

Military Conscription and Armed Conflicts

Nicole V. Crain
National Defense University

W. Mark Crain
Lafayette College

This paper examines the effects of military conscription on the tendency of a country to engage in an armed conflict. It includes a discussion of the Gates Commission, and a theoretical discussion of the expected relationship between conscription and a government's proclivity to send troops into harm's way. The finding of the empirical analysis, using a large sample of countries over four decades, indicates that conscription reduces the likelihood of an armed conflict by about 50 percent relative to a volunteer military. The findings also suggest that conscription tends to shorten the duration of armed conflicts, although the magnitude of estimated effect is small.

Keywords: conscription, armed conflict, peace, security, defense, Gates Commission, military


FREQUENCY AND DURATION OF GLOBAL ARMED CONFLICTS

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed a peace agreement designed to end the longest war in US history. This 18-year conflict cost the US an estimated \$2 trillion and took the lives of 2,400 US service members since Oct. 7, 2001, when “Operation Enduring Freedom” commenced. Imagine how this conflict might have been different if all US citizens, women and men, were required to serve in the military. Would the conflict in Afghanistan have lasted 18 years under a system of mandatory military service? Does a nation's policy regarding military service have an impact on its proclivity to engage in armed conflicts?

This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by analyzing panel data for 200 countries over the period 1980 to 2018. During these four decades, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset reports more than 2,000 instances in which countries were engaged in an armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2019). The median is 45 countries per year.¹ In other words, the US is far from alone in experiencing armed conflicts during this period. The analysis specifies and estimates a model to examine the pattern of armed conflicts, across countries and over time. The purpose is to identify the impact of conscription after controlling for other factors. Globally, the number of countries that requires mandatory military service—also known as military conscription, compulsory military service, or simply “the draft”—has declined since 1980. Based on data for 200 countries reported in the CIA *The World Factbook*, 106 had mandatory service in 1980 (53%), falling to 70 in 2018 (35%). Figure 1 plots the pattern over this period, and indicates that the decline began after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

Figure 1 also plots the share of total armed forces globally composed of conscripts. In 1989, 76 percent of the 24 million people in military service were conscripts.² In 2017, 57 percent of the 27 million people in the armed forces globally were conscripts. By this measure, conscription declined, yet more than half of world's military personnel are conscripts. This brief overview indicates that conscription persists as a crucial tool of military manpower systems and remains an important element in national defense policies.

FIGURE 1
INCIDENCE OF MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE: 1980 TO 2018 *



*Sources: CIA, *World Fact Book* and World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.

The analysis that follows explores the relationship between conscription and a nation's tendency to engage in armed conflicts. We also examine the impact of conscription on the duration of a conflict, once a nation becomes involved. To preview the findings, countries with compulsory military service appear less likely to engage in armed conflicts and to engage in shorter conflicts, relative to countries with a voluntary force. These findings hold up in difference-in-differences model specifications that control for potential reverse causation issues. Section 2 provides a short background on the recent US experience with conscription, and discusses several reasons why conscription might have an impact on armed conflicts. It also summarizes findings from prior empirical studies that address this question. Section 3 specifies and estimates the empirical model and presents the results. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.

MILITARY MANPOWER SYSTEMS: CONSCRIPTION VERSUS VOLUNTARY ARMED FORCES

Since 1789, the US has relied on conscription to populate its armed forces for only 36 years. Almost all of these times occurred during the 20th century and during wartime: 1917, 1918, and 1919 (WWI) and 1944 to 1973 (WWII, Korea, and Vietnam). The most recent end to US conscription in 1973 was driven by political events in the late 1960s. At that time, a number of studies by economists were influential, at least

in the formal policy deliberations.³ The economists' arguments and other elements central to the debate over the pros and cons of conscription appear in the *Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (1970), also known as the Gates Commission.⁴

This paper revisits and presents empirical evidence concerning a key question with respect to military conscription: does it constrain countries from engaging in armed conflicts relative to an all-volunteer force? The Gates Commission raised this very question, and concluded that such an effect was unlikely. Somewhat surprisingly, the Commission brushed aside the issue without the level of rigor it used to evaluate other key elements in the debate over conscription. The impact of conscription on armed conflicts resurfaced in 2007, motivated by legislation proposed by then-US Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), who chaired the House Ways and Means Committee. Mr. Rangel's bill would have returned the US to compulsory and universal (women and men) military service.⁵ After Mr. Rangel retired from Congress in 2017, no legislation has been introduced to reinstate compulsory military service in the US.⁶

Several reasons stand behind the expected relationship between conscription and a government's proclivity to send troops into harm's way. The first is labeled the troop composition effect. Under a policy of conscription, the composition of a country's armed forces will be more representative of the general population in comparison to a policy of voluntary service. For example, the income, education, race, geographic origins, and ethnic dimensions of the armed forces will be more reflective of the general population under conscription than under a volunteer system. When the troop composition reflects the general population, the decision by policy makers to engage in conflicts is likely to affect the median voter. This does not require necessarily that the median voter is drafted into the military; the draftee might be a person in the median voter's family or circle of friends. The impact of an armed conflict places a higher expected cost on the median voter with conscripted troops relative to a system that draws troops voluntarily. In essence, in a regime of conscription the median voter faces a higher expected cost from armed conflicts than under a voluntary regime, and this acts as a deterrent to policy-makers.

The second reason is labeled the sympathy effect. Citizens may react differently and less sympathetically to volunteer soldiers being put in harm's way, in comparison to conscripted soldiers. Volunteer soldiers presumably had some idea of the risks of being harmed or becoming a casualty when they made the choice to enlist. Conscripted soldiers had no choice, and the decision to place them in hazardous situations might be viewed by voters as an incremental burden. The sympathy effect means that the political decision to engage in military conflicts would create more voter dissatisfaction under conscription than under a voluntary force.

The third reason is akin to the Rawlsian notion of uncertainty. Consider the options for the military manpower system. Under conscription, a citizen is virtually certain to be called-up for military service and possibly placed in dangerous conditions. Under a volunteer system, a citizen is uncertain about being placed in dangerous conditions. Even if the citizen enlists voluntarily, she can time her service to control some of the risk. Under conscription, she has little or no control over the hazardous risks. In the conscription regime, she is more highly motivated to encourage the development and employment of alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. These include, for example, international alliances and treaties, channels for effective diplomacy, immigration policies, and economic interdependencies.

A fourth consideration is that countries with conscription are more likely to have political leaders who have served in the armed forces. As Pickering puts it: "...those who have donned the uniform tend to be more keenly aware of the potential human costs and the uncertainties associated with military operations than those who have not" (Pickering 2011, 121). This line of reasoning has its critics, who argue that politicians with military experience have a lower level of aversion to violence. Influenced by a "cult of the offensive," politicians with military training are more inclined to use force compared to those with no military background (for example, see Alison, *et al.* 1985 and Lasswell 1941).

A fifth consideration relates to the battle-readiness of conscripts versus volunteer forces, and, again, the literature contains competing arguments. One argument holds that because a volunteer system relies on market forces to attract the required manpower and skill sets, it does not respond quickly enough to a crisis. Moreover, retention of experienced, battle-ready troops might wane during dangerous periods. Conscription potentially offsets these timing challenges, using the legal system to draw an adequate force with the needed

capabilities. In essence, the quality and readiness of the military force depends on the type of manpower system, and this, in turn, affects the willingness of decision makers to engage in armed conflicts.

These arguments provide the conceptual backdrop for why military conscription might have an impact on armed conflicts. As the summary reveals, theory offers some guidance, and a few empirical studies have attempted to bring evidence to bear on the question. Koch and Gartner (2005) finds evidence that conscription has no impact on casualty levels in a conflict, but it increases the likelihood that a country engages in a war. Similarly, Choi and James (2003), using a cross-country, time series dataset, finds that countries with conscription are more likely to be involved in an interstate dispute. In a follow up study, Choi and James (2008) includes additional control variables in their analysis, specifically controlling for a free press and whether the military is under civilian control. When these variables are added, they find no relationship between conscription and interstate disputes.

Vasquez (2005) uses cross-country and time series data to examine the impact on battle casualties and finds that in a democratic regime, conscription results in fewer casualties compared to a volunteer system. Examining interstate conflicts between 1950 and 1985, Vasquez finds that voluntary militaries experience 30 percent more casualties than conscript militaries. He concludes that "...societal actors most closely affected by conscript casualties are more likely to have the political power and access with which to constrain policy makers" (Vasquez 2005, 849).

Pickering (2011) expands the scope of the analysis by including military conflicts that involve actors other than state actors. That is, the prior studies focused on "dyadic" conflicts, or conflicts between two state actors. Pickering notes that according to the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset, military "[M]issions targeting nontraditional actors (*i.e.*, those that are not other state governments) thus constitute a significant portion of cross-border military force that has been employed by state actors over the past half-century" (Pickering 2011, 124). Using the IMI dataset, Pickering defines an armed engagement as a military operation "with one thousand or more intervening troops" (Pickering 2011, 125). His analysis also includes control variables that distinguish traditional military missions and other military objectives labeled "operations other than war." Pickering's analysis uses cross-country, time series data for the period 1946 to 2001, and finds that countries with conscription have a significantly higher probability of initiating military interventions. This holds for both traditional military interventions and military operations other than war.

Duff (2014) focuses on the duration of armed conflicts using data from the *COW Interstate War v. 4.0. 1816-2007* (Sarkees, Reid, and Wayman 2010). Duff relies on the conceptual frameworks reviewed above, and hypothesizes that "democratic countries will be more likely to experience shorter wars if they have a conscripted force due to electoral costs" (Duff 2014, 24). However, his evidence does not support this hypothesis in his empirical analysis using a sample of 180 countries that were engaged in a war during the period 1938 to 2007. Indeed, Duff's results indicate that conscription is associated with longer wars.

In summary, prior empirical studies present mixed evidence on the impact of conscription on the likelihood of an armed conflict, and only one study has examined the possible impact of conflict duration. Comparisons and general conclusions are difficult, because these studies use different time periods, different datasets, different models, and different conflict metrics.


MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS

The quantitative analysis examines the determinants of armed conflicts using data collected and metrics developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO). The measure for an armed conflict used here is defined as:

*a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.*⁷

Figure 2 illustrates the number of countries engaged in armed conflicts and the number of armed conflicts in the 1980-2018 period using UCDP/PRIO metrics.

FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN ARMED CONFLICTS,
1980 TO 2018



In 2018, 92 countries were engaged in 215 armed conflicts. Over the 1980-2018 period the median number of countries engaged in armed conflicts per year is 45. The median number of conflicts per year is 62.

Equation (1) presents the general form of the model used to examine the determinants of armed conflicts over time and across countries:

$$\text{Armed Conflict}_{i,t} = \beta_C (\text{Conscription}_{i,t}) + \beta_{AF} (\text{Size of Armed Forces}_{i,t}) + \beta_{ME} (\text{Military Spending \% of GDP}_{i,t}) + \beta_T (\text{Trade \% of GDP}_{i,t}) + \beta_{GDP} (\text{Real GDP}_{i,t}) + \beta_{PDS} (\text{Polity5 Democracy Score}_{i,t}) + \alpha_t + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

The sample used to estimate Eq. 1 is organized as a panel dataset that includes 200 countries for the 39-year period that starts in 1980 and ends in 2018. The exact sample of countries included in a specific regression model depends on the set of independent variables included; observations on some variables are missing in specific years. The variable subscripts i and t in Equation (1) denote an observation in country i ($= 1, \dots, n$) in year t ($= 1980, \dots, 2018$).

The dependent variable, $\text{Armed Conflict}_{i,t}$, equals one if a country i is engaged in an armed conflict in year t , and equal to zero otherwise. (Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute). Equation (1) is estimated using a logit regression because of the binary values for the dependent variable.

The main explanatory variable of interest is *Conscription*, an indicator variable equal to 1 if a country has a policy of compulsory military service in year t , and equal to zero otherwise (Source: CIA, *The World Factbook*). The control variables in Eq. 1 are based on the models used in the prior studies that were discussed in Section 2. The size of the military force may affect the likelihood of an armed conflict for several reasons, and the expected sign is not predictable on theoretical grounds. A large military force might act as a deterrent to external aggressors, and this would reduce the number of armed conflicts. Alternatively,

a large force provides the readiness and capacity to use force. Likewise, military spending might deter potential aggressors, or it might strengthen the readiness and capacity of a nation to engage in armed conflicts. Trade as a share of GDP rests on the assumption that it reflects voluntary international exchange and cooperation, as well as a country's reliance on global markets. Higher levels of trade are expected to reduce armed conflicts. GDP reflects the capacity of country to support its national defense through taxation and borrowing. Finally, the Polity5 Democracy Score is measured on a scale from -10 ("strongly autocratic") to +10 ("strongly democratic"). The literature reviewed above consistently finds an inverse relationship between democracy scores and the various indicators of armed conflicts. Finally, the models reported in Table 1 include a time trend variable (τ_t), and country fixed-effects (α_i) as noted in some specifications.

Table 1 presents the results for four variations of the specification. Column (1) presents the simplest specification as a benchmark for comparison, omitting all of the control variables. The coefficient on Conscription, -1.08, is negative and significant at the 0.01 level.

Column (2) presents the results when the control variables and fixed-country and fixed-year effects are included. The coefficient on the Conscription variable remains negative and significant at the one-percent level. This finding indicates that countries with conscription are less likely to engage in armed conflicts than countries with volunteer armies.

The results for the control variables are easy to summarize. The likelihood of an armed conflict falls as the size of the armed services increases, suggesting that large armed force tends to deter conflicts. The likelihood of an armed conflict also falls as the trade-to-GDP ratio rises, and as a country's democracy score increases. These results support fairly well-established notions that trade (as an instrument of soft power) is a substitute for conflict (hard power), and that democracies generally are less prone to violent conflicts. On the other hand, the likelihood of an armed conflict increases with the size of the military budget and the size of the economy. Both of these variables are proxies for the readiness and capacity of country to engage in an armed conflict.

A potential reverse causation merits consideration, namely the likelihood of a conflict might influence a country's military manpower system. Faced with a conflict, policy makers respond by implementing conscription. Conceptually, this possibility seems plausible, yet it is difficult to reconcile with the negative relationship observed between conscription and armed conflicts. If an armed conflict provides a force for policy makers to change, the negative coefficient suggests a tendency to abolish conscription, rather than to adopt it.

We explore the causality question by estimating a difference-in-differences (DID) specification, where conscription is considered the treatment, and voluntary service is the untreated control set. The DID results are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Column (3) presents the results without any controls, and Column (4) presents the results adding the control variables. In both models, the coefficients on the DID variable are negative and significant to the 0.01 level. Using the estimated coefficient in Column (4), -0.0004, conscription reduces the probability of an armed conflict by almost 50 percent.⁹ For comparison, the estimated coefficient in Column (2), -0.79, indicates that conscription reduces the probability of armed conflict by about 30 percent.

We use a modification of Eq. (1) to explore a related question about conscription: Does it have an impact on the duration of armed conflicts? In this case the dependent variable is the number of days since the armed conflict began. The variable is entered into the equation as a natural log transformation. Table 2 presents these results. The estimated coefficient on Conscription is negative and significant at one-percent level in Columns (1) and (2). The estimate in Column (2) suggests that conscription reduces the duration of armed conflicts by 28 percent (recall that the continuous variables are entered into the model as log transformations). The possibility of reverse causation is again examined by estimating DID models, and the results are shown in Columns (3) and (4). The DID estimate, while statistically significant, suggests that the impact of conscription on conflict duration is only 0.01 percent.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This paper examines conceptual and empirical links between military conscription and armed conflicts. The empirical evidence based on a large sample of countries suggests that conscription constrains armed conflicts, reducing the likelihood by as much as 50 percent. The analysis finds some evidence that conscription also shortens the duration of conflicts, although the estimated effect is quite small.

The finding that conscription constrains conflicts does not resolve an important and related question: does conscription result in too little armed engagement? The political constraints of conscription might check the use of armed force in situations with legitimate legal or moral foundations that meet the conditions of just war. This area is a topic worthy of future research.

ENDNOTES

1. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines a state-based armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2019, 1).
2. The World Bank data on armed services are missing for a number of countries before 1989 and after 2017, so the aggregate data for the share of armed services in Figure 1 only illustrates this period.
3. A sample of the relevant research by economists in 1960s include Friedman (1962, 1967a, and 1967b), Miller (1968), and Oi (1967). For more recent articles, see Ross (1994) and Mulligan and Shleifer (2005).
4. Prominent economists were involved in the Gates Commission. Milton Friedman and Allen Wallis were members of the commission, and Walter Oi served on the commission’s staff. Then-President Richard Nixon credited his domestic policy advisor, Martin Anderson, as the most important person behind the change to an all-volunteer force. For a historical account of the Gates Commission, see Rostker (2006). Chambers (1975) and Warner and Asch (2001) provide literature surveys.
5. Mr. Rangel introduced the “Universal National Service Act of 2007” on January 10, 2007 (Congress.gov), as bill “[T]o require all persons in the United States between the ages of 18 and 42 to perform national service, either as a member of the uniformed services or in civilian service in furtherance of the national defense and homeland security, ...”. Mr. Rangel, a US Army veteran who served in the Korean War, continued to introduce legislation that would have reinstated mandatory and universal military service until his retirement from Congress in 2017.
6. A related body of work focuses on type of military manpower systems a country has in place. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) argues that conscription, like most regulations, demands a substantial fixed cost, in addition to the resources used to recruit a volunteer force. This implies, first, that countries with large populations are more likely to have conscription. Second it implies that countries for which incremental administrative fixed costs are lower are more likely to have conscription. Ross (1995) specifies and estimates an empirical model to examine the determinants of conscription based on a model that assumes countries seek to minimize costs, including the excess burden of taxation. A volunteer system becomes relatively more costly as the required number of soldiers increases. This distortionary effect of taxes at some level offsets the distortionary effects of getting the wrong people in the military, those who will not represent the opportunity-cost-minimizing set of soldiers. In addition, Ross argues that the more heterogeneous the reservation wages of those eligible for the military, the greater the advantage of the volunteer system. That is, the opportunity cost distortion will be greater under conscription. Lee and McKinsey (1992) develops a similar model that considers the tradeoff between distortionary effects of taxes necessary to compensate a volunteer force versus the human capital inefficiencies caused by conscription.
7. Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook v 19.1 (<https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>). The data creation program is described in Gleditsch, et al. (2007) and Pettersson, et al. (2019).
8. The data sources are as follows: Armed Conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute); Conscription (CIA World Fact Book); Size of Armed Forces, Military Spending % of GDP, Trade % of GDP, and Real GDP (World Bank); Polity5 Democracy Score (Center for Systemic Peace).
9. The computation is as follows: $(\text{Exp}(-0.0004))/(1+\text{exp}(-0.0004)) = 0.499$.

REFERENCES

- Alison, G.T., Canesale, A., & Nye, J.S., Jr. (1982). *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War*. New York: Norton.
- Anderson, M., & Honegger, B. (eds.) (1982). *The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Atkinson, D.B., Fahey, K., Lindstädt, R., & Warner, Z. (2021). Conscription Systems, Political Survival, and Battlefield Deaths. University of Birmingham Working Paper. Retrieved August 8, 2022, from <https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/en/publications/conscription-systems-political-survival-and-battlefield-deaths>
- Center for Systemic Peace. (2020). *Polity5 Project*. Retrieved July 17, 2022, from www.systemicpeace.org
- Chambers, J.W., II (Ed.). (1975). *Draftees or Volunteers: A Documentary History of the Debate over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787–1973*. New York: Garland.
- Choi, S.-W., & James, P. (2003). No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate Disputes? A New Question for Neo-Kantianism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47, 796–816.
- CIA. (2022). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved July 17, 2022, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>
- Cohn, L.P., & Toronto, N.W. (2017). Markets and Manpower: The Political Economy of Compulsory Military Service. *Armed Forces & Society*, 43(3), 436–458.
- Congress.gov. (n.d.) Retrieved July 17, 2022, from <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/393/text>
- Congressional Digest Corporation. (2006). Legislative Background: Recent Action on Compulsory National Service. *Congressional Digest*, 85, 193–224.
- Duff, A.W. (2014). Does Conscription Affect War Duration? A Study of Military Manpower Systems, Regime Type, and Interstate Wars. Lawrence University Honors Projects. Retrieved August 13, 2022, from <https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp/64>
- Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Friedman, M. (1967a). Discussion: Recruitment of Manpower Solely by Voluntary Means. In Sol Tax (Ed.), *Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Friedman, M. (1967b). Why Not a Volunteer Army? In Sol Tax (Ed.), *Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives* (pp. 200–207). Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Gleditsch, N.P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), 615–637. <https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx>
- Kant, I. (1963). *Kant's Political Writings*. ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nesbit. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lasswell, H.D. (1941). The Garrison State. *American Journal of Sociology*, 46(4), 455–68.
- Lee, D.R., & McKenzie, R.B. (1992). Reexamination of the Relative Efficiency of the Draft and the All-volunteer Army. *Southern Economic Journal*, 58(3), 644–54.
- Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies (LCCS). (n.d.). Retrieved July 17, 2022, from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>
- Miller, J.C. (Ed.). (1968). *Why the Draft? The Case for a Volunteer Army*. Penguin Books.
- Mulligan, C., & Shleifer, A. (2005). Conscription as Regulation. *American Law and Economics Review*, 7(1), 85–111.
- Oi, W.Y. (1967). The Economic Cost of the Draft. *American Economic Review*, 57(2), 39–62.
- Pettersson, T. (2019). *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook v 19.1*. Retrieved July 17, 2022, from <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads>
- Pettersson, T., Högbladh, S., & Öberg, M. (2019). Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(4), 589–603.
- Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. (1970). London: Macmillan.

- Ross, T.W. (1994). Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 37(1), 101–131.
- Rostker, B. (2006). *I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA.
- Sarkees, M.R., & Wayman, F. (2010). *Resort to War: 1816-2007*. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Slantchev, B.L. (2004). How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), 813–829.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute. (2019). Retrieved July 17, 2022, from http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm#brd
- Vasquez, J.P., III. (2005). Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(6), 849–73.
- War Resisters' International (WRI). (n.d.). *Refusing to Bear Arms: World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service*. Retrieved July 17, 2022, from <http://wri-irg.org/co/rtba/index.html>
- Warner, J.T., & Asch, B.J. (1995). In K. Hartley, & T. Sandler (Eds.), *Handbook of Defense Economics* (pp. 347–398). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Warner, J.T., & Asch, B.J. (2001). The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(2), 169–192.
- World Bank (n.d.). *World Development Indicators*. Retrieved July 17, 2022, from, <https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx>

APPENDIX

TABLE 1
INCIDENCE OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 1980 THROUGH 2018 ^A

	Dep.Var.=1 if Conflict and =0 if No Conflict ^b			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription	-1.08 (-9.92)**	-0.79 (-4.51)**		
Difference in Differences			-0.0002 (-2.49)*	-0.0004 (-4.51)**
Size of Armed Forces		-0.29 (-3.34)**		-0.29 (-3.34)*
Military Spending (% of GDP)		0.62 (5.13)**		0.62 (5.13)**
Trade (% of GDP)		-0.37 (-2.26)*		-0.37 (-2.26)*
GDP (Real 2010 US\$)		0.44 (2.71)**		0.44 (2.71)**
Polity5 Democracy Score		-0.13 (-6.09)**		-0.12 (-6.09)**
Fixed-Country Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed-Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. Obs.	7,799	3,119	5,459	3,119
No. Countries	200	115	140	115

Notes: ^a All continuous variables are entered as logarithmic transformations.

^b xtlogit regression model

z-statistics in parentheses, where:

** indicates significance at the one percent level

* indicates significance at the five percent level

TABLE 2
DURATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 1980 THROUGH 2018 ^A

	Dep. Var.=Number of Days since the Conflict Began		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscription	-0.41	-0.28	
	(-4.86)**	(-3.67)**	
Difference in Differences			-0.0001
			(-3.68)**
Size of Armed Forces		0.03	0.03
		(1.30)	(1.30)
Military Spending (% of GDP)		0.08	0.08
		(1.73)	(1.73)
Trade (% of GDP)		-0.06	-0.06
		(-1.14)	(-1.14)
GDP (Real 2010 US\$)		-0.004	-0.005
		(-0.15)	(-0.15)
Polity5 Democracy Score		0.001	0.001
		(0.18)	(0.18)
R-Sq Within	0.015	0.37	0.37
R-Sq Between	0.015	0.35	0.35
R-Sq Overall	0.004	0.27	0.27
Fixed-Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes
No. Obs.	1,988	1,431	1,431
No. Countries	142	124	124

Notes: ^a All continuous variables are entered as logarithmic transformations.
t-statistics in parentheses, where:
** indicates significance at the one percent level
* indicates significance at the five percent level