The Outsiders: Examining the Effects of Political Appointments on Public-Sector Employee Engagement

Abstract

Scholars have long examined the inherent trade-offs between control and capability when presidents politicize the executive branch through their appointment powers, including through appointments. Research has consistently connected high ratios of appointees to career leaders with decreased agency performance and higher voluntary turnover at the career senior ranks. However, far less attention has been paid to the cumulative effect of such appointments on the engagement of the civil service workforce, a factor shown to influence organizational performance. Using the 2012 and 2016 Federal Employee Viewpoint Surveys, I evaluate the relationship between degree of agency politicization and self-reported measures of engagement among civil servants. Preliminary analysis indicates the use of political appointments by presidents can impede agency efforts to build and sustain an engaged workforce. The findings suggest the negative outcomes associated with these appointments are both broader and more enduring than the tenure of a single appointee, presenting a new perspective for scholarly understanding of the dynamics at play when presidents politicize the agencies they are entrusted to lead.