns from merchants in Lhasa and Yushu, and raised horses to exchange for cattle and sheep in Qinglong, Ngari, etc., reportedly in large amounts. After the highway was opened, the business organizations run by the central government in Tibet have supplied tea to these areas in large quantities, reducing such exchange greatly.” See: Survey Report on Tribes in Nagqu (那曲宗罗马学让部落调查报告). In Social and Historical Survey of the Tibetans (III), edited by Editorial Board of the Tibet Social and Historical Survey Data Series. Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House, 2009, p.37.

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