Corporate Governance and Delisting: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the delisting behavior of firms from emerging markets and how corporate governance is associated with delisting in these economies. The literature of equity delisting has been scarce and has focused mainly on firms from developed countries such as the U.S. and U.K. Using data from 23 emerging markets, I find that there is a delisting wave during the period 2008-2014. The incidence of delisting varies by type, year, and country. I also find that country-level corporate governance measured by the rule of law index and the investor protection index is inversely related to the incidence of overall delisting. This indicates that firms from countries with better rule of law or investor protection are less likely to delist their shares. I also find that governance is inversely related to involuntary delisting triggered by M&As or bankruptcy and liquidation, while governance is positively associated with the incidence of voluntary delisting via going private transactions.