# The Rising *Janus Germania*: Innovations in German Foreign and Security Policy, EU Policy and Its National Ideas[1]

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*Germany acquired a Leitbild "Janus Germania" in which the theses of both civilian power and normal great power fuse and are transformed into a thesis of "peace restoration power with power orientation". Such a transformation is attributed to the "fluid five-party system", and fragmentation increased. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) became concentrated towards the centre. This movement is reflected in the SPD's stressing of Germany's own national interests and the transfer to the CDU/CSU of the ideas of crisis prevention and comprehensive security. Segmentation decreased, and the grand coalition normalised.*

*Keywords: Leitbild (guiding principle/general orientation), civilian power, normal great power, German foreign and security policy, fluid five party system*

## PROBLEM SETTING

### Research Questions

In the 21st century, international society has experienced crises such as terrorism, civil wars, migrant crises, far-right populism, climate change and COVID19. After Brexit, more expectations are being placed on Germany as the leader of the European Union (EU) and the stronghold of liberal democracy.

Since the euro crisis, researchers have discussed a "German problem", that is, whether Germany is seeking hegemony in Europe and developing classical power politics as well as whether Germany will drive the EU (Beck, 2012; D'Ottavio, 2015). In addition, researchers have discussed Germany's nation type, international role (Miskimmon & Molthof, 2015: 67-88; D'Ottavio, 2015: 31-48), and leadership. William Paterson regarded Germany as a "reluctant Hegemon" (Paterson 2014: 170). Douglas Webber regarded Germany as an "indispensable nation" responsible for defending the euro as an economic power in Europe (Webber, 2014: 354-358). Hans Kundnani insisted that Germany has become a "geo-economic semi-Hegemon": Germany is too small to bear the burden of a full Hegemon, so it self-asserts economically but refuses to grasp military power (Kundnani, 2015: 109-114). Stephen Szabo developed the trading power concept and insisted that Germany is a "geo-economic power" that seeks to achieve political and economic aims by economic means (Szabo, 2015: 7-10, 143). Hanns Maull argued that German foreign policy since the Merkel III government is a "civilian power 2.0" (Maull, 2018: 461).

Although researchers have approached the problem from different angles, they have asserted the (supposed) orientation, role and current situation of German foreign and security policy from the perspective of a *Leitbild* (guiding principle/general orientation): a civilian power and a normal great power.

Previous studies about the *Leitbild* of German foreign policy have promulgated a dichotomy between civilian and normal great powers and have argued that Germany is either a civilian power or a normal great power (e. g. Maull, 2018; Schwarz, 2005). However, German foreign policy is inconsistent with this view.

In addition, researchers have attributed Germany's *Leitbild* to the visions of its policymakers and their politics (Rittberger, 2003: 93, 96; Allers, 2016: 520). However, since the federal constitutional court decision on 12 July 1994, a majority support in the lower chamber (*Bundesta*g) has become the precondition for military dispatches. Parliament is an arena in which the interests and ideas of a nation's society are reflected, and they are coordinated through parliamentary debates in which the interests and ideas of both parliamentarians and policymakers are represented (Wagner, 2001: 194ff). Parliamentarians cannot ignore the interests and ideas of voters because of re-election considerations; therefore, these interests and ideas are understood to be reflected in the arguments of parliamentarians. Furthermore, the author defines a nation's *Leitbild*, which affects its foreign policy in the middle and long term and defines the views of German parliamentarians to clarify the *Leitbild* of German foreign policy.

Moreover, previous studies have debated the continuity and change in German foreign policy since 1990. Some studies have overemphasised its continuous nature and neglected its changing nature (e. g. Maull, 2004: 17-23). Advocates of civilian power have claimed that political culture, i. e., the culture of restraint, and ideas decisively influence policy and are relatively stable. Consequently, they have argued tacitly that Germany has continuously been a civilian power (ibid.). However, political culture, norms and ideas are reproduced based on the accumulation of gradual changes in a nation's policy behaviours (cf. Hellmann, Baumann & Wagner, 2006: 189, 203). Others have argued that German foreign policy has changed only at the policy level, not at the idea level, and that a paradigm shift has not occurred (Allers, op. cit.; Risse, 2004: 24-31). However, because changes at the idea level were not adequately analysed with the process-tracing method that the authors used, their conclusions are incorrect.

Furthermore, the civilian power and normal great power theses are exemplified in similar ways with only very subtle differences, as reflected in the previous studies that have encountered difficulties in judging the kind of *Leitbild* an actor has. For example, both theses affirm multinationalism. However, the civilian power thesis regards it as a way of seeking the international common good over the long term, whereas the normal great power thesis regards it as a way of maximising pure national interests in the short term. In addition, both theses embrace national interests. However, whereas the civilian power thesis considers that an actor seeks national interests as an international common good over the long term (Maull, 2006: 62-76), the normal great power thesis insists that a nation seeks its pure national interests in the short term.

We can study policy changes at the idea level through a discourse analyse. Prof. Rainer Baumann and Prof. Gunther Hellmann et al. clarified the power-political transformations in German foreign policy by a discourse analysis, targeting multilateralism (Baumann 2006) and words such as self-confidence as the objects for the analysis (Hellmann et al., 2008). Patrick Mello's discourse analysis was based on a quantitative analysis; however, he clarified only the change in the frequency of words that belong to the civilian power thesis, not the inductive changes in the contents of the words nor the power-political developments in German foreign policy (Mello, 2019: 295-316).

Further, the foregoing studies have attributed changes in the German *Leitbild* to structures such as international society and political culture (Harnisch & Maull, 2001). However, these studies have considered only rarely the dynamics caused by the domestic actors in the change in foreign policy. Other studies have attributed these changes to domestication, in which the influence of domestic actors in policy decisions has increased or domestic actors have used foreign policy as an instrument to achieve their aims (Daase, 2015: 555-80). However, the studies have not clarified the decisive factor in the change in foreign policy.

**Aims, Object and Method for Analysis**

To overcome the above research problems, the author uses an approach from liberal constructivism. Thereby, he analyses *Leitbild* as a collective idea to clarify the role, orientation and changes in German foreign policy. He analyses the parliamentary debates about German military dispatches from 1994 to 2017 using a discourse analysis and especially a qualitative content analysis. This method is appropriate for an

analysis of the *Leitbild* of German foreign policy because the related debates have developed mainly around this case. The author establishes 1994 as the starting point for the analysis because the German federal constitutional court approved out-of-area German military dispatches to NATO on 7 December 1994, provided they would be deployed within multinational frameworks.

A discourse analysis describes shared ideas, interests and behaviours as they are in society. It enables us to reflect on the subtle differences between the *Leitbild* models. Additionally, this approach allows us to analyse the intersubjectivity among the actors and the reciprocal changes between policies and ideas. Furthermore, the author explains the change in *Leitbild* by scrutinising the transformation of the German party system, unlike in previous studies.

A qualitative content analysis provides high objectivity and trackability (Mayring, 2010: 49). This analysis is composed of deductive and inductive processes. In the deductive process, the author extracts the representative instances of the civilian power and normal great power theses as deductive peculiarities from the existing studies. Next, in the inductive process, the author extracts characteristic words or phrases from the parliamentary debates that relate to German foreign policy and labels them as inductive peculiarities. Thereafter, he analyses the parliamentary debates surrounding these deductive and inductive peculiarities (Mayring, 2002: 83-5). The author can analyse the policy developments inductively, whether they fit a civilian power or a power-political normal great power thesis, by using discourse and qualitative content analyses.

The author describes the civilian power and normal great power theses as the *Leitbild* models and a nation's real foreign policy ideas as the (real) *Leitbild*. The *Leitbild* models are Max Weber's ideal types, and the author judges how closely an actor's (real) *Leitbild* fits each *Leitbild* model. The actor's (real) *Leitbild* is the conglomerate of the peculiarities from *Leitbild* I to VI (Fig. 1).

**FIGURE 1**
**CONFIGURATION OF THE *LEITBILD***



The author establishes AX as the peculiarities of a civilian power model (*Leitbild* I) and BX as those of a normal great power model (*Leitbild* II). In addition, he identifies the inductive peculiarities found in the debates about the military dispatches to Bosnia (1995) as CX, the military dispatches to Kosovo (1999) as DX, the military dispatches to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF; 2001) as EX, the military non-dispatches to Iraq (2002–3) as FX, the military dispatches to Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II; UNIFILII; 2006) as GX, the military dispatch to OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom)/ISAF (2007) as HX, the military non-dispatches to Libya (2011) as IX, the weapon supply to the Kurdish people as JX (2014), the military dispatch to Syria (2015) as KX and the military dispatches to Mali (2016–7) as LX ($1 \leqq X \leqq \infty$). If the meanings of these peculiarities are close to those of the civilian power model, then the author calls them *Leitbild* III; if the meanings of these peculiarities are close to those of the normal great power model, he calls them *Leitbild* IV. If the meanings of these peculiarities include those of both the civilian power and normal great power models, then he calls them *Leitbild* V, and, if the meanings of these peculiarities include neither of the *Leitbild* models, then he calls them *Leitbild* VI.

Furthermore, the author evaluates the extent to which each peculiarity is shared within German society by judging the extent to which it is reflected in the debates of the parliamentarians of two large parties, the

Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and those of the small parties, i.e., the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Coalition 90/the Greens (subsequently, the Greens) and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/the leftist party.

**TABLE 1**
**PERCENTAGE OF ELECTION VOTES & SHARE OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS HELD BY THE MAIN PARTIES FROM 1994–2021**

| Election Year (Period) | 1994 (13) | 1998 (14) | 2002 (15) | 2005 (16) | 2009 (17) | 2013 (18) | 2017 (19) | 2021 (20) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDU/CSU | 41.4 (43.8) | 35.1 (36.6) | 38.5 (41.1) | 35.2 (36.8) | 33.8 (38.4) | 41.5 (49.3) | 32.9 (34.7) | 24.1 (26.7) |
| SPD | 36.4 (37.5) | 40.9 (44.5) | 38.5 (41.6) | 34.2 (36.2) | 23 (23.5) | 25.7 (30.6) | 20.5 (21.6) | 25.7 (28) |
| FDP | 6.9 (7.0) | 6.2 (6.4) | 7.4 (7.8) | 9.8 (9.9) | 14.6 (15) | 4.8 (0) | 10.7 (11.3) | 11.5 (12.5) |
| Coalition 90/The Greens | 7.3 (7.3) | 6.7 (7) | 8.6 (9.2) | 8.1 (8.3) | 10.7 (10.9) | 8.4 (10) | 8.9 (9.4) | 14.8 (16.1) |
| PDS/The leftist party | 4.4 (4.5) | 5.1 (5.4) | 4 (0.3) | 8.7 (8.8) | 11.9 (12.2) | 8.6 (10.1) | 9.2 (9.7) | 4.9 (5.3) |
| AfD (Alternative for Germany) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 4.7 (0) | 12.6 (13.3) | 10.3 (11.3) |

(Created by the author; the values are percentages. The percentage of election votes are the results from second votes. The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of the share of parliamentary members)

According to Table 1, which shows the share of parliamentary seats held by the main parties during the federal elections from 1994 to 2021, the share of parliamentary seats held by the two large parties ranged approximately from 73% to 83%, except for Period 17, 19 and 20. Therefore, during this time period, approximately 70–80% of the electorate, namely over two-thirds, might share an idea, except in Period 17, and the author gives an evaluation of ○ as the retention degree within society for that peculiarity. In Period 17, when a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of the two large parties, the author gives a score of ○−, and the author gives a score of ○ to the peculiarity, if it is shared by the two large parties and one small party.

If a peculiarity is shared by one large party and at least one small party, the author gives it an evaluation of ○△. However, this combination results in, e.g., 45–47% of the parliamentary seats in Period 16 (2005–2009), 34.4–53.4% in Period 17 and 40.6–59.4% in Period 18 (2013–2017). Therefore, the author gives an evaluation of ○△+ to a peculiarity if it is shared by approximately an additional 50% of all the parliamentarians, i. e., by those of the CDU/CSU with one small party except for the PDS, or the SPD and two small parties in Period 13 (1994–1998); the SPD and one small party or the CDU/CSU and two small parties in Period 14 (1998–2002); one large and one small party except for the PDS in Period 15 (2002–2005); one large and two small parties in Period 16; the CDU/CSU and one small party or the SPD, the FDP, and the Greens or the leftist party in Period 17; and the CDU/CSU alone or the SPD and two small parties in Period 18. If ○, ○− or ○△+ are given to a peculiarity, then this means that that peculiarity is minimally shared by the majority and the author judges it is fixed in society.

When one idea is accepted by one-third of voters, a cascade happens in which spontaneous acceptance for the idea occurs like an avalanche (Oyane, 2013: 23). If the share of a peculiarity by one large party exceeds 33.3% of all parliamentary seats, the author gives a score of △ as the retention degree within society to that peculiarity. However, because the shares of parliamentary seats for the SPD were only 23.5% in Period 17 and 30.6% in Period 18, if a peculiarity is shared by the SPD parliamentarians in these periods,

the author gives a score of $\triangle-$ as the retention degree within society to that peculiarity. If a peculiarity is found in the statements of the parliamentarians of one or two small parties, then the author gives $\triangle\times$ as the retention degree within society to that peculiarity.

This article explains the change of Germany's *Leitbild* from that of the party system. The composition of a party system can be expressed by a 2×2 chart comprising, on the one hand, the format and mechanism and, on the other hand, the party concurrence at the election and parliamentary levels (Table 2).

## TABLE 2
## ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

|  | Party concurrence at the election level | Party concurrence at the parliamentary level |
|---|---|---|
| Format | Effective number of parties (ENP) and magnitude correlation (fragmentation); degree of convergence and imbalance | |
| Mechanism | Ideological distance among parties (polarisation); intensity and orientation of concurrence among parties (segmentation) | Openness of parties' coordination at the level of parliament and governments |

(Based on Detterbeck, K., 2011: 145 and Niedermayer O., 2008: 9-35.)

Fragmentation is the ENP and relative magnitude of the correlation among the parties.[2] Polarisation denotes the programmatic and ideological differences among parties. These differences are composed of a social state axis of "social justice-liberal market" and a cultural axis of GAL (green, alternative, and libertarianism)- TAN (traditional, authority, and nationalism). Segmentation is the degree of the parties' coordination and competition and the occurrence of feasible coalitions within the realm of theoretically possible coalitions.

## Leitbild as an Idea and the Complementary Relationship Among Ideas, Discourse and Policy Behaviours

*Leitbild* is an idea constituted of socially shared ideas about future goals as normative values that regulate criteria, norm visions and orientations for behaviour as well as the recognition of the current situation that includes power and material interests (Schneider, 1992: 4f; Giesel, 2007: 74f).

The idea of a desired future and the recognition of current situations are dialectically tied, and the former influences the latter. Therefore, *Leitbild* functions as an idea about goals and a cognitive map with which an actor recognises and interprets a current situation and which defines their behaviour and goals (Schneider, 1992: 4f; Münch, 2007: 17). *Leitbild* clarifies the content of the rules and experienced knowledge shared with other actors, and it forms a foundation for actors' knowledge and behavioural motives. It also establishes the implicit and explicit conditions for policy implementation.

Moreover, as a focal point, this idea combines the intentions that actors can perform or desire, their experimental knowledge and their causal and normative beliefs. Therefore, this idea functions as a prism through which actors' beliefs and material elements are reflected.

An actor judges requests from the outside through this prism and forms an idea about their role within the framework of a value order that is intersubjectively shared (Harnisch & Maull, 2001: 3).

Furthermore, this idea functions as a political orientation when it evolves into the dominant interpretation for behaviours in society. It provides an orientation for actors by binding the causal and normative interpretations of situations; by leading to a simple, clear, and transmittable basic template among varied interpretations; by narrowing down competing perceptions or obscuring them under a single dominant discourse; and by developing competing perceptions into the dominant interpretation of the pending problem and its disposal (Kohler-Koch, 2001: 159f). It also orients an actor's behaviour when they are confused during routine tasks, when they experience something for the first time, or when they adapt to

new situations. Further, *Leitbild* provides a strategy and methods for how one leads policies towards specific aims, and it determines behavioural strategic priorities (Hörnlein, 2000: 36-40.; Giesel, 2007: 75).

The peculiarities that constitute *Leitbild* provide the parameters for the behavioural principles in specific political contexts, and actors behave within its parameters (Maull, 2014: 125).

*Leitbild* is a collective of ideas. Ideas are causal beliefs about economic, societal and political phenomena that are indivisible from interests and power (Schmidt, 2010: 58). They are produced in our minds and are connected to the material world only by our interpretations of our surroundings (Béland & Cox, 2010: 3). When ideas are internalised and embraced as "ours" in society, they transform into common content there. The ideas in a country provide its orientation and a framework for its behaviours, and these ideas control the perception of society about national interests rather than determine them. Ideas are the main reason for policy changes under certain institutional and political conditions (Béland, 2009: 702).

Ideas are promoted by policy entrepreneurs. These are politicians who invigorate and reinterpret the existing meaning structure (Price & Jeffery, 2001: 693, 697f). They impact political power relations and policy decisions, leading to interpretations of specific ideas as appropriate and dominant as well as the setting of specific goals and means to be accepted in society by (re-)constituting the ideas as coalition magnets. Coalition magnets are the ideas with which policy entrepreneurs can reconstitute interests, mobilise supporters and form advocacy coalitions (Béland & Cox, 2016: 428f, 432f, 441).

Ideas, discourses and policy behaviours complement and influence each other (Risse, 2007: 52, 60). Ideas provide the ultimate grounds for discourse, and discourse determines which idea elements are (non)activated (Nadoll, 2003: 172). Ideas limit policy behaviours through discourse, and policy behaviours reconstitute ideas through discourse. Ideas submit patterns of behaviours by a country and their legitimations via discourse (Ibid: 171f).

Discourse is a series of ideas that carry new rules, values, and customs as well as the resource through which actors create and legitimise ideas. Discourse includes reciprocal processes through which ideas are transmitted in policymaking or political communications (Schmidt, 2010: 56). In discourse, not objective reality, society's interpretation of reality is reflected. A series of social and political ideas and material interests are proposed and arranged in discourse (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004: 206). Actors change their own insights, values, and orientations about policy legacy through discourse (Ibid: 188). Discourse reconstitutes and legitimises the idea elements about certain behaviours. In addition, discourse influences the possibility of policy behaviours, limits the framework for them and evaluates them (Ibid: 170). On the other hand, discourse is reproduced and transformed by policy behaviours.

Various groups develop their own discourses and try to set specific ideas as dominant in society. A dominant discourse limits opposition against the government's behaviours. A branch discourse remarks on policies that are unsuitable or unconventional in society. When a discourse has repercussions in society, it becomes dominant. However, if it is criticised heavily, it becomes a branch discourse. Both dominant and branch discourses share basic codes at a much deeper, more abstract level (Wæver, 2005: 36). Even though a branch faction may clash with the mainstream, it can use issues, vocabularies and concepts that are similar to those of the mainstream. Branch factions try to siphon off supporters from the mainstream, e.g., by inserting a discourse that includes the same concepts as one from the mainstream. Even if internalisation appears and such competitions end, the (re-)crystallisation of a dominant discourse is always latently opened (Nadoll, 2003: 176).

Discourse varies depending on institutional contexts. An institutional context, such as its polity, affects discourse by factors such as who talks to whom about what and where. In compound polities such as Germany, in which governing activities tend to be dispersed among multiple authorities, the coordinative discourse among many actors tends to be much more elaborate than is the communicative discourse to the general public (Schmidt, 2009: 136) because the outcomes of negotiations are difficult to transmit to citizens when these outcomes are agreed upon through compromises among the policy actors without threatening these compromises.

A coordinative discourse is formed by politicians who produce and legitimise policy ideas so they can coordinate the consensus for those ideas. A communicative discourse is formed by those who sit at the core of policy communications, and it is the means by which politicians persuade citizens that a policy idea

developed in a coordinative discourse is required and appropriate (Ibid: 135). The author analyses the German case; therefore, he analyses coordinative discourses in parliament.

Ideas change most readily at critical junctures. These are defined as relatively brief historical moments when the possibility increases that selection by actors will influence the outcomes of interest. Critical junctures often arise due to external events. When the crises and policy faults that challenge existing norms are brought to the forefront, doubts increase in society about existing policies, and the quantity of information contradicting the existing norms reaches an unbearable level. Then, a new meaning structure gains political influence and is internalised in society (Price & Jeffery, 2001: 693).

A meaning structure transforms more quickly through effective transactions at critical junctures by policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs can deal with such pressures for transformation borne by critical junctures with surface changes, i.e., they grant new meaning to existing ideas by reconstituting and activating dormant ideas (Nadoll, 2003: 175). Conversely, the government can veer away from the basis of existing ideas and reinterpret them without giving them any legitimations in the parliamentary debates. However, if society cannot agree with such treatments, lacking grounding in the ideas, doubt occurs against the existing idea and decisions, the demand for the new idea increases, and the old existing ideas and policies are withdrawn eventually (Ibid: 171, 176). Such transformations appear wide and continuous, even if the domestic pressures that promote new ideas and policies disappear (Harnisch & Maull, 2001: 145).

## LEITBILD MODELS OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

### Peculiarities of the Leitbild Models

In the deductive process of a qualitative content analysis, the author extracted the peculiarities of the civilian power and normal great power theses. The results are as follows (Table 3):

**TABLE 3**
**PECULIARITIES OF THE *LEITBILD* MODELS**

| Leitbild I: civilian power | Leitbild II: normal great power |
|---|---|
| A1) Value orientation as a motive for action (Kirste, 1998: 45) | B1) Strong pursuit of national interests based on cost-and-benefit considerations (Le Gloannec, 2004: 28) |
| A2) Antimilitarism (Duffield, 1999: 780)<br>  a) Scepticism about military power ("never again")<br>  b) Emphasis on non-military means in crisis settlement/promotion of cooperative security/worldwide construction of democracy/good governance | B2) Crisis management by military power (Rittberger 2003: 93) / Acknowledgement of military power as a power resource |
| A3) Multilateralism/supranationalism ("never alone") (Maull 2001: 652)/promotion of interest through interdependency/promotion of deepening and enlarging regimes and institutions | B3) Refusal of binding sovereignty (Von Bredow, 2003: 9)<br>  a) Autonomy and subjectivity<br>  b) Unilateralism |
| A4) Culture of restraint I (Maull 2001: 659) | B4) End of taboo against specific foreign actions from historical considerations (Bahr 2003: 137) |
| A5) Culture of restraint II (Price, 2000: 220) | B5) Maximisation of national interests using international institutions (Von Bredow, 2003: 10) |
| A6) Promotion of global rule of law | B6) Disregard of international law/ UN |

| A7) Self-confidence I (Kirste, 1998: 54) | B7) Self-confidence II <br> (Von Bredow, 2003: 12) |
|---|---|
| A8) Promotion of human rights (Rittberger, 2003: 89) | B8) *n/a* |
| A9) Exclusion of social and economic imbalances (Rittberger, 2003: 93) | B9) Development assistance depending on security (Rittberger, 1999) |
| A10) *n/a* | B10) Sense of equal rights (Hacke, 2002: 99f) |
| A11) *n/a* | B11) Balancing |

(Based on the aforementioned literature, created by the author)

A1. means a norm orientation along which actors behave, even if they sacrifice their own interests.

A2a. means strict self-constraint against military usage.

A2b. means emphasising crisis resolution through non-military and diplomatic means.

A3. means multilateralism and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions.

A4. means a self-controlled use of military power and policy behaviours based on historical contexts such as the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) atrocities.

A5. means giving priority to a European identity, international public goods and EU interests over the long term, even if the actor sacrifices national identity and interests. It means also reflexive leadership avoidance behaviour.

A6. means promoting global governance in law and a monopoly of military force by the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

A7. means actively engaging in civilising international relations along a civilian power thesis.

A8. means supporting individual and collective rights.

A9. means correcting global social and economic inequalities.

B1. means neglecting norms and maximising short-term national interests and power based on cost-benefit considerations.

B2. means the crisis resolution idea of using military power positively and as a resource for maximising an actor's power.

B3a. means avoiding the restriction of actions by not belonging to multinational organisations and not taking on a burden.

B3b. means to seek subjective and autonomous behaviour.

B4. means to abolish the taboo consciousness based on the historical context.

B5. means maximising national interests by joining international institutions because of the ability to acquire relative independence and institutionalise national interests.

B6. means disregarding global governance in law and avoiding an overestimation of the UN.

B7. means taking greater responsibility for the formation and maintenance of an international order along the normal great power orientation.

B9. means promoting development assistance by an actor to acquire their own security.

B10. means a sense of equality with allied partners and the USA, based on which the actor requests equal status and rights.

B11. means correcting power imbalances and acquiring international influence by forming a countervailing power with others against the Hegemon.

    In setting the categories of the *Leitbild* I and II, the author adds the theoretical features of liberalism and idealism to the former and those of (neo)realism to the latter as their peculiarities because of theoretical affinities. These features are common in the rational theories. Peculiarities that have the same number under the different *Leitbild* models (e.g., A1 and B1) are essentially in opposing relationships with each other. There are no counterparts to A8, B10 and B11.

# INNOVATIONS AND THEIR BASES IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

## Idea Innovations in the German Leitbild

Based on the aforementioned extracted peculiarities, the author performed the inductive process of qualitative content and discourse analyses. In this chapter, the author submits those results and explains the bases for the transformations in the *Leitbild* of German foreign policy from the aspect of the party system.

Seen from a macro level, the ideas of the civilian power thesis in the real *Leitbild* transformed, whereas some ideas dissolved and some matured and heightened their retention degree within society. In contrast, those of the normal great power thesis in the *Leitbild* solidified, and their share in the *Leitbild* increased and heightened their retention degree in society.

The composition of the real *Leitbild* changed first from a state with many ideas of *Leitbild* I and III to one in which the *Leitbild* lost *Leitbild* III. Whereas the real *Leitbild* maintained *Leitbild* I as it transformed, the ideas of *Leitbild* II and IV shared superiority over those of *Leitbild* I, and the share of *Leitbild* V increased in the *Leitbild*. Below, the author discusses the micro-level changes in the real *Leitbild*. For each peculiarity, the author shows the changes in its content and the retention degree in society as below.

Accordingly to express the changes of the retention degree in society, the author uses the categories of weakened (↓), deepened (↑), partially deepened (↗), partially weakened (↘), vanished (×) and no change/unclear (一) compared with the status at the time of the Bosnian War in 1995.

> *A1. **Value orientation as a motive for action** ( 一 )*
> *B1. **Strong pursuit of national interests** (↗) ( ↘) (↗)*
> *C1. **Legitimation of military dispatch according to the emphasis of values** ( ↘) ( × )*

As Göring-Eckardt (Greens) criticised the ISIS terror attacks in France in 2015 as an attack against our common values (*Deutscher Bundestag. Stenographischer Bericht*, [subsequently DBT. StenBer]; 2. 12. 2015: 13889, 13891), politicians continued to emphasise values. However, the author cannot assert that value orientations determined the actions of politicians as an independent factor.

In the Bosnian War, only the politicians of the CDU/CSU and the FDP emphasised the search for national interests. Foreign Minister Kinkel (FDP) legitimised the military dispatch to Bosnia because it affected the German self-interest (DBT. StenBer, 30. 6. 1995: 3956). However, since the Schröder government, the right faction of the SPD had also begun to stress purely German national interests. SPD Secretary-General Müntefering hoped, in 2002, that Germany would pursue German interests with self-confidence as a normal nation (Ibid, 29. 10. 2002: 74). In addition, Schockenhoff (CDU) insisted, in 2006, that a military dispatch to Lebanon was a means by which Germany could maximise its national interests (Ibid, 19. 9. 2006: 4813f).

Furthermore, C1 as *Leitbild* V appeared in the debates since the Bosnian War until the Merkel II government, which legitimised military dispatches based on values such as peace and liberty. In the Bosnian War, C1 acquired the retention degree of ○△＋ in society. Schäuble (CDU) insisted on protecting peace and freedom through military dispatches in an emergency (Ibid, 30. 6. 1995: 3970). As such, idea B1 is fixed in the German *Leitbild*.

> *A2a) **Wide scepticism against military action** (↓) (↗) (↓)*
> *   b) **Emphasis on non-military means of crisis settlement** (↗)*
> *D1) **Prevention I** (↗) ( × )*
> *G1) **Role of mediator I** (↗)*
> *G2) **Role of mediator II** (↗)*
> *B2) **Crisis management by military power/acknowledgement of military power as a power resource** (↗)*
> *C2) **Solidarity with allied partners** (↘) (↗)*
> *C3) **Trust** (↘) (↗)*
> *E2) **Comprehensive security concept** (↗) ( × )*
> *G4) **Comprehensive measures/strategy (whole/comprehensive/overall approaches)** ( 一 )*

### H1) Networked security (↗)
### L2) Ertüchtigung (training) strategy (一)

The PDS and its successor, the leftist party, consistently advocated for antimilitarism. Lafontaine (leftist party) denied that war was an appropriate means of fighting against terrorism (Ibid: 12730). However, A2a dissolved in the German *Leitbild*, and its retention degree within society became low.

At the time of the Kosovo War, all parliamentarians except for those aligned with the PDS acquired the crisis control vision of using military power as the last resort, and they have maintained this stance since then (Ibid, 25. 3. 1999: 2427). The retention degree in society for B2 has consequently been ○. Politicians have legitimised military dispatches since the Bosnian War by appealing to C2 and C3. Glos (CSU) legitimised the military dispatch in 1995 because allied partners asked Germany for solidarity (Ibid, 30. 6. 1995: 3983). Defence Minister von der Leyen insisted, in 2015, that Germany was a trusted partner and should show solidarity militarily with its partners (Ibid, 2. 12. 2015: 13888).

However, politicians prioritise non-military means in crisis resolution. The SPD and the Greens began to emphasise conflict prevention and peace building in 1998 (Nakagawa, 2017: 105ff). During the Kosovo War, high retention degrees for A2b and D1 as *Leitbild* III (both ○△+) in society were observed. As a reflection of D1, Erler (SPD) argued for the necessity of conflict prevention (Ibid, 15. 4. 1999: 2651f). D1 then disappeared as it was incorporated into E2.

After 9/11, the Schröder government formed E2, which was a crisis resolution vision that used both non-military and military means. Chancellor Schröder (SPD) embraced the pursuit of global social equity through economic assistance, environmental protection and the promotion of human rights as preventive and comprehensive security measures, in addition to taking military action against violence (Ibid, 29. 10. 2002: 57f). E2 was absorbed into the ideas G4 and H1.

Around E2, an "idea transfer" named "emulation" occurred from the Greens and the SPD to the CDU/CSU (Nakagawa, 2017: 106f; cf. interview with Mr. Vietz, 9. October 2017). "Emulation" means to add a new contrivance while following the base. As a result, the CDU/CSU acquired a crisis resolution view that resembled E2 and used various means to further it, such as military action, democratisation and intercultural dialogue (DBT. StenBer, 29. 10. 2002: 118). Furthermore, since the Merkel I government, the CDU/CSU has produced H1. Under this concept, the category of crisis prevention crosses over into security by military, police, and intelligence means as well as by development assistance including cultural dialogue and economy policy (cf. Merkel, 2006). At the same time, the CDU/CSU has emphasised non-military conflict resolution through nation-building, combined with the orientation of a normal great power. E1 as *Leitbild* V is an example (see below).

In the Merkel III government, aid such as arms, military training, and development in the non-military sector were tied together under L2 and given to latent conflict regions to maintain order. *Ertüchtigung* was the strategy by which they could ask donor nations to assist with self-help (Ibid, 12. 5. 2016: 16803).

As a result – under E2, G4 and H1 – the large parties established a consensus for a crisis control vision that fuses crisis prevention and peace restoration, and a series of non-military and military means are regarded as continuous conflict resolution operations. Peace restoration operation means seamless operations ranging from treatments against situations that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) considers threats against international peace and security by military powers to peace making, peace keeping, peace enforcement and peace building (Hoshino 2004: 32, 36f).

Since the Lebanon dispatch, G1 as *Leitbild* III and G2 as *Leitbild* V have developed. As an example of a debate in which G1was reflected, Kiesewetter (CDU) claimed that, in the military dispatch to Mali, the German government became a "sincere mediator" because it made diplomatic efforts such as engaging in dialogue (DBT. StenBer, 13. 1. 2016: 14613). As a reflection of G2, Lamers (CDU) stated that there was a chance to preserve Germany's status as a mediator in the Lebanon dispatch because Israel and Lebanon wanted Germany to participate (Ibid, 20. 9. 2006: 4840).

As such, A2a dissolved, whereas A2b, E2, G4, and H1 as *Leitbild* V and B2 are solidified in the German *Leitbild*.

*A3) Multilateralism/supranationalism* (↘) (↗)
*A5) Culture of restraint II* ( ─ )
*B3) Refusal of binding sovereignty*
　　*a) unilateralism* (↗) (↘) */b) autonomy and subjectivity* (↗) (↘)
*B5) Maximisation of national interests using international institutions* (↗) (↘) (↗)
*C4) Legitimisation of a military dispatch by emphasising multilateralism* (↗) (↘)

Reflexive leadership avoidance behaviour, which A5 connotes, was still observed in 1995. Gysi (PDS) warned that Germany sought "Europe for Germany" instead of "Germany for Europe", because Chancellor Kohl clarified that Germany would undertake the primary roles in European political and economic affairs (Ibid, 30. 6. 1995: 3978f). Europe for Germany promulgates the view that German identity and interests should be prioritised over European ones; Germany for Europe indicates a contrary view. However, A5 has weakened since the Schröder government.

Certainly, Germany has maintained a position of multinationalism. Chancellor Schröder (SPD) praised the outcome of the Berlin EU Council in which the EU leaders finally prioritised their common responsibility over their individual interests (Ibid, 26. 3. 1999: 2574). In his speech, A3 was seen. However, after 9/11, German society began to strengthen B5. Many politicians argued that Germany had to seek its own national interests such as influence, security and economic interests in multinational organisations. Chancellor Merkel (CDU) argued that Germany could maximise its own interests within multinational institutions (Ibid, 20. 9. 2006: 4832).

Furthermore, C4 as *Leitbild* V, which legitimised military dispatches based on multinationalism, has appeared since the Bosnian War. Lamers (CDU) argued in the discussion on the Iraq War, in 2003, that Germany was isolated by the refusal of a military dispatch to Iraq and that she should send troops to Iraq (Ibid, 14. 11. 2002: 549f).

Moreover, B3 appeared. During the Iraq War, Chancellor Schröder insisted, as the manifestation of B3a, that, even if the UNSC decided to take an enforcement measure, Germany would never deploy its military to Iraq. Additionally, the SPD and the Greens radicalised the consciousness of B3b, insisting on independence from the USA. Schröder stated, "It is decided in Berlin about the existential questions of the German nation, and nowhere else" (Ibid, 13. 9. 2002: 25583). In 2011, when Germany unilaterally allowed German soldiers who had engaged in the NATO-Atalanta operation to leave the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Polenz (CDU) said that "to be an allied partner does not mean that Germany has to participate in all NATO operations. Otherwise, NATO decides everything and we participate" (Ibid, 18. 3. 2011: 11145).

As such, whereas A3 and A5 are weakened, B5 and C4 as *Leitbild* V are solidified, and B3 sometimes rises to the surface in the German *Leitbild*. Various ideas are fixed under the position of multilateralism.

*A4) Culture of restraint I* (↓) (↗) (↘)
*B4) End of the taboo against specific foreign actions from historical considerations* (↘) (↑)
*C5) Legitimising military dispatches from the historical context* (↘) (✕)
*J1) Destruction of the taboo and legitimisation of weapon supply from credit* (↗) (─)
*J2) ── from the historical context* (↗) (─)
*J3) ── from the aspect of human rights* (↗) (─)

Germany steadily destroyed the taboo consciousness she had obtained from her historical context. Policy entrepreneurs refrained from dispatching the military to places that had been previously occupied by the NSDAP under the Kohl-doctrine. In the Bosnian War in 1995, however, they sent Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance fighters and medical teams to Croatia and weakened A4 in Germany. In addition, as Fischer (Greens) noted, a culture of restraint was the refusal of power politics, and it was meant not only to reflect a historical context rather than solidarity with allied partners, but also to refuse dispatching the military (Ibid, 30. 6. 1995: 3973f). However, for Foreign Minister Steinmeier (SPD) and Müller (Greens) in 2006, a culture of restraint meant only forbidding the destruction of taboos from the historical context

and taking prudent actions (Ibid, 19. 9. 2006: 4799.; DBT. StenBer, 20. 9. 2006: 4830); it no longer meant the forbidding of military dispatches.

In the Bosnian War, B4 already existed in the views of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, with a high retention degree in society (○△＋). Schäuble (CDU) argued that it was arrogant to say that "others send the military, but we do not because of the horrors during Hitler's time" (Ibid, 19. 6. 2006: 4813).

Furthermore, Germany regarded it as taboo to engage in conflicts in which Israel participated or to dispatch the military to the Middle East because of the context of the Holocaust. However, in 2006, Germany destroyed this taboo and sent troops to Lebanon to engage in a conflict in which Israel participated for the first time since WWII. Parliamentarians legitimised the Lebanon dispatch through C5: precisely because Germany had the historical onus of the NSDAP did it have a moral responsibility to intervene in a war in which Israel was involved and send troops there. Schockenhoff (CDU) explained that the German military contribution was appropriate from the aspect of Germany's special historical situation (Ibid, 19. 6. 2006: 4813). That was a reinterpretation of history.

Moreover, German society had a taboo against supplying weapons to war regions because of its historical context. In 2014, when the issue arose of whether Germany should supply weapons to Kurdish forces for the fight against ISIS, the parliamentarians violated the taboo and legitimised the supply of weapons from B4, J1, J2 and J3. B4 was found in Defence Minister von der Leyen (CDU)'s statement that it is more important to violate the taboo and discuss the question openly than to remain firm on the standpoint of whether Germany should supply the weapons (Vornbäumen, 2014: 45). J1 and J2 were seen in Hasselfeldt (CSU)'s statement that, if the Germans had learnt from their own history, Germany would not be credible if she refused to help stop ISIS (DBT. StenBer, 1. 9. 2014: 4435). J3 was found when Arnold (SPD) legitimised the supply of weapons to Kurdish forces from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Ibid, 1. 9. 2014: 4442). As such, whereas A4 dissolved, B4 is fixed in the *Leitbild*.

> **A6) Promotion of the global rule of law** (↗) (↘) (↗)

> **B6) Disregard of international law/the UN** (↘) (↗) (↘)

All parties emphasise international governance in law. Certainly, in the Iraq War, Chancellor Schröder intended to neglect the UNSC's decision in the case of compulsory treatment against Iraq. However, Germany has intended generally to form an international order, mainly through the UN. The Fischer plan designated that Kosovo would be governed by the UN after the war. After the Iraq War, Germany, together with France, sought the formation of order in Iraq under the UN. Except for the Kosovo War, Germany has emphasised the UNSC mandate as a prerequisite for military dispatches. The SPD and the Greens have insisted on the monopoly of worldwide forces by the UN (e.g., ibid, 16. 11. 2001: 19864). As such, A6 has rooted in the German *Leitbild*.

> **A7) Self-confidence I** (—)

> **B7) Self-confidence II** (↗) (↘)

> **C6) Legitimisation of conflict resolution using military power from the intention to form and maintain an international order** (↗)

> **G3) Intention and capability to embrace heavier responsibilities for international order II** (↗) (↘) (↗)

In the Bosnian dispatch, B7's retention degree in society was △; however, it deepened towards ○ during the Iraq War. On the other hand, the retention degree of A7 in society remained △×. Lamers (CDU) insisted, in 2002, that Germany should realise important opportunities to form an international order through the recovery of German-American relations (Ibid, 14. 11. 2002: 550).

In the Bosnian War, C6 appeared, which allows the use of military power in conflict resolution for the formation and maintenance of an international order. Foreign Minister Kinkel (FDP) legitimised Germany's use of military power by claiming that Germany would contribute to an international order (Ibid, 30. 6. 1995: 3957). In the Iraq War, Economic Assistance and Development Minister (Development Minister) Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) argued that Germany should impose an international order through a crisis resolution that includes military means (Ibid, 13. 9. 2002: 25615). However, C6 diminished thereafter.

Since the military dispatch to Lebanon, the Greens, FDP, and SPD politicians have argued G3 as *Leitbild* V, advocating for Germany to assume an exemplary role in forming an international order and placing more weight on non-military than military means in crisis control, different from B7. As the manifestation of G3, Künast (Greens) insisted, in 2007, that Germany should internationally promote policy changes that place more weight on non-military crisis control (Ibid, 12. 10. 2007: 12358). While A7 and B7 disappeared after the Libya case, while G3 is fixed in the *Leitbild*.

   **A8) Promotion of human rights**  (↘)  (↗)

   **C7) Legitimising military dispatches from the aspect of human rights**  (↗)  (↘)  (↗)

C7 is the idea that military dispatches are legitimised from the aspect of human rights. All main parties stressed A8. However, A8 began to be emphasised in the style of C7. Vaatz (CDU) argued, in 2002, "Anti-terrorism war and the re-instatement of human rights are the front and back of the same coin" (Ibid, 15. 11. 2002: 660) and supported military dispatches. In the Libya case, Development Minister Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) criticised the default R2P position by the German government in that it cast abstentions towards the UNSC resolutions about the enforcement measures against Libya (Ibid, 18. 3. 2011: 11145). As such, A8 and C7 as *Leitbild* V are solidified in the German *Leitbild*.

   **A9) Exclusion of social and economic imbalances**  (↗)  (↘)  (↗)

   **B9) Development assistance depending on security**  (↗)

   **E1) Achievement of international common goods and national interests through non-military crisis resolution means**  (↗)

   **L1) Security depending on development assistance**  (─)

Since the Kosovo War, left-wing politicians have stressed A9. Development Minister Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) stressed development assistance as a means for crisis prevention and global social justice (Ibid, 13. 9. 2002: 25615f). Since the post-9/11 dispatch, politicians have stressed A9 in combination with B2 under E2. At the same time, E1 appeared, which seeks both international common goods and national interests through non-military means. Ruck (CSU) insisted that, by assisting with development in the Middle East, they could promote not only interests there, but also purely German national interests such as peace and security (Ibid, 20. 9. 2006: 4842).

Development Minister Wieczorek-Zeul discussed accomplishing the 0.7% target of a development assistance contribution to the world's citizens alongside Germany's own security by eliminating terrorism's resources (Ibid, 16. 11. 2001: 19873). The insistence of E1 by the SPD's left faction meant its rightward swing.

Furthermore, SPD politicians strengthened B9 in the Merkel III government. However, in the Mali dispatch, they insisted on L1 as *Leitbild* V, which legitimises military dispatches from the viewpoint that security was needed as a prerequisite for development, and development and security were mutually complementary. In L1, A9 and development assistance were stressed more than security, unlike in B9. Kofler (SPD) legitimated the German military dispatch to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by insisting that the promotion of development and security was indispensable and that the achievement of security was needed to promote state-building in Mali (Ibid, 14. 1. 2016, S. 14701).

On the other hand, since the Merkel I government, with Ruck's (CSU) slogan, "development and security are the front and the back of the same coin" (Ibid, 20. 9. 2006: 4842), the CDU/CSU has presented a vision that development assistance prevents terrorism and ensures the security of both the Middle East and Germany as the manifestation of B9 and E1. A9, B9, and E1 as *Leitbild* V are solidified in the German *Leitbild*.

   **B10) Sense of equal rights**  (↗)

Since the Schröder government, Germany has strengthened B10 and engaged in the same dangerous duties as its allied partners. Germany was the leading nation in the Kosovo Force, ISAF and UNIFILII. In the Bosnian War, Defence Minister Rühe refused to send the *Bundeswehr* to the front. However, in 2007, Germany sent Tornado fighters to south Afghanistan, where she had avoided going previously because of

the danger. In 2015, Germany sent Tornado fighters and frigate ships to Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS.

In the post-9/11 dispatch, Chancellor Schröder (SPD) claimed that Germany had become a partner with equal rights as its allied partners (Ibid, 16. 11. 2001: 19857). In the Iraq War, Foreign Minister Fischer (Greens) stated, "When we (Germany and USA) have differences, we bespeak openly. It has nothing to do with the walk to Canossa" (DBT. StenBer, 29. 10. 2002: 95). As such, B10 was reinforced in the German *Leitbild*.

### B11) Balancing ( ─ )

In the Iraq War, German Chancellor Schröder invited France President Chirac and Russian President Putin to join the Anti-War Coalition. Based on this coalition, Germany sought international influence under a multipolar worldview through deterrence and a balance against the USA and its new European partners (Schröder, 2007: 229, 234-41). However, since then, B11 has not been evident in the German *Leitbild*.

### C8) Responsibility I  (↗)  (↘)  (↗)
### D2) Responsibility II  (↘)  (↗)  (↘)
### F1) Responsibility III  (↘)  (✗)

Furthermore, a series of concepts appeared that provided room for "cohabiting but living in different worlds" among parliamentarians. During the Bosnian War, C8 as *Leitbild* IV was shared by parties such as Defence Minister Rühe (CDU), who legitimised the German military dispatches to Bosnia to fulfil the German responsibility in the multinational force (DBT. StenBer, 30. 6. 1995: 4000).

After 9/11, D2 appeared as *Leitbild* V in which responsibility is regarded as acquiring stability and peace as well as satisfying both the international common good and Germany's national interests. Mosblech (CDU) explained that Germany's responsibility is to support its allied partner France, to hinder terrorism, and to engage in Germany's own security and security for the liberal world (Ibid, 3. 12. 2015: 13998).

During the Iraq War, F1 appeared as *Leitbild* III, in which German responsibilities were regarded as the implementation of crisis prevention and development assistance (Ibid, 19. 9. 2006: 4811). However, F1 diminished after the OEF/ISAF dispatch.

### C9) Interest I  (↗)  (↘)  (✗)
### C10) Interest II  (↗)  (↘)
### C11) Interest III  (↗)  (↘)  (↗)

While some parliamentarians of the SPD and Greens regarded interest mainly as an international common good (C9 as *Leitbild* III), such as values and the monopolisation of forces by the UN (Ibid, 13. 6. 2007: 10543f), the CDU/CSU parliamentarians mainly regarded it as purely national interests (B1 as *Leitbild* II) (Ibid, 1. 9. 2014: 4420). C9 diminished later. Parliamentarians have legitimised military dispatches since the Bosnian War by claiming that they contribute to Germany's security interests (C10 as *Leitbild* IV). On the other hand, parliamentarians began to regard interest as a combination of both the international common good and national interests (C11 as *Leitbild* V).

Over time, parliamentarians' views about responsibility, interest and development assistance have concentrated on E2. They functioned as coalition magnets.

The retention degrees in society for each of the peculiarities from *Leitbild* I to V in each military dispatch case are summarised as follows (Tables 4–8):

# TABLE 4
## RETENTION DEGREE IN SOCIETY FOR EACH PECULIARITY OF *LEITBILD* I IN EACH MILITARY DISPATCH CASE

| | Bosnia | Kosovo | Post- 9/11 | Iraq | Lebanon | OEF /ISAF | Libya | Weapon supply to Kurds | Syria | Mali |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | | | △× | | | | | | | |
| A2a | ○△ | △× | △× | ○△ | △× | △× | △× | | △× | △× |
| A2b | | ○△+ | ○△+ | ○ | ○ | ○ | △× | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| A3 | | ○△+ | △× | △× | | | ○− | △− | | |
| A4 | ○△ | △× | △ | △ | △× | | | △× | | |
| A5 | △× | △× | | | | | | | | |
| A6 | ○△+ | ○△+ | △ | ○ | ○ | ○△+ | △− | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| A7 | | △× | △× | △× | | △× | | | | |
| A8 | ○ | △× | △ | ○△+ | ○ | △ | | ○ | ○ | |
| A9 | | △ | △× | ○ | △ | | | ○△+ | | ○△+ |

# TABLE 5
## RETENTION DEGREE FOR *LEITBILD* II

| | Bosnia | Kosovo | Post- 9/11 | Iraq | Lebanon | OEF /ISAF | Libya | Weapon supply to Kurds | Syria | Mali |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | ○△+ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○△ | ○△ | ○△+ | ○ | ○△+ | ○ |
| B2 | ○△+ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| B3a | | △ | | ○△+ | | | △ | | | |
| B3b | | | | ○△+ | | | △ | | | |
| B4 | ○△+ | | | △ | △× | | | ○ | | |
| B5 | | △ | ○△+ | ○ | △ | △ | | ○△+ | ○ | ○△+ |
| B6 | | △ | | | | | | | | |
| B7 | △ | | | ○ | △ | | | | | |
| B8 | | | | | | | | | | |
| B9 | | | △ | | △ | ○ | | | ○△+ | |
| B10 | △× | | △ | ○ | | | | | | |
| B11 | | | | △ | | | | | | |

# TABLE 6
## RETENTION DEGREE FOR *LEITBILD* III

| | Bosnia | Kosovo | Post- 9/11 | Iraq | Lebanon | OEF/ISAF | Libya | Weapon supply to Kurds | Syria | Mali |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C9** | △ | ○△+ | | | | △ | | | | |
| **D1** | | ○△+ | △ | ○△+ | | | | | | |
| **F1** | | | | ○△+ | △× | ○△ | | △× | | |
| **G1** | | | | | △× | | | | ○△+ | |

**TABLE 7**
**RETENTION DEGREE FOR *LEITBILD* IV**

| | Bosnia | Kosovo | Post-9/11 | Iraq | Lebanon | OEF/ISAF | Libya | Weapon supply to Kurds | Syria | Mali |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C2 | ○△+ | ○ | △ | ○ | △ | | △− | | ○ | ○ |
| C3 | ○ | ○ | △ | ○△+ | △ | | | | ○△+ | |
| C4 | ○△+ | △ | ○ | ○△ | | | ○− | | | ○ |
| C8 | ○△+ | △ | ○ | ○ | △ | | ○△ | | | ○△+ |
| C10 | △ | | △ | △ | △ | ○△ | △ | ○ | ○△+ | ○△+ |

**TABLE 8**
**RETENTION DEGREE FOR *LEITBILD* V**

| | Bosnia | Kosovo | Post-9/11 | Iraq | Lebanon | OEF/ISAF | Libya | Weapon supply to Kurds | Syria | Mali |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | ○△+ | ○ | | △ | △ | △ | | | | |
| C5 | ○△+ | ○ | △ | △ | △ | | | | | |
| C6 | △× | | | ○△+ | | | | | | |
| C7 | ○△+ | ○ | | ○ | | △ | ○△ | △× | ○ | |
| C11 | △× | | | | ○△ | ○ | △ | | | ○ |
| D2 | | ○ | △ | ○ | △ | ○ | ○△+ | ○ | ○△+ | ○△+ |
| E1 | | | △ | | △ | ○ | | | | |
| E2 | | | ○△+ | ○ | | | | | | |
| G2 | | | | | ○ | | | | | |
| G3 | | | | | △ | ○△+ | △× | △− | ○△+ | |
| G4 | | | | | ○ | ○ | | ○△+ | ○ | ○ |
| H1 | | | | | △ | | △ | ○△+ | | ○△+ |
| J1 | | | | | | | | ○△+ | | |
| J2 | | | | | | | | ○△+ | | |
| J3 | | | | | | | | ○ | | |
| L1 | | | | | | | | | | △− |
| L2 | | | | | | | | | | ○△+ |

Table 9 shows the composition of Germany's *Leitbild* in the Merkel III government. In sum, Germany acquired the fused ideas of both civilian power and normal great power in her real *Leitbild*, just as the Roman god Janus had two faces on one head. That is, Germany changed into a peace restoration power with a power orientation that embraces a fused *Leitbild Janus Germania*.

**TABLE 9**
**GERMANY'S *LEITBILD* IN THE MERKEL III GOVERNMENT**

| *Leitbild* type and peculiarities |
|---|
| II: B1) <br> V: C11) |
| I: A2b) <br> II: B2) <br> V: G4) <br> V: H1) |
| (*II: B3 exists latently) |
| II: B4) <br> IV: C8) |
| II: B5) |
| I: A6) |
| V: G3) |
| V: L2) <br> (* II: B7 exists latently) |
| I: A8) |
| I: A9) <br> II: B9) |
| (* II: B10 and B11 exist latently) |
| III: G1) |
| IV: C2) <br> IV: C3) |
| IV: C6) <br> V: D2) |
| V: J2) <br> V: J3) |

(Tables from 4 to 9 are created by the author)

## Changes in the German Party System

In the Merkel I government, the German party system moved to a fluid five-party system. While support for the two large parties was low, the CDU/CSU maintained superiority over the SPD. Fragmentation among the small parties fuelled progress (Niedermayer, 2015: 9). Below, the author explains the changes in the German party system since 2009.

*Format*

Format refers to the power relationships between large and small parties. Based on the percentages of votes from the election and that of the share of members in parliament, the ENP was approximately 4.7 and 4.0, respectively, in Germany's 2009 federal election and was approximately 3.9 and 2.8, respectively, in Germany's 2013 federal election. In contrast, the ENP was approximately 6.18 and 4.6, respectively, in Germany's 2017 federal election and was approximately 5.78 and 4.84, respectively, in Germany's 2021 federal election. As such, the ENP decreased between 2009 and 2013 at both levels, whereas it has increased since 2017 and is in increasing tendency currently at both levels compared with the 2013 status.

The electoral net volatility indicates the degree of the instability of a party system (Machidori, 2015: 47f). It can be calculated by comparing two subsequent elections and totalling the increment of the percentage of votes or the share of members in parliament for only the parties that increase them. Based on the percentage of votes in the elections, the electoral net volatility was ca. 12.6 in 2009, ca. 15.4 in 2013, ca. 17 in 2017 and ca. 13.9 in 2021. Based on the share of members in parliament, the net volatility was ca.

12.6 in 2009, ca. 29. 2 in 2013, ca. 24. 3 in 2017 and ca. 14.3 in 2021. When the volatility index is over 15, the party system is experiencing great fluctuation. Since 2013, the instability and fragmentation of the party system have been reinforced.

As the framework to judge the type of party system, the author uses the model established by Toshihiro Matoba. This classification is purified by the party relationship, and it enables an analyse of the dynamics for the long term. However, it lacks a micro analytical basis, and it can not clarify the causal relation and the structure that leads to the actors' concrete behaviour and the type of party system that is constructed from it (Machidori 2015: 29f).

The convergence degree is the sum of the percentage of votes by the two largest parties. If the convergence degree decreases, the possibility of creating coalitions heightens, which transcends ideological borders. The imbalance degree, which shows the power relations between the two largest parties, is calculated by their voting percentage gaps.

Table 10 shows the convergence (X) and imbalance degrees (Y) in each parliamentary election from 1994 to 2021.

## TABLE 10
## DEGREES OF CONVERGENCE AND IMBALANCE FOR THE TWO LARGEST PARTIES

|  | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2005 | 2009 | 2013 | 2017 | 2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Convergence degree (X) | 77.8 (81.2) | 76 (81.1) | 77 (82.8) | 69.4 (73.0) | 56.8 (61.9) | 67.2 (79.9) | 53.5 (56.3) | 49.8 (54.7) |
| Imbalance degree (Y) | 5 (6.2) | 5.8 (8.0) | 0 (0.5) | 1 (0.6) | 10.8 (15.0) | 15.8 (18.7) | 13.5 (13.1) | 1.6 (1.3) |

(Created by the author; The numbers denote percentages. The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of parliamentary seats.)

Table 11 shows which combination fits which party system typology for the values of X and Y in each category of the percentage of votes in elections and the percentage of parliamentary seats, and Table 12 shows which party system typology was to be seen in each election year along the index in Table 11.

## TABLE 11
## PARTY SYSTEM TYPOLOGY

|  | Percentage of votes in elections | | Percentage of parliamentary seats | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Convergence degree (X) | Imbalance degree (Y) | Convergence degree (X) | Imbalance degree (Y) |
| Two-party dominant system (①) | X＞69.17 | Y＜10.41 | X＞74.56 | Y＜13.64 |
| One dominant party in two-party system (②) | X＞69.17 | Y＞10.41 | X＞74.56 | Y＞13.64 |
| One dominant party in multiparty system (③) | X＜69.17 | Y＞10.41 | X＜74.56 | Y＞13.64 |
| Multiparty system (④) | X＜69.17 | Y＜10.41 | X＜74.56 | Y＜13.64 |
| Typlical Multiparty system (⑤) | X＜55.15 | Y＜3.20 | X＜58.34 | Y＜5.04 |

(Matoba 2003: 19-22. Numerical values indicate percentages.)

**TABLE 12**
**TRANSITION OF PARTY SYSTEM TYPES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL OVER THE LAST 27 YEARS**

|  | 1994 | 1998 | 2002 | 2005 | 2009 | 2013 | 2017 | 2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of votes in elections | ① | ① | ① | ① | ② | ③ | ③ | ③ |
| Percentage of parliamentary seats | ① | ① | ① | ④ | ② | ③ | ④ | ⑤ |

(Created by the author)

According to Table 12, until 2002, the German party system was a two-party dominant system. However, in 2013, it had one dominant party in a multiple-party system. In 2017, it partly reached a multiparty system. However, it partly reached a typical multiparty system in 2021.

After 2009, the CDU/CSU's superiority over the SPD was strengthened. However, after the CDU and CSU struggled over the refugee problem in September 2015, support for the CDU/CSU decreased. The unsuitable actions of party leader Laschet at the disaster site led to the party's debacle in Germany's 2021 election. The SPD was on the verge of losing its raison d'être as the nation's party. The SPD could not resurrect itself until its chancellor candidate Scholz was appraised well since the end of July 2021.

On the other hand, the fragmentation of small parties has accelerated due to distrust of the government and the current parties. Since the refugee crisis, AfD expanded its party power by emphasising anti-refugee and conservative policies. It currently occupies a niche in the party system, ideologically further right than the CSU.

The FDP revived its party power by criticising the government's COVID 19-policy as decreasing liberties and rights.

The Greens had increased their party's power since October 2018, because the politicisation of climate change and decarbonisation have increased support for them. The unsuitable manner of chancellor candidate Baerbock and the ruling parties' aggressive climate policy led to the exhaustion of the party's power.

The leftist party stagnated mainly because its core supporters in eastern Germany were poached by AfD.

*Mechanism*

Under the Merkel I government, the CDU/CSU was compelled ideologically to approach the SPD because of smooth cabinet management. CDU party chief Merkel propelled the CDU's modernisation (Clemens, 2009: 131-134).

Along the social state axis, the CDU/CSU approached the SPD in the labour market policy (Clemens, 2018: 57). The CDU/CSU moved towards the political centre in 2013 and adopted a middle-way between a state-interventionist and market economy in pension and minimum wage policies (Jun, 2016: 50).

Along the cultural axis, the CDU/CSU maintained authoritarian values; however, it supported libertarian values (Jun & Jakobs, 2015: 132, 148) in its family, migration and climate policies. In its security policy, basic military service was suspended after 2010. Furthermore, the security ideas of crisis prevention and comprehensive security transferred to the CDU/CSU.

The SPD swung ideologically right towards the political centre, especially during the Schröder II government. Because of strengthened self-responsibility and reduced social security under the Hartz IV reform, the SPD weakened its social justice abilities in the axis of the social state (Niedermayer, 2010: 8-12).

Since 2009, the SPD and the Greens have strengthened their social fairness line and positioned themselves as the libertarian parties in the cultural axis. However, the SPD has maintained the primary insistence of the right-wing faction on ALG (unemployment benefits) II or a pension system from the age of 67 (Jun & Jakobs, 2015: 132f).

The ideological lean to the right was also observed in the security sphere, in which the SPD stressed the seeking of its own national interests and security, the heightening of the self-confidence of the leading international order and the equality consciousness with allied states, and to the use of military means for crisis control, although the SPD has reverted to a left orientation to some extent since 2009.

As such, the large parties strengthened their concentration in the political centre (Hornsteiner & Saalfeld, 2014: 96ff), including in their foreign and security policies. This concentration formed the basis on which Germany acquired a fused-type *Leitbild*. However, this concentration led to a power vacuum on the right and left poles and, therefore, the rise of the leftist party and AfD.

The leftist party positioned state interventionism along the axis of the social state. Along the cultural axis, it wandered between libertarianism and authoritarianism.

AfD positioned itself as the liberal market line along the social state axis and, along the cultural axis, at a pole of TAN.

The FDP departed slightly from the extreme liberal market line by refusing to support a minimum wage. It strengthened not only a TAN line by reinforcing its anti-refugee stance, but also a GAL line by reinforcing climate preservation. In sum, polarisation developed (Jun, 2016: 48).

Under a fluid five-party system, the formation of a minimum winning coalition by the traditional coalitions became difficult because fragmentation increased. As a result, the possibility of coalitions that are ideologically incompatible has increased since 2005 and the coalition's diversity has also increased. Therefore, segmentation has decreased. Among the coalition types that are ideologically incompatible, the grand coalition could acquire a majority of seats in parliament, and it has been generalised at the federal level. Thus, Germany acquired a fused-type *Leitbild Janus Germania*.

**CONCLUSION**

Germany acquired a *Leitbild Janus Germania*, in which the theses of both civilian power and normal great power fuse and are transformed into a peace restoration power with power orientation. This change was attributed that the German party system transformed into a fluid five-party system. Under this system, the formation of the grand coalition has normalised. In addition, two large parties are ideologically concentrated in the centre. An ideological concentration is reflected in the SPD's seeking of its own national interests and security to heighten the self-confidence of the leading international order and attain an equality consciousness with allied states, desiring to use military means for crisis control and transferring of the security ideas of crisis prevention and comprehensive security from the Greens and the SPD to the CDU/CSU. While the Merkel III government maintained the *Leitbild Janus Germania*, Germany reinforced the ideas of the normal great power thesis in its actual *Leitbild*.

After Brexit, the Carolingian Europe, in which France and Germany take leadership, has been strengthened in the EU. Choices remained for the EU to reform its Common Security and Defence Policy, either excluding the UK (PESCO) or including it (E2P); however, its orientation remains opaque. Germany would continue to perform the "German way" of crisis management, namely by fusing military and non-military means as "reverse-Europeanization" with the name of "European way", where Germany would instead emphasize the institutionalisation of non-military measurements.

AfD has been fixed in the German party system since 2017. However, provided other parties do not coalesce with it, it will not have decisive impacts on the German *Leitbild* or foreign policy.

The German party system is balanced between being a one dominant party in a multiparty system and a multiparty system. The Germany's 2021 federal election showed that the German party system resembled a typical multiparty system and neither of the "large" parties could acquire 30% of the vote percentage; thus, the *Bundestag* consists of four or five medium parties. Along with the decrease in segmentation and the realization of a three-party coalition, traffic-light-coalition, the making of the rigid *Leitbild* would be

more difficult. German foreign policy might lose face, its creativity and stability with a vague *Leitbild*, and could not easily maintain the European and global order. It is a vital point that the ruling parties coalesce well with one another on this policy.

In this article, the author did not analyze the developments of German foreign policy since the Merkel IV government, but will analyze them in the near future.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

## ENDNOTES

1. This article is one which the author made significant final adjustments to the extracted content of Nakagawa (2020).
2. The ENP is calculated by

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} pi^2}$$

where n is the number of parties with at least one vote or seat, and pi is the percentage of seats in parliament or the poll votes of a party. Laakso & Taagepera, 1979: 3-27.

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