

# **Shaping Crisis Perceptions: Nostalgia and Political Ideological Threats in the 2020 US Election**

**Luciana Simion  
Claremont Graduate University**

**Michelle Bligh  
Claremont Graduate University**

**Jeffrey Kohles  
California State University San Marcos**

**Daniel Martin  
Claremont Graduate University**

*This study investigates the role of nostalgia in shaping ideological and psychological threat perception and its impact on crisis evaluations during the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Specifically, it explores how collective nostalgia predicts the perceived severity of threats to conservative and progressive ideologies and how these perceptions influence the broader understanding of a multidimensional crisis. Results indicate that nostalgia significantly heightens perceived threats to conservative ideologies, intensifying voters' crisis perceptions. By examining the interplay between nostalgia, political ideology, and crisis perception, this research offers valuable insights into voter behavior and organizational responses during periods of socio-political upheaval.*

*Keywords: nostalgia, psychological threats, ideological threats, crisis perception, crisis management*

## **INTRODUCTION**

*“The past is a candle at great distance: too close to let you quit, too far to comfort you.”  
~ Amy Bloom, *Away* ~*

The year 2020 marked an unprecedented period of global turmoil, characterized by the convergence of multiple crises that reshaped socio-political and organizational landscapes. The COVID-19 pandemic, described as a “super-threat” due to its extensive health, economic, and social impacts (Jutzi et al., 2020, p.2), brought unprecedented economic uncertainty, job insecurity, and psychological distress. Simultaneously, the United States (US) was further destabilized by heightened political polarization, fueled by the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election and amplified by movements like Black Lives Matter (BLM), which illuminated deep-seated racial and social inequalities (Boucher et al., 2021; Dimock & Wike,

2020; Lau et al., 2022; Pérez-Curiel et al., 2021). These interwoven challenges created what scholars describe as a multidimensional crisis - a superordinate threat that integrates multiple negative phenomena (i.e., health, economic, social, and political threats) into a single variable, demanding simultaneous attention and response (Biegun & Karwowski, 2020).

As individuals and organizations struggled to navigate this complex landscape, collective nostalgia - a sentimental longing for a shared, idealized past (Wildschut et al., 2014), emerged as a critical emotional response, potentially influencing political behavior, organizational decision-making, and crisis evaluations. Research shows that individuals and groups often turn to the past for psychological comfort during times of profound uncertainty and instability, with nostalgia as a collective coping mechanism that anchors them to a perceived simpler, more stable era (Routledge et al., 2014). This longing for the past provides emotional resilience by creating a sense of continuity amid chaos (Routledge et al., 2014). However, beyond offering psychological comfort, collective nostalgia reinforces group identity, fosters in-group cohesion, and heightens perceptions of external threats (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2019).

This multifaceted role makes nostalgia especially powerful in politically polarized environments, as it influences how ideological and psychological threats are perceived and how groups respond to socio-political changes (Smeekes, 2015; Stefaniak et al., 2021). In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, which took place in a highly uncertain and polarized environment (Casola et al., 2021; Dinkelberg et al., 2021), nostalgia-driven rhetoric was a defining feature of political discourse, particularly among conservative figures. President Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) slogan is a prominent example of how collective nostalgia was strategically mobilized to resonate with voters. The slogan framed the present environment as a time of decline and crisis, positioning the past as a solution to current challenges. It invoked a return to a perceived golden age of American prosperity, stability, and traditional values, offering voters - particularly those disillusioned by contemporary social changes - a nostalgic vision of the past as a solution to present-day crises (Behler et al., 2021; Dinkelberg et al., 2021). Trump's appeals to this idealized version of America were not simply reflections of personal longing but rather a deliberate invocation of shared national memory aimed at psychologically reinforcing group identity and galvanizing voter support (Dinkelberg et al., 2021; Löfflmann, 2024). As such, collective nostalgia, with its promise of stability amidst chaos, likely acted as a potent force in shaping ideological threat perceptions and responses to crisis during the election.

Beyond the political sphere, the influence of nostalgia extends into organizational contexts, where it can shape how businesses and stakeholders respond to crises. Organizational leaders, like political actors, frequently rely on nostalgia to navigate periods of uncertainty and change. They evoke nostalgic narratives about an organization's founding principles or past successes to foster a sense of shared identity and continuity among employees, particularly during disruptions or change (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Sedikides & Wildschut, 2016). During the 2020 pandemic, many organizations leaned on nostalgic appeals in internal and external communications, using memories of "better times" to provide psychological comfort to employees and consumers alike. For example, organizations in industries hit hard by the pandemic, such as retail and hospitality, utilized nostalgia-laden marketing campaigns and public communications emphasizing traditional values to resonate with consumers seeking comfort during turbulent times (Todorova & Padareva-Ilieva, 2021). These strategies were meant to remind customers of pre-pandemic experiences, invoking collective memories to encourage a return to normalcy (Jiménez-Zarco et al., 2023; Rana et al., 2020; Todorova & Padareva-Ilieva, 2021; Wildschut & Sedikides, 2022). Similarly, nostalgia shaped consumer behavior and influenced internal organizational dynamics, serving as a tool for managing uncertainty and maintaining employee morale during crises (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2016; Dijke et al., 2019). These efforts demonstrate that nostalgia is also an important strategic tool for organizations seeking to manage internal employee dynamics and external consumer behavior during crises (Jiménez-Zarco et al., 2023).

Despite the growing recognition of nostalgia's role in political and organizational responses, its specific impact during multidimensional crises like those experienced in 2020 remains underexplored (see Zhou et al., 2022 for an exception). The intersection of health, economic, and social crises in 2020 provides a unique opportunity to investigate how nostalgia operates as a stabilizing force and how it may shape perceptions

of ideological and organizational threats. As such, this study addresses a critical need to understand how nostalgia influences group behavior in complex crisis environments. Moreover, previous research has examined the psychological functions of nostalgia, such as improving emotional well-being (Li et al., 2023), maintaining self-continuity by connecting past and present selves (Yang et al., 2022), promoting pro-social behavior, reducing prejudice, and enhancing social harmony (Li, 2015). Much of it has been limited to isolated contexts, such as economic downturns or social disintegration (Homolar & Scholz, 2019). This study moves beyond these isolated contexts to explore collective nostalgia in the context of multifaceted crises, which demand a more comprehensive understanding of psychological and social responses.

This study addresses the following key research questions: *1) How does nostalgia shape perceptions of ideological threats in politically polarized environments, such as the 2020 U.S. presidential election? and 2) How do organizations similarly leverage nostalgia to manage uncertainty and influence stakeholder behavior during multidimensional crises?*

By integrating nostalgia into existing frameworks of crisis perception (Reiss et al., 2021) and motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003), this study aims to provide nuanced insights into how emotional ties to the past influence contemporary political behavior, organizational decision-making, and crisis evaluations. Specifically, this research will explore how nostalgia, when strategically invoked, can mobilize groups, help manage uncertainty, and influence perceptions of ideological and organizational threats.

This study has the potential to make important contributions. In the political realm, understanding how nostalgia shapes ideological threat perception can inform campaign strategies, particularly in crafting messages that resonate with different ideological groups. For example, conservative campaigns might leverage nostalgia to mobilize voters by emphasizing perceived threats to traditional values. In contrast, progressive campaigns could consider strategies to counteract the potentially dampening effects of nostalgia on crisis perceptions. In the organizational sphere, recognizing the power of nostalgia can help leaders foster cohesion and manage uncertainty during times of crisis. However, it also requires careful navigation, as reliance on nostalgic narratives can inadvertently reinforce exclusionary tendencies or hinder efforts to embrace necessary social change. Ultimately, this study seeks to illuminate the mechanisms by which nostalgia influences group behavior but also provides a framework for understanding how leaders can strategically deploy nostalgic narratives to manage ideological and organizational threats in an increasingly complex world.

## THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Nostalgia, defined as a sentimental longing for the past (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2018), plays a crucial role in how individuals interpret and respond to contemporary events, especially during times of crisis (Wildschut & Sedikides, 2022). Nostalgia can be categorized into two primary forms: individual nostalgia, which pertains to personal memories and experiences, and collective nostalgia, which involves shared memories and traditions within a social group (Lammers, 2023). Both forms of nostalgia can have significant psychological implications for political behavior, particularly in shaping how individuals perceive and react to threats against their ideological beliefs.

Reiss et al. (2021) provide a comprehensive framework for categorizing psychological threats based on their impact on three fundamental psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. These needs are critical in driving human behavior and are closely linked to negative affective experiences such as anxiety, sadness, sorrow, and hostility. Autonomy requires a meaningful, purposeful, authentic, and self-governed life (Deci & Ryan, 2000). It encompasses the desire for individuals to feel in control of their actions and decisions and live by their true selves. When autonomy is threatened, individuals may experience feelings of helplessness and a lack of purpose, leading to significant emotional distress. Competence involves the need for knowledge, predictability, and control over personal and social events. It reflects the human desire to navigate life's challenges effectively and capable. When this need is compromised, individuals might feel incompetent, uncertain, and overwhelmed, which can trigger anxiety and a sense of inadequacy. Further, relatedness entails the need for belonging and social embeddedness. It

represents the drive to form meaningful connections and be part of a community. Threats to relatedness, such as social exclusion, can lead to profound feelings of loneliness and isolation, severely impacting mental health and well-being.

The taxonomy proposed by Reiss et al. (2021) categorizes psychological threats into two broad domains: social/environmental threats and personal threats, which are relevant in the 2020 context. Social and environmental threats include isolation, social exclusion, relationship strain, and limitations on freedom of action within a social context. For example, the social distancing measures imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated feelings of isolation and uncertainty, disrupting social connections and limiting autonomy in social interactions. Personal threats, meanwhile, involve mortality, personal uncertainty, and threats to individual freedom of action. These threats are more internal and individual, undermining a person's sense of competence and autonomy by emphasizing personal vulnerabilities, such as the fear of illness or death during the pandemic or concerns about job insecurity. Both categories of threats highlight the broader impact on psychological well-being, as they simultaneously challenge individuals' social bonds and personal stability.

Individuals employ various defense mechanisms to cope with psychological threats, which can be broadly categorized into proximal and distal defenses (Reiss et al., 2021). Proximal defenses are immediate; reactive strategies triggered when threats lack clear solutions. These defenses often manifest as intense emotional responses, such as anxiety, fear, anger, or sadness, prompting individuals to suppress or avoid thoughts related to the threat to mitigate its immediate emotional impact. For example, someone feeling overwhelmed by the uncertainties of a global crisis might consciously avoid news or discussions about the threat. In contrast, distal defenses are more complex and long-term strategies that indirectly address threats by reshaping broader cognition and behavior. Distal defenses come into play after the initial emotional response has been managed. These defenses help individuals adapt by constructing narratives or finding meaning, which influence long-term decisions, including voting behavior and how crises are processed cognitively and emotionally.

Interestingly, nostalgia - an emotion that reconnects individuals with a glorified past, can function as a proximal and distal defense mechanism during multidimensional crises. As a proximal defense, nostalgia provides immediate emotional relief, reducing anxiety by evoking memories of a more stable, orderly, and secure past. As a distal defense, nostalgia may shape long-term attitudes and behaviors, particularly by heightening sensitivity to perceived threats to ideological values. This aligns with conservative tendencies to resist change and preserve tradition (Stefaniak et al., 2021; Wildschut et al., 2014), as nostalgia often amplifies concerns that contemporary changes, such as progressive social movements advocating for LGBTQ+ rights or racial equality, undermine traditional values. This sensitivity can lead nostalgic individuals to perceive such changes as existential threats to cherished social structures.

The motivated social cognition framework of Jost et al. (2003) provides a theoretical foundation for understanding this phenomenon. Central to this framework is managing uncertainty and threat, with conservatism emphasizing resistance to change and preserving traditional values. Key psychological dimensions associated with conservatism include dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, a preference for order and structure, a need for closure, fear of death, and system threat. These cognitive and emotional tendencies help individuals manage existential and epistemic uncertainties. The framework also accounts for variability across contexts, highlighting how conservatives and liberals may exhibit these traits depending on their social and ideological circumstances.

Nostalgia integrates seamlessly into this framework by intensifying the perception of threats to conservative ideologies, framing progressive changes as challenges to stability and continuity. This reinforces the cognitive and motivational tendencies associated with conservatism and highlights the role of emotional mechanisms in shaping ideological adherence. For instance, the resurgence of right-wing populism in various Western democracies and other developed nations has been partly attributed to a collective sense of nostalgia for a time when national identity and social norms were perceived to be more homogenous and secure (Emiroğlu, 2022; Smeekes et al., 2021).

The current study builds on Jost et al.'s framework by examining how nostalgia interacts with ideological threat perception and crisis evaluation. Nostalgia may deepen the emotional underpinnings of

conservatism and shape perceptions of societal challenges, particularly during periods of socio-political upheaval. By framing contemporary changes as existential threats, nostalgia may contribute to heightened perceptions of a multidimensional crisis, wherein various societal, political, and economic challenges are viewed as interconnected and urgent. This study further expands the framework by exploring the asymmetrical effects of nostalgia on conservative and progressive ideologies. While conservatives may perceive nostalgia as affirming their worldview and amplifying threats to their values, progressives, whose ideologies are more forward-looking, may experience nostalgia with less intensity or alignment. This asymmetry reveals how nostalgia's emotional resonance can polarize threat perceptions, deepening ideological divides during crises.

Given this complex interplay between nostalgia, ideological threat perception, and crisis evaluation, the study hypothesizes that nostalgia will amplify the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideologies, leading to heightened perceptions of a multidimensional crisis. Conversely, nostalgia is expected to have a weaker or even negative effect on the perception of threats to progressive ideologies, as progressive values are less aligned with the nostalgic longing for the past (Smeekes et al., 2015). This effect is anticipated to be particularly pronounced during a Republican presidency, where conservative values are more prominently represented. Specifically, we propose the following hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 1a:*** *Nostalgia will positively predict an increased perception of threats to conservative ideology (CI) as immediate and real threats.*

While nostalgia will likely amplify the perceived threat to conservative ideologies (CI), its effect on the perception of threats to progressive ideologies may be markedly different. Progressive ideologies are inherently forward-looking, emphasizing change, innovation, and reforming existing social structures to achieve greater social justice and equality. As such, these ideologies may not resonate as strongly with the nostalgic sentiment, which is more closely tied to preserving past values and traditions.

Nostalgia's emphasis on an idealized past can lead individuals to downplay or dismiss the urgency of contemporary issues championed by progressive ideologies. For instance, movements advocating for social justice might be perceived as less immediate or threatening by nostalgic individuals because these movements are not seen as direct challenges to the past. Instead, they are viewed as part of an ongoing process of change that is less connected to the nostalgic longing for a return to a previous era (Jost et al., 2003). Moreover, nostalgia may engender a sense of detachment or ambivalence towards progressive causes, as these movements often advocate for the very changes that nostalgic individuals may resist. This resistance is not necessarily due to a direct opposition to the values of progressivism but rather because these movements do not align with the nostalgic desire to restore or maintain traditional social orders (Jost et al., 2003; 2017). Therefore, we hypothesize that nostalgia will negatively predict the perception of threats to PI as immediate and real, as these threats are less likely to be viewed as directly challenging the nostalgic individual's idealized past:

***Hypothesis 1b:*** *Nostalgia will negatively predict the perception of threats to progressive ideology (PI) as immediate and real threats.*

Building upon Hypotheses 1a, we further posit that the effect of nostalgia on threat perception will be asymmetrical, with a stronger impact on the perception of threats to CI than to PI. This asymmetry is rooted in the inherent alignment between nostalgia and conservatism. CI often emphasizes preserving existing social structures, norms, values, and elements central to the nostalgic longing for a past perceived as better than the present (Hirsh et al., 2010). The emotional power of nostalgia lies in its ability to evoke a sense of loss for the past and a desire to reclaim it, which is inherently conservative in nature. This emotional resonance is likely to heighten the perceived seriousness of any threats to conservative values, as these threats are seen as direct assaults on the very essence of the nostalgic individual's idealized past. In contrast, because PI is more oriented towards change and the future, nostalgia is less likely to enhance the perception of threats to these ideologies.

For example, nostalgic individuals may be particularly alarmed by movements that challenge traditional family structures, religious norms, or national identity, perceiving these as immediate and existential threats to their cherished values (Elad-Strenger & Shahar, 2018). On the other hand, while nostalgic individuals may recognize the efforts of progressive movements such as social activism and social justice campaigns, they may not perceive these movements as posing an immediate threat to the social order they wish to preserve. Consequently, we hypothesize that nostalgia will have a more substantial effect on the perception of threats to CI than on the perception of threats to PI:

***Hypothesis 1c:*** *The relationship between nostalgia and the perception of threats to conservative ideology (CI) will be stronger than the relationship between collective nostalgia and the perception of threats to progressive ideology (PI).*

The perception of threats to conservative ideology, particularly when viewed as urgent and existential, can significantly contribute to a broader sense of societal crisis. In this context, a threat to CI refers to the belief that core conservative values, such as religious freedom, national sovereignty, or traditional family structures, are being undermined or attacked. These perceptions are especially potent during politically polarized periods, such as the 2020 U.S. presidential election, where ideological divides were sharp, and perceived threats to CI may manifest as challenges to long-standing societal norms (Schildkraut, 2014). When these ideological threats are perceived as immediate and interconnected, they are likely to be interpreted as part of a multidimensional crisis, or a convergence of social, economic, and political instability that compounds a sense of existential threat (Biegun & Karwowski, 2020).

In this framework, individuals who perceive their conservative values as under siege may interpret these threats as part of a larger, systemic attack on the social order, heightening the sense of crisis. For example, conservative voters may view policy changes on issues like immigration or healthcare not as isolated challenges but as emblematic of a broader effort to dismantle the traditional societal fabric. This multidimensional crisis perception is likely to be especially pronounced when these threats are viewed as both real and urgent, requiring immediate action to safeguard their worldview.

Given that nostalgia often amplifies the longing for a return to a perceived “better past” where these values were more secure, we hypothesize that the relationship between nostalgia and the perception of threats to CI will be stronger than for PI. Moreover, perceiving these threats as imminent will also positively predict the perception of a multidimensional crisis, as these threats are seen as part of a larger, systemic breakdown of social, political, and economic stability:

***Hypothesis 2a:*** *Perceiving threats to conservative ideology (CI) as immediate, real threats will positively predict a heightened perception of a multidimensional crisis.*

Similar to the mechanism proposed in Hypothesis 2a, the perception of threats to PI as immediate and real is also expected to contribute to the perception of a multidimensional crisis. For liberals, core ideological progressive values such as social justice and economic equality are foundational to their worldview (Sterling & Hardin, 2019). When these values are perceived to be under attack, particularly by conservative policies or political movements, liberals are likely to interpret these threats as indicative of a broader crisis that spans multiple dimensions of society (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

For instance, during a conservative administration, liberals may perceive the erosion of civil rights and the widening of economic inequality as interconnected threats that collectively contribute to a multidimensional crisis. This perception is fueled by the belief that these threats are not isolated incidents but rather part of a systematic effort to dismantle the progress that has been made toward a more just and equitable society (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Given that PI is often oriented towards protecting vulnerable groups and promoting long-term social and environmental goals, threats to these values will likely be perceived as urgent and serious.

As such, we hypothesize that perceiving threats to PI as immediate and real will positively predict the perception of a multidimensional crisis, as these perceived threats are seen as undermining the foundational principles of a just society:

***Hypothesis 2c:*** *Perceiving threats to progressive ideology (PI) as immediate, real threats will exhibit a stronger effect on perceptions of a multidimensional crisis than perceiving threats to conservative ideology (CI) as immediate, real threats.*

The political context, particularly the party in power, may also significantly influence how individuals perceive and react to ideological threats. When policies and rhetoric are more likely to align with conservative values, liberals/progressists may feel that their core ideological beliefs are under greater threat. This heightened sense of threat is likely to amplify the perception of a multidimensional crisis, as liberals may view the actions of a Republican administration as part of a broader effort to undermine progressive values and roll back social and environmental protections. For example, during the Trump administration, many liberals perceived the administration's policies on immigration, environmental deregulation, and social justice as indicative of a broader crisis that endangered the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). This perception of a multidimensional crisis was likely intensified by the belief that these policies were not isolated decisions but part of a coordinated effort to dismantle progressive gains and reinforce conservative ideals.

In contrast, during a Republican presidency, conservatives may feel more secure in their ideological beliefs, as the administration's policies are more likely to align with their values. As a result, conservatives may perceive fewer threats to their ideology and, consequently, may be less likely to view the political landscape as indicative of a multidimensional crisis. Therefore, we hypothesize that perceiving threats to progressive ideology as immediate and real will have a stronger effect on perceptions of a multidimensional crisis than perceiving threats to conservative ideology:

***Hypothesis 3a:*** *Perceiving threats to conservative ideology (CI) as immediate, real threats will mediate the relationship between nostalgia and the perception of a multidimensional crisis.*

By fostering a longing for a perceived better past, Nostalgia can heighten sensitivity to perceived threats to conservative ideology, which can influence broader crisis perceptions. The mediating role of perceived ideological threats would suggest that nostalgia does not directly cause individuals to perceive a multidimensional crisis. However, it does so through the lens of perceived threats to the values and social structures central to the nostalgic longing (Ionescu et al., 2023). For instance, a nostalgic individual may idealize a time when traditional family structures, national sovereignty, and religious values were more prominent. When these values are threatened by progressive social movements, secularization, or globalization, these threats may be interpreted as indicators of a broader societal decline, contributing to the perception of a multidimensional crisis. The perceived immediacy and reality of these threats mediate the relationship between nostalgia and crisis perception, with nostalgia heightening the perceived seriousness of these threats and, consequently, the sense of crisis (Wildschut et al., 2014):

***Hypothesis 3b:*** *Perceiving threats to progressive ideology (PI) as immediate, real threats will mediate the relationship between nostalgia and the perception of a multidimensional crisis.*

While nostalgia is more closely aligned with conservative values, it can also influence perceptions of a multidimensional crisis through perceived threats to PI, albeit in a potentially different manner. For nostalgic individuals who nonetheless hold progressive values, the perception of threats to PI—such as social inequality or the erosion of civil liberties—can mediate the relationship between nostalgia and crisis perception (Routledge et al., 2013).

In this context, nostalgia may evoke a longing for a past where progress toward social justice and environmental protection was more vigorous, and these values were considered integral to national identity.

When these values are perceived to be under threat, nostalgic individuals may interpret these threats as part of a broader crisis that undermines the progress they hold dear. Therefore, the perceived seriousness of these threats mediates the relationship between nostalgia and the perception of a multidimensional crisis, with nostalgia heightening the sense of urgency and concern for the future (Smeekes et al., 2015):

***Hypothesis 3c:*** *Collective nostalgia will exhibit a positive direct effect on perceptions of a multidimensional crisis.*

Nostalgia, as an emotion rooted in a sense of loss or displacement, can directly contribute to the perception of a multidimensional crisis. Individuals who experience nostalgia often feel that the present is disconnected from a cherished past, leading to a heightened awareness of contemporary social, political, and economic challenges. This disconnection can foster a belief that society is in a state of decline, contributing to the perception that multiple, interrelated crises are converging to create a broader societal breakdown. For example, nostalgic individuals may perceive the current state of political polarization, economic inequality, and social unrest as signs of a broader crisis, reflecting their belief that society has moved away from the values and stability of the past. This perception is not necessarily tied to specific ideological threats but rather to a generalized sense that the present is fundamentally flawed compared to the idealized past. As such, we hypothesize that nostalgia will have a direct positive effect on the perception of a multidimensional crisis, as the emotional resonance of nostalgia amplifies the perceived seriousness and interconnectedness of contemporary challenges (Routledge et al., 2011):

***Hypothesis 4a:*** *Nostalgia will moderate the relationship between the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology (CI) and perceptions of a multidimensional crisis, such that higher levels of nostalgia will be associated with a weakening of the focal relationship.*

While nostalgia can heighten sensitivity to perceived threats to CI, it can also provide a psychological buffer that moderates the relationship between these perceived threats and the overall perception of a multidimensional crisis. By evoking a sense of continuity and stability, nostalgia can mitigate the perceived seriousness of contemporary threats, as nostalgic individuals may take comfort in the belief that the core values they cherish will ultimately endure despite current challenges (Sedikides et al., 2008). A nostalgic conservative might perceive progressive social changes as serious threats but may also find solace in believing that society will eventually return to its traditional values. This nostalgic reassurance could weaken the relationship between the perceived seriousness of these threats and the overall perception of a multidimensional crisis, as nostalgia's emotional comfort reduces the crisis's perceived urgency or severity (Wildschut et al., 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize that higher levels of nostalgia will be associated with a weakening of the relationship between perceived threats to CI and perceptions of a multidimensional crisis:

***Hypothesis 4b:*** *Nostalgia will moderate the relationship between the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology and perceptions of a multidimensional crisis, such that higher levels of nostalgia will be associated with a weakening of the focal relationship.*


Similarly, nostalgia may moderate the relationship between perceived threats to PI and the perception of a multidimensional crisis. However, given that nostalgia is less likely to be aligned with progressive values, its moderating effect may manifest differently. While nostalgia may still provide a psychological buffer, it might do so by fostering a sense of detachment or ambivalence towards progressive causes rather than offering reassurance as it might with conservative values (Routledge et al., 2013). A nostalgic individual might recognize the importance of social justice but feel less personally threatened by challenges to these issues. This detachment could weaken the relationship between the perceived seriousness of these threats and the overall perception of a multidimensional crisis, as the nostalgic individual may not view these issues as directly challenging their idealized past (Smeekes et al., 2021). Consequently, we



hypothesize that higher levels of nostalgia will be associated with weakening the relationship between perceived threats to PI and perceptions of a multidimensional crisis.

This study also explores whether the proposed Hypotheses 1-4 apply consistently across individual and collective nostalgia forms. Specifically, Research Question 1 investigates whether the relationships outlined in Hypotheses 1-4, such as nostalgia's impact on the perception of ideological threats and subsequent crisis evaluation, hold substantively equivalent when nostalgia is experienced individually versus collectively. The theoretical model associated with these hypotheses is depicted in Figure 1.

**FIGURE 1**  
**THEORETICAL MODEL FOR HYPOTHESES 1-4**



Political ideology is a key factor in how individuals interpret and prioritize threats (Choma & Hodson, 2017), particularly regarding the temporal focus of those threats. Conservatives, who often value tradition, order, and the preservation of established social hierarchies, are more likely to perceive past-focused threats, or those that challenge or seek to overturn these hierarchies, as particularly serious (Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, the temporal focus of a threat can interact with political ideology to shape the perceived seriousness of that threat.

For example, conservatives may perceive movements advocating for the dismantling of traditional gender roles, the secularization of public life, or the weakening of national borders as serious threats because these movements are seen as efforts to undermine the social order they wish to preserve. The temporal focus on reversing or challenging the past makes these threats more salient and concerning for conservatives, who are likely to view them as existential challenges to their ideological beliefs (Jost et al., 2003). In contrast, liberals who are more likely to prioritize future-oriented goals such as social justice, environmental sustainability, and innovation may be less concerned with past-focused threats and more concerned with threats that impede progress toward these goals. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 5:** *Political ideology will moderate the relationship between the temporal focus of a threat and its Perceived seriousness, such that past-focused threats are perceived as more serious among politically conservative individuals.*

With its focus on an idealized past, nostalgia is likely to amplify the perceived seriousness of threats that are temporally focused on the past, particularly those that challenge the continuity of social hierarchies and traditions. For nostalgic individuals, threats that seek to overturn or discredit the past are not merely ideological challenges but existential ones that threaten their sense of identity and belonging (Sedikides et al., 2015).

For instance, nostalgic individuals may perceive efforts to rewrite historical narratives, remove traditional symbols, or challenge longstanding social norms as serious threats because these actions attack the past they idealize. The temporal focus on altering or erasing the past makes these threats more salient and concerning for nostalgic people, who may view such changes as direct challenges to their cherished values (Smeekes et al., 2017). Given that nostalgia is often intertwined with a desire to preserve or return to the past, it is likely to moderate the relationship between the temporal focus of a threat and its perceived seriousness. Specifically, we hypothesize that:

***Hypothesis 6:*** *Nostalgia will moderate the relationship between the temporal focus of a threat and its perceived seriousness, such that past-focused threats to existing social hierarchies will exhibit higher levels of perceived seriousness in people who report higher levels of nostalgia (such that those who are more nostalgic are likely to perceive threats to existing social hierarchy as more serious).*


The interaction between nostalgia, political ideology, and the temporal focus of threats is likely to produce complex effects on how serious these threats are perceived to be. Specifically, the moderating effect of nostalgia on the relationship between temporal focus and perceived seriousness is expected to be stronger among conservatives, for whom both nostalgia and ideology reinforce the importance of preserving the past (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).

For example, a conservative, nostalgic individual might perceive efforts to dismantle traditional institutions (e.g., marriage, religion) as particularly serious threats because these efforts only challenge their political beliefs and their nostalgic attachment to the past. The combination of nostalgia and conservative ideology amplifies the perceived seriousness of these past-focused threats (Jost et al., 2003). This three-way interaction suggests that the effect of nostalgia on the perceived seriousness of threats is not uniform but is instead contingent on the individual's PI and the temporal focus of the threat. Thus, we hypothesize that:

***Hypothesis 7:*** *There is a three-way interaction among the temporal focus of a threat, nostalgia, and political ideology, such that the moderating effect of nostalgia on the relationship between a threat's temporal focus and its perceived seriousness will be stronger for individuals who identify as holding more conservative political ideals.*

The theoretical model associated with these hypotheses is depicted in Figure 2.

**FIGURE 2**  
**THEORETICAL MODEL FOR HYPOTHESES 5-7**



Note: No specific hypothesis surrounding the main effect of temporal focus

## METHOD

### Sample and Procedure

This study employed a cross-sectional survey design. The survey was conducted during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, one week before election day, to measure levels of personal and collective nostalgia, perceived threats, and political ideology. The study involved two separate samples collected through different platforms, with a total of 484 participants. Sample one consisted of 224 students at a large public university in California, surveyed through a Qualtrics survey. Sample two included 260 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), allowing for a diverse set of respondents and increasing the generalizability of our findings. The sample was diverse, including 45% females and 54% males (<1% Other), with an average age of 32 years ( $SD = 12.21$ ). Ethnic representation included 63% White, 6% Black or African American, 1% American Indian or Alaskan Native, 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 12% Asian, and 21% other ethnicities (5% of respondents reported multiple ethnicities, and 1% reported none). Political partisanship also varied, with 26% identifying as Republican, 23% as Independent, 43% as Democrat, and 8% as Other.

Participants completed an online survey (Appendix A) assessing their perception of crisis (existence, severity, solutions, need for change in decision-making), perception of different threat drivers composing the then-current context in the US (BLM, radical far-left groups, white supremacy groups, domestic voting fraud, foreign interventions in current elections, Covid-19, wearing a mask and practicing social distancing), their perceived temporal focus of threat drivers, political affiliation, level of media exposure, romanticism of leadership, collective nostalgia, Holbrook Nostalgia Index, agentic vs communal values, self-esteem, managerial cynicism, voting preference, and political knowledge.

### Measures

#### *Individual Nostalgia*

Respondents' level of individual nostalgia was measured using a subset of the Time Perspective Inventory's Past-Positive Subscale, which comprises a set of items designed to assess the degree to which respondents positively view personal past experiences (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). A sample item included, "Even when I am enjoying the present, I am drawn back to comparisons with past experiences." The full list of survey items is provided in Appendix A. This subset included all original scale items except reverse-coded items, omitted from the final scale. While inclusion of reverse coded items has been shown to address issues related to acquiescence bias and non-attention of respondents, they have also been shown to elicit higher error rates while resulting in numerous psychometric issues stemming from reduced internal consistency and method effects that detract from the unidimensionality of a scale (Hughes, 2009; Ilhan et

al., 2024; Suárez Álvarez et al., 2018; Weijters & Baumgartner, 2012). After removing reverse-coded items, the final scale exhibited adequate internal consistency metrics ( $\alpha = 0.84$ ,  $\omega = 0.84$ ).

#### *Collective Nostalgia*

Respondents' level of collective nostalgia was measured using the Baldwin et al. (2018) Collective Nostalgia Scale, designed to assess shared experiences of nostalgia among members of an unspecified ingroup. Sample item included "*How nostalgic do you feel for each of the following aspects of the past? The way the society was.*" Items exhibited adequate internal consistency metrics ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ,  $\omega = 0.94$ ) in the scale's original form.

#### *Perception of Multidimensional Crisis*

Respondent's perception of the multidimensional crisis was measured using four items, "*The US is currently in a state of crisis,*"; "*The problems facing America are severe,*"; "*Swift decisions must be made in order to resolve the current state of affairs in the US,*" and "*It is unclear how to solve the current situation in America.*" Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with each of these statements on a 7-point scale ranging from "Very Strongly Disagree" to "Very Strongly Agree." These items, aimed at assessing respondents' perceptions surrounding the presence, severity, and urgency of a multidimensional crisis in the U.S., collectively exhibited adequate internal consistency metrics ( $\alpha = 0.86$ ,  $\omega = 0.86$ ).

#### *Perceived Relevance of Threats to Conservative and Progressive Ideology*

Respondents were presented with 11 statements regarding hypothetical threat drivers central to national political discourse during the 2020 US presidential election cycle. The items encompass a range of perceived threats, including social movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter), extremist groups (e.g., Antifa, white supremacists), public health concerns (e.g., COVID-19), and geopolitical issues (e.g., China's handling of the COVID-19 outbreak) (Drakulich & Denver, 2022; Lau et al., 2021; Pérez-Curiel, 2021). Respondents were asked to express the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with said statements on a 7-point scale ranging from "Very Strongly Disagree" to "Very Strongly Agree." Responses were factor analyzed using confirmatory models to assess the one-dimensionality of participant endorsements of the various threat drivers. Initial assessments identified opposite loading patterns, with five items exhibiting positive loadings and six items exhibiting negative loadings. As such, a second-factor model was specified in which items were split into two distinct, inversely correlated factors ( $r = -0.50$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ), which exhibited significantly improved fit to the data via likelihood ratio testing ( $\chi^2(1) = 107.94$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ) (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). Assessment of item contents revealed a distinct mapping from each factor to items describing threats to conservative and progressive ideology. As such, items with substantive loadings ( $\beta > 0.3$ ) onto their corresponding factors were retained as measures of participants' perceptions regarding the relevance of threats to conservative and progressive ideology (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Both scales exhibited adequate internal consistency metrics (Threats to conservative ideology:  $\alpha = 0.78$ ,  $\omega = 0.78$ ; Threats to progressive ideology:  $\alpha = 0.82$ ,  $\omega = 0.82$ ) (Cronbach, 1951; Kalkbrenner, 2024; McDonald, 1999). See Table 1 for a summary of factor loadings corresponding to both unidimensional and bidimensional factor models.

**TABLE 1**  
**FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THREAT DRIVER ITEMS**

Threat Driver	Unidimensional Loading	Bidimensional Factor 1 loading	Bidimensional Factor 2 loading
The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is a serious threat to our country.	0.56	0.79	-
Radical far-left groups such as Antifa are a serious threat to our country.	0.38	0.67	-
Domestic voting fraud in this election (e.g., through mail-in ballots) is a serious threat to our country.	0.35	0.59	-
Wearing face masks and practicing social distancing represents government intrusion into our personal lives, threatening our individual rights.	0.72	0.62	-
China's handling of the COVID-19 outbreak continues to be a serious threat to our country.	0.27	0.55	-
White supremacist groups are a serious threat to our country.	-0.63	-	0.73
Ultraconservative militia /vigilante groups are a serious threat to our country.	-0.62	-	0.72
Foreign interference in this election (e.g., by Russia) is a serious threat to our country.	0.53	-	0.62
I feel threatened that my loved ones or I could become infected with COVID-19	0.67	-	0.64
COVID-19 is currently a serious threat to our country.	-0.79	-	0.74
People's jobs and economic security are currently being threatened in our country	-0.20	-	0.27*

Note: All loadings were significant at the 0.0001 level. Bidimensional Factor 1: Perceived relevance of threats to conservative ideology. Bidimensional Factor 2: Perceived relevance of threats to progressive ideology. \*Item dropped from perceived relevance of threats to progressive ideology scale.

#### *Political Ideology*

Political Ideology was measured using a single item, “How would you describe your political ideology 1(very Liberal) - 7 (very conservative)?” aimed at assessing participants’ identification with conservative versus progressive political ideology.

#### *Seriousness of Threat to Social Welfare*

For individual threat drivers, respondents were asked to respond to a single item, “In your opinion, how serious does the following item pose the threat to social welfare? 1 (not serious) - 7 (very serious)”, aimed at assessing respondents’ perceived seriousness surrounding 13 issues central to national political discourse

in the U.S. during the 2020 presidential election cycle (Bedolla, 2020; Chen et al., 2020; Martin, 2021). See Table 2 for a summary of descriptive statistics of issues assessed.

#### *Temporal Focus of Threat*

To analyze how individuals perceive the temporal focus of threats concerning their ideological leanings, respondents were asked to categorize 13 issues central to U.S. political discourse during the 2020 presidential election cycle based on their perceived threat to the past or future. The item used was, “*Based on your personal opinion, categorize the items below based on the threat that they pose to the past or the future.*” The scale ranged from 1 (threat to the past: established systems, traditions, old values) to 2 (threat to the future: change and progression). These ratings allowed us to examine whether specific threats were predominantly seen as challenges to preserving traditional societal structures or as obstacles to advancing future-oriented goals. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for these items.

**TABLE 2**  
**DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THREAT SERIOUSNESS AND TEMPORAL FOCUS ITEMS**

Issue	Mean Temporal Focus	SD (Temporal Focus)	Proportion (Temporal Focus= Future)	Mean Seriousness	SD (Seriousness)
More police reform	1.49	0.50	0.49	3.50	1.92
Stricter gun control	1.47	0.50	0.47	3.45	2.10
Limiting abortion rights	1.67	0.47	0.67	4.22	2.20
More education reform.	1.54	0.50	0.54	3.25	2.00
Climate change	1.83	0.38	0.83	4.87	2.11
“Zero tolerance” approach to illegal immigration	1.69	0.46	0.69	4.12	1.99
Keeping Obamacare	1.54	0.50	0.54	3.42	1.98
Foreign countries interference with domestic affairs	1.74	0.44	0.74	4.85	1.63
Women’s right movements (#MeToo, Time’s up)	1.48	0.50	0.48	3.10	2.02
The COVID-19 pandemic	1.92	0.28	0.92	5.73	1.55
The Black Live Matters movement	1.55	0.50	0.55	3.57	2.18
Voting fraud	1.73	0.44	0.73	4.51	1.99
Current economic policies	1.73	0.44	0.73	4.64	1.61
Police brutality	1.76	0.43	0.76	5.29	1.83

#### **Data Analysis**

Analyses were conducted using R (Version 4.2.2; R Core Team, 2022). Data cleaning and preparation were conducted using R’s dplyr (version 1.1.2) and tidyverse (version 1.3.2) packages. Outlier treatment was conducted using R’s MASS package (version 7.3.58.1). Statistical assumption testing was conducted using R’s car (version 3.1.1) and mvnTest (version 1.1.0) packages for homoskedasticity and multivariate normality testing. Model one estimation and reliability testing were conducted using R’s lavaan (version

0.6.12) semTools (version 0.5.6). Bootstrapping procedures used in supplementary analyses aimed at testing hypotheses 1c and 2c were implemented using R's boot (version 1.3.28) package. Model two estimation was conducted using R's lme4 (version 1.1.31), performance (version 0.10.2), and lmerTest (version 3.1.3) packages. After constructing all necessary composite scores, the data was split into separate sets containing the necessary variables for testing hypotheses 1-4 and 5-7. Missing data and multivariate outliers (identified via cases exhibiting Mahalanobis distances with associated  $\chi^2$  statistics that were significant at the 0.05 level) were treated via listwise deletion.

During data cleaning, three cases were dropped due to missing values. Furthermore, 43 multivariate outliers (with respect to individual and collective Nostalgia, Perceived seriousness of threats to conservative and progressive ideologies, Perception of Multidimensional Crisis, Political Ideology, and Age) were also dropped, leaving 438 observations for subsequent analyses. All variables were centered before the construction of interaction terms, and multicollinearity was assessed via variable-wise variance inflation factors, all below 2.1.

#### *Analysis: Hypotheses 1-4*

Assumption checks involved multivariate normality testing via a Henze-Zirkler test (using the *HZ.test* function in R's *mvnTest* package) test and homoscedasticity testing via a Breusch-Pagan test (using the *ncvTest* function in R's *car* package). Multivariate normality was supported ( $HZ=0.99$ ,  $p=0.19$ ), but Breusch-Pagan testing indicated a violation of homoskedasticity ( $\chi^2(1) = 41.31$ ,  $p<0.0001$ ). As such, hypotheses 1-4 were tested using mediational path models that utilized bootstrapped standard errors (based on 10,000 bootstrap draws), which have been shown to yield robust estimates of both direct and indirect effect coefficients (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Tomarken & Waller, 2005).

#### *Analysis: Hypotheses 5-7*

Hypotheses 5-7 involved asking participants to assess multiple political threat drivers' temporal focus and seriousness. Accurate assessment of the effect that a threat driver's temporal focus exercises on its perceived seriousness requires careful consideration of the level of analysis at which this effect is being considered. When lower-level units of analysis share some common characteristic described by the levels of some higher-order unit of analysis, measurements taken at the lower-order level are described as *nested* or *clustered* within higher-order units. Nested data results in violations of statistical independence assumptions crucial to the accurate estimation of effects under generalized linear models (GLMs). Mixed-effects models are extensions of traditional GLMs that account for these violations by estimating fixed effects or the linearized effects of independent variables (IVs) on a given dependent variable (DV) after controlling for random effects, which describe the effect of variability in the higher-order units within which lower-order units are nested on the variability of a given DV (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Random effects can exercise their influence on a DV in the form of random intercepts or random slopes. Random intercepts describe the variability in baseline levels of a DV across higher-order units after controlling for fixed effects. In contrast, random slopes describe variability in IV effects across higher-order units (i.e., deviations from fixed effects that manifest within specific higher-order units) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).

Testing Hypotheses 5-7 involved using nested data structures where measurements about the same set of lower-level units of analysis (i.e., participants) were taken concerning all higher-level units (i.e., individual threat driver items assessed by participants for serious and temporal focus). Data structured in this manner is described as *cross-nested* because clustering is non-hierarchical, with neither level of analysis capable of being strictly designated as a lower or higher order (i.e., while people can be described as nested within items, items can just as well be described as being nested within people). This type of cross-nested data lends itself to violations of statistical independence at both the between-persons (due to clustering of persons-level variance within specific items) and between-items (due to clustering of items-level variance within specific people who supplied measurements of multiple items) levels, which can result in inaccurate or biased effect estimates (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Mixed-effects models can be extended to account for random effects concerning any number of cross-nested levels of analysis, with fixed effects being interpretable as the main effect of an IV on a DV at any given combination of units at the between-persons

and between-items level (i.e., the expected effect of an item's perceived temporal focus on its perceived seriousness for any given combination of person  $i$  and item  $j$ , etc.; see Snijders & Bosker, 2012).

Given the cross-nested nature of the data used to test hypotheses 5-7, it was necessary to account for the effects of person-level variability in the expected baseline level of any given item's perceived seriousness, as well as item-level variability in the expected baseline level of any given person's level of endorsement for item seriousness. However, because we made no specific hypotheses regarding item-wise variability in the effects of a person's nostalgia or political ideology on their level of endorsement for item seriousness, nor regarding person-wise variability in the effect of an item's perceived temporal focus on its perceived seriousness, we elected to only specify random intercepts in all mixed effects models specified in the process of testing hypotheses 5-7.

To prepare the data for mixed effects modeling, we created separate datasets to hold data of interest about individual items and person-wise data held constant across items. Data was cleaned on a dataset-wise basis before being recombined in a long R data frame indexed by individual items for use in mixed effects modeling. Within each dataset, missing data and outlier treatment mimicked the procedure used in preparing the data for testing hypotheses 1-4. All variables were centered before the construction of interaction terms, and multicollinearity was assessed via variable-wise variance inflation factors, all below 1.3. See Table 3 for a summary of data cleaning outcomes, including counts of missing items and multivariate outliers dropped, as well as final sample sizes for each item of interest to hypotheses 5-7.

**TABLE 3**  
**ITEM-WISE DATA CLEANING FOR THREAT SERIOUSNESS AND TEMPORAL FOCUS ITEMS**

Issue	Missing items	Multivariate Outliers	Final sample size
More police reform.	11	23	450
Stricter gun control	12	23	449
Limiting abortion rights	11	23	450
More education reform.	13	22	449
Climate change	9	34	441
“Zero tolerance” approach to illegal immigration	10	25	449
Keeping Obamacare	13	29	442
Foreign countries interference with domestic affairs	11	22	451
Women's right movements (#MeToo, Time's up)	12	22	450
The COVID-19 pandemic	9	57	418
The Black Live Matters movement	12	24	448
Voting fraud	11	24	449
Current economic policies	13	28	443
Police brutality	28	22	434



## RESULTS

### Model 1: Hypotheses 1-4 (Collective Nostalgia)

Model one indicated mixed support for hypotheses 1-4. See item-wise descriptives and correlations in Table 4. Nostalgia exhibited both a significant positive relationship with the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology ( $\beta = 0.55$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ) and a significant negative relationship with the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology ( $\beta = -0.20$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ), indicating support for both hypotheses 1a and 1b. Concerning predicting perceptions of multidimensional crisis, perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology exhibited a non-significant effect ( $\beta = -0.01$ ,  $p = 0.9$ ), indicating insufficient support for hypothesis 2a, but its interaction with Nostalgia ( $\beta = 0.10$ ,  $p < 0.02$ ) did exhibit a significant effect, indicating support for Hypothesis 4a. On the other hand, the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology exhibited a significant effect ( $\beta = 0.61$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ), but its interaction with Nostalgia did not ( $\beta = -0.08$ ,  $p = 0.11$ ), indicative of empirical support for Hypothesis 2b, but not for Hypothesis 4b.

**TABLE 4**  
**ITEM-WISE DESCRIPTIVES AND CORRELATIONS**


Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Crisis Perception	5.67	1					
2. Perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology	3.7	1.35	-.22**				
3. Perceived seriousness of threats to liberal ideology	5.34	1.14	.60**	-.46**			
4. Collective Nostalgia	4.13	1.76	0	.55**	-.20**		
5. Age	30.93	10.93	0	-0.02	0.01	0.09	
6. Conservativeness of political ideology	3.53	1.66	-.31**	.64**	-.54**	.42**	.12*

The conditional indirect effects of Nostalgia on perceptions of multidimensional crisis via perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology were non-significant across all measured levels of Nostalgia ( $\beta = -0.004$ ,  $p = 0.9$  at average Nostalgia levels;  $\beta = 0.05$ ,  $p = 0.15$  at one standard deviation above the mean;  $\beta = -0.06$ ,  $p = 0.17$  at one standard deviation below the mean), indicating insufficient support for hypothesis 3a. One caveat to note with this result is that, given the restricted ranges within which these simple slope analyses were conducted and the trend toward statistical significance observed at one standard deviation removed from the mean for nostalgia, it may be possible for nostalgia to exhibit significant indirect effects at both extremely high and extremely low levels. Indeed, supplemental analyses found just such a pattern, with Nostalgia exhibiting significant indirect effects on perceptions of multidimensional crisis via perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology at three standard deviations above ( $\beta = .16$ ,  $p = 0.03$ ) and below ( $\beta = -0.17$ ,  $p = 0.04$ ) the mean of Nostalgia.

The conditional indirect effects of Nostalgia on perceptions of multidimensional crisis via perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology were significant across all measured levels of Nostalgia ( $\beta = -0.12$ ,  $p < 0.0001$  at average Nostalgia levels;  $\beta = -0.11$ ,  $p < 0.0001$  at 1 standard deviation above the mean;  $\beta = -0.14$ ,  $p < 0.0001$  at 1 standard deviation below the mean), indicative of support for hypothesis 3b. Nostalgia also exhibited a significant, positive direct effect on perceptions of multidimensional crisis ( $\beta = 0.19$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ), ultimately supporting Hypothesis 3c. When conditioned on all other model variables, this

positive direct effect further indicates that Nostalgia's negative indirect effect via perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology acts as a suppressive effect, weakening the unconditioned effect of Nostalgia on multidimensional crisis perceptions. This model explained approximately 39% of the variance in participants' perceptions of the multidimensional crisis, 30% in the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology, and 4% in the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology. See Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of Model 1 concerning Collective Nostalgia, and Table 5 in Appendix B for a complete summary of model coefficient statistics.

**FIGURE 3**  
**PATH DIAGRAM SUMMARIZING MODEL 1 RESULTS**



Note: \*Indicates statistically significant estimates at the 0.05 level (also indicated by bolded paths).

To test hypothesis 1c, we ran a series of supplemental analyses that began with running a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance to assess whether Collective Nostalgia explained a significantly different amount of variance in the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative and progressive ideology. Omnibus testing concluded significant differences via Wilks lambda ( $\Lambda=0.68$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), Pillai's trace ( $\Lambda=0.32$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), Hotelling's Trace ( $\Lambda=0.47$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), and Roy's greatest Root ( $\Lambda=0.47$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Post Hoc analyses were then run by building a series of simple linear regression models predicting the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative and progressive ideology from Collective Nostalgia. These models were based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples, from which we constructed a bootstrapped distribution of  $R^2$  statistics to build a robust estimate of how much variance Collective Nostalgia could predict in each outcome of interest.

This analysis found that Collective Nostalgia could be expected to explain approximately 32% of the variance in perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology (95%CI [0.25, 0.39]) and 3% of the variance in perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology (95%CI [0.01, 0.06]). Given the lack of observed overlap between the bootstrapped confidence intervals of the two models, we concluded that Collective Nostalgia exhibited a stronger effect on the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology than threats to progressive ideology, ultimately supporting hypothesis 1c. See Table 6 for omnibus

MANCOVA statistics and Table 7 for a summary of bootstrapped statistics for a post-hoc analysis of Collective Nostalgia's differential effects on the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative and progressive ideology. Similarly, to test hypothesis 2c, we constructed a series of bootstrapped simple linear regression models to assess how much of the variance in crisis perceptions could be explained by the unconditioned, simple effects of perceived seriousness of threats to conservative and progressive ideology, respectively. Because this analysis did not include any effects corresponding to Nostalgia, it yielded identical results to those described above, which correspond to the statistics summarized in Table 8, supporting hypothesis 2c.

**TABLE 6**  
**MANCOVA SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE EFFECT OF NOSTALGIA ON THE PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THREAT**

Statistic	Value	df	F	p
Wilks	0.68	(2, 449)	107.11	<.001
Pillai	0.32	(2, 449)	107.11	<.001
Hotelling-Lawley	0.47	(2, 449)	107.11	<.001
Roy	0.47	(2, 449)	107.11	<.001

**TABLE 7**  
**SUMMARY OF BOOTSTRAPPED EFFECT DIFFERENTIAL ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF NOSTALGIA ON PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THREAT**

Model	R <sup>2</sup>	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>
Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.32	0.25	0.39
Threats to Progressive Ideology	0.028	0.006	0.06

**TABLE 8**  
**SUMMARY OF BOOTSTRAPPED EFFECT DIFFERENTIAL ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THREAT ON MULTIDIMENSIONAL CRISIS PERCEPTIONS**

Model	R <sup>2</sup>	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>
Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.04	0.01	0.08
Threats to Progressive Ideology	0.365	0.29	0.44

#### **Model 2: Hypotheses 5-7 (Collective Nostalgia)**

Model two indicated mixed support for hypotheses 5-7. The temporal focus of a threat exhibited a significant negative fixed effect on the perceived seriousness of that threat ( $\beta = -0.24$  (95% CI [-0.27, -0.22]),  $p < 0.0001$ ), indicating that more future-focused threats generally exhibited higher levels of perceived seriousness. The interaction of Temporal Focus and Political Ideology exhibited a significant positive fixed effect on the perceived seriousness of that threat ( $\beta = 0.05$  (95% CI [0.03, 0.08]),  $p < 0.0001$ ), demonstrating support for hypothesis 5. This result indicates that across all items, people who reported more conservative political ideologies were expected to exhibit weaker negative effects between temporal focus and


seriousness, such that more conservative individuals were less likely to report future-focused items as more serious and more likely to report past-focused items as more serious. The interaction of Temporal Focus and Nostalgia exhibited a non-significant fixed effect on the perceived seriousness of that threat ( $\beta = 0.01$  (95% CI [-0.02, 0.03]),  $p = 0.55$ ), demonstrating insufficient evidence to support hypothesis 6.

The three-way interaction of temporal focus, political ideology, and nostalgia exhibited a significant negative fixed effect on the perceived seriousness of that threat ( $\beta = -0.06$  (95% CI [-0.08, -0.03]),  $p < 0.0001$ ), indicating that, while among people reporting average levels of conservative ideology, those reporting higher levels of nostalgia are expected to be no less likely to report future focused items as more serious, among those reporting higher levels of conservative ideology, the impact of nostalgia on the relationship between temporal focus and seriousness may change such that those with higher levels of nostalgia become more likely to report future focused items as more severe than those with lower levels rather than less likely.

This pattern of conditional effects reflects the opposite of what was hypothesized: the negative moderating effect of nostalgia would be amplified in more conservative individuals. We instead observe that while the moderating effect of collective nostalgia is typically null or weakly negative, it is expected to strengthen in the opposite direction at moderately high levels of ideological conservatism, ultimately dampening the joint moderating effect of the two variables (given the typically negative moderating effect of ideological conservatism). At extremely high levels of ideological conservatism however, the moderating effect of collective nostalgia is expected to continue strengthening in the positive direction, eventually overtaking the negative moderating effect of ideological conservatism in magnitude. This results in a net positive joint effect of the two variables, strengthening the positive relationship between an item's temporal focus and perceived seriousness. As such, these results, although statistically significant and potentially distinct from those observed under individual nostalgia models, also failed to support hypothesis seven.

The model's Intra-Class Correlation was 0.18, indicating a fair degree of clustering within people and items (Nakagawa et al., 2017). Concerning the model's random effects, the random intercept variance was 0.10 across persons and 0.69 across items, whereas the residual variance was 3.14. Concerning variance explained by the model, marginal  $R^2$  was 0.09, and conditional  $R^2$  was 0.27. See Figure 4 for a graphical summary of model two's fixed effects coefficients and Table 9 for a full summary of all fixed effects coefficient statistics.

**FIGURE 4**  
**PATH DIAGRAM SUMMARIZING MODEL 2 RESULTS**



Controls

Age: **-0.04\***

Note: \*Indicates statistically significant estimates at the 0.05 level (also indicated by bolded paths). See Table 9 for a full summary of model fixed effects coefficients.

**TABLE 9**  
**SUMMARY OF MODEL 2 FIXED EFFECTS**

Variable	B	SE	df	T	p	$\beta$	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>
(Intercept)	4.450	0.235	17.256	18.911	0.000	0.010	-0.201	0.221
Age	-0.007	0.002	1290.812	-3.110	0.002	-0.039	-0.063	-0.014
Temporal Focus	-1.125	0.056	6208.689	-20.229	0.000	-0.242	-0.266	-0.219
Political Ideology	-0.014	0.016	4623.907	-0.869	0.385	-0.011	-0.036	0.014
Collective Nostalgia	0.091	0.015	5170.291	5.999	0.000	0.077	0.052	0.102
Temporal Focus * Political Ideology	0.144	0.035	6208.364	4.142	0.000	0.052	0.027	0.076
Temporal Focus * Collective Nostalgia	0.020	0.033	6209.400	0.602	0.547	0.008	-0.017	0.033
Political Ideology * Collective Nostalgia	-0.001	0.009	5109.425	-0.075	0.940	-0.001	-0.024	0.023
Temporal Focus * Political Ideology * Collective Nostalgia	-0.089	0.018	6209.122	-4.876	0.000	-0.056	-0.079	-0.034

Note: \*Denotes interaction between two or more variables. 95% Confidence intervals were computed with reference to standardized  $\beta$  coefficients and are included in-text. Political Ideology describes the conservativeness of ideology, with higher scores indicating more conservative political leanings.

## DISCUSSION

Findings yielded mixed support for the proposed hypotheses, highlighting nostalgia's power and limits in shaping political perceptions.

When considering individual nostalgia, the results demonstrated a significant positive effect on the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideology, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1a. This finding aligns with existing literature suggesting that individuals who idealize the past are more likely to view challenges to traditional values as serious threats (Wildschut et al., 2014). However, the study did not find significant support for Hypothesis 1b, as individual nostalgia did not significantly predict the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology. This outcome suggests that while nostalgia may heighten sensitivity to conservative threats, its influence on perceptions of progressive threats is less pronounced, potentially due to the dissonance between nostalgic ideals and progressive change.

The psychological needs framework proposed by Reiss et al. (2021) offers valuable insight into the underlying dynamics at play. The three fundamental psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—help explain why nostalgic individuals may perceive certain ideological threats as more serious. For example, threats to autonomy resonate with conservative fears of "losing freedoms" (e.g., resistance to mask mandates), while threats to competence reflect anxieties about "losing jobs" or economic stability. Additionally, threats to relatedness manifest in concerns about social cohesion being disrupted by outgroups or changing cultural norms (e.g., immigration or racial justice movements). These dimensions are evident in the study's findings, particularly in the factor loadings that link conservative ideology to perceived threats such as government overreach or the perceived erosion of traditional values.

In terms of crisis perception, individual nostalgia's influence was more complex. While the perceived seriousness of threats to progressive ideology significantly predicted perceptions of a multidimensional

crisis (supporting Hypothesis 2b), the same was not true for threats to conservative ideology, leading to insufficient support for Hypothesis 2a. This finding indicates that, during the period studied, threats to progressive ideology were more strongly associated with the perception of a broader societal crisis, perhaps due to the prevailing political climate at the time. The interactions between individual nostalgia and the perceived seriousness of ideological threats on crisis perceptions were similarly mixed. While nostalgia did not amplify concerns about conservative threats into broader crisis perceptions (rejecting Hypothesis 4a), it significantly interacted with progressive threats (supporting Hypothesis 4b). This suggests that nostalgia may amplify concerns about progressive threats but does not necessarily increase the perception of a broader crisis unless these threats are seen as immediate and severe.

When conceptualized as collective nostalgia, the study supported both Hypotheses 1a and 1b, with collective nostalgia significantly predicting the perceived seriousness of both conservative and progressive threats. This supports the idea that collective nostalgia is more robust and can heighten concerns about any perceived threat to a group's conservative or progressive identity (Smeekees et al., 2021).

However, the effects of collective nostalgia on crisis perceptions were more nuanced. While the interaction between collective nostalgia and perceived threats to CI was significant, supporting Hypothesis 4a, this was not the case for PI, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 4b. Additionally, collective nostalgia exhibited significant indirect effects on crisis perceptions via perceived threats to PI but not via CI. This partially supports Hypotheses 3a and 3b, suggesting that collective nostalgia may influence crisis perceptions differently depending on the ideological context.

The examination of temporal focus about political ideology (Hypotheses 5-7) revealed significant effects as well. The temporal focus of a threat significantly predicted its perceived seriousness, and this relationship was moderated by political ideology, supporting Hypothesis 5. This finding is consistent with prior research suggesting that conservatives prioritizing tradition and stability are more likely to perceive past-focused threats as serious (Jost et al., 2003).

Moreover, nostalgia significantly moderated the relationship between the temporal focus of a threat and its perceived seriousness, supporting Hypothesis 6. This indicates that nostalgic individuals who idealize the past are more likely to view past-focused threats as serious. However, the three-way interaction among temporal focus, political ideology, and nostalgia was more complex than anticipated. While the interaction was statistically significant, it did not support the expected directionality, partially rejecting Hypothesis 7. Instead, the results suggest that the moderating effect of nostalgia on threat perception may vary depending on the level of conservatism, with nostalgia potentially dampening or amplifying threat perceptions depending on the specific ideological context.

The implications of this study extend to understanding the psychological mechanisms through which nostalgia shapes political behavior. Nostalgia, whether experienced individually or collectively, appears to amplify the perceived seriousness of threats to conservative ideologies, which in turn influences broader crisis evaluations. This effect is particularly pronounced in collective nostalgia, where shared reflections on the past strengthen social identity and heighten perceptions of contemporary challenges as existential crises. The framework provided by Reiss et al. (2021) further contextualizes these findings, suggesting that nostalgia interacts with fundamental psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—to shape how ideological threats are perceived and evaluated.

Our results also align with the literature on motivated social cognition, which suggests that nostalgia can serve as a defense mechanism that reinforces social identity and ideological beliefs (Jost et al., 2003; Wildschut et al., 2014). The stronger effect of collective nostalgia on crisis perceptions indicates that when individuals engage in shared reflections on the past, they may be more likely to perceive contemporary challenges as part of a broader crisis and societal decline.

## **Theoretical Implications**

The findings of this study contribute to the broader literature on nostalgia, political ideology, and threat perception in several keyways. First, the study underscores the critical importance of distinguishing between individual and collective forms of nostalgia. While previous research has often treated nostalgia as a monolithic construct, our findings highlight how these two forms of nostalgia influence threat

perceptions differently. Individual nostalgia, rooted in personal memories and a longing for one's past, appears to be more closely tied to personal identity and conservative values. This form of nostalgia leads individuals to perceive contemporary threats as more immediate and severe, especially when those threats are perceived to undermine traditional values that they associate with their personal past (Sedikides et al., 2008). In contrast, collective nostalgia, which pertains to shared memories and a longing for a group's past, is more strongly linked to broader concerns about group identity and societal continuity (Smeekes et al., 2017). This distinction is crucial for understanding how nostalgia operates individually and collectively, influencing personal attitudes and group-based perceptions of societal threats.

*Second*, this study highlights political ideology's significant role in moderating nostalgia's effects on threat perception. The finding that conservatives are more likely to perceive past-focused threats as serious, particularly when combined with high levels of nostalgia, aligns with existing theories of motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). Conservative ideologies are often associated with a preference for stability, tradition, and resistance to change - values that nostalgia inherently amplifies. By demonstrating how nostalgia interacts with the temporal focus of perceived threats, this research extends these theories, showing that nostalgia can intensify threats' perceived seriousness when framed as challenges to the established order. This interaction is particularly pronounced among conservatives, who are more likely to view such threats as existential, further validating the connection between conservative ideology and a nostalgic orientation toward the past.

*Third*, the study reveals the complex nature of the three-way interaction between nostalgia, political ideology, and temporal focus, suggesting that the relationship between these variables is not straightforward. While nostalgia generally heightens sensitivity to past-focused threats, its effect is moderated by the individual's level of conservatism. This interaction indicates that nostalgia does not operate in a vacuum but is influenced by broader ideological contexts. For example, while high levels of conservatism amplify the nostalgic response to past-focused threats, this effect is less pronounced among individuals with lower levels of conservatism.

### **Managerial Implications**

The findings of this study have significant implications for organizational psychology and communication, political communication, marketing, and public relations, particularly in contexts where ideological polarization is prominent.

Specifically, understanding how nostalgia influences perceptions of ideological threats can help political strategists and marketers craft more effective messages. For instance, political and other organizational campaigns targeting conservative audiences might emphasize past-focused threats to mobilize support. By leveraging nostalgia, these campaigns can evoke a sense of urgency about preserving traditional values, which resonates strongly with conservative voters who already have a predisposition toward viewing the past as a golden age worth defending. Messaging that appeals to collective nostalgia—such as invoking shared memories of a “better” past when societal norms were more homogeneous—can be particularly effective in rallying conservative bases.

Conversely, campaigns aimed at progressive audiences need to be mindful of the potential dampening effects of nostalgia on crisis perceptions. PIs, which are typically future-oriented and emphasize change and innovation, may find it challenging to mobilize support if their messaging inadvertently triggers nostalgic sentiments that focus on past losses rather than future gains. To mitigate this, messaging that acknowledges the importance of historical continuity while emphasizing future-oriented goals—such as advancing social justice or environmental sustainability—can help align nostalgic sentiments with progressive objectives. This dual approach can prevent the alienation of potential supporters who might otherwise be resistant to change due to their nostalgic inclinations.

In the realm of public relations, organizations operating in politically polarized environments could benefit from understanding how nostalgia shapes stakeholder perceptions. For instance, corporations facing public scrutiny or crises can tailor their communication strategies to account for the nostalgic sentiments of their audience. By framing their messages to respect and honor past traditions while advocating for necessary changes, organizations can navigate crises more effectively and maintain public trust. This

approach is particularly relevant in industries where historical continuity and brand legacy play a significant role in consumer perceptions (e.g., Coca-Cola, Ford Mustang, or Nike).

Another significant managerial implication involves addressing the nostalgia experienced by long-tenured employees in established organizations. These individuals often develop strong emotional connections to the company's traditional culture, values, and operational practices, which can lead to a sense of discord when faced with contemporary changes. For instance, at organizations like Boeing, employees may reflect nostalgically on periods marked by stability, innovation, and a unified sense of purpose. While such nostalgia can foster identity cohesion and reinforce organizational pride (Wildschut et al., 2014; Sedikides & Wildschut, 2016), it can also function as a barrier to change by engendering skepticism or resistance toward new initiatives (Dang et al., 2023). Managers should actively engage with this dynamic by providing opportunities for employees to acknowledge and celebrate their connection to the organization's legacy while simultaneously framing change initiatives as a continuation of the company's historical successes rather than a departure from them (Brown & Humphreys, 2002). This approach could include commemorating milestones and drawing parallels between foundational values and evolving strategic goals, thereby mitigating resistance and fostering a shared sense of purpose (Sedikides et al., 2015). Moreover, recognizing and validating these emotional ties can strengthen trust, improve employee engagement, and build commitment during transitions, transforming nostalgia into a powerful resource for resilience and motivation.

### **Study Limitations and Future Research Directions**

Despite its contributions, this study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the cross-sectional design limits the ability to establish causal relationships between nostalgia, threat, and crisis perceptions. Future studies could employ longitudinal designs to track how nostalgia and threat perceptions evolve over time, particularly in response to political and social changes, thus providing stronger evidence for causality. Alternatively, experimental designs could be used to manipulate nostalgia and assess its direct impact on perceptions of threats and crises.

Second, the study's findings might be temporally sensitive, given the unique context of the 2020 U.S. presidential election and the COVID-19 pandemic, which was an unusually polarized and charged environment. Replicating the study in different contexts, when the social and political climate is less intense, would test the robustness and generalizability of these findings. Thus, future research may consider follow-up studies in different temporal contexts or during other significant political and social times to help determine whether nostalgia's observed effects are stable over time or specific to the unique circumstances of 2020.

Third, the complex nature of the three-way interaction observed in Hypothesis 7 suggests that further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which nostalgia interacts with political ideology and temporal focus. Future studies could explore additional moderating variables, such as identity salience, emotional regulation strategies, exposure to nostalgic media, or even psychological traits like anxiety or authoritarianism to better understand the boundary conditions of these effects.

Fourth, to advance a more comprehensive understanding of nostalgia and its role in political behavior, future research should explore the intersection of nostalgia with other theoretical frameworks, such as the psychology of populism. Nostalgia has been recognized as a key rhetorical tool in populist movements (particularly when mobilized in populist rhetoric to frame contemporary challenges as direct threats to autonomy, competence, and relatedness). Nevertheless, research has often focused on its thematic presence rather than its psychological effects (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). Examining how nostalgia operates in tandem with populist appeals, such as using emotional narratives to frame crises or reinforce traditionalist ideologies, could yield more profound insights into its role in shaping collective perceptions of social and political challenges. By integrating these frameworks, future studies could illuminate how nostalgia influences voter behavior, ideological polarization, and the dynamics of group identity in diverse political settings. Such research would help bridge gaps in literature and offer practical implications for understanding and addressing the emotional dimensions of political mobilization in contemporary society.



## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study advances our understanding of the intricate relationships between nostalgia, political ideology, and threat perception in organizational and political contexts. These findings underscore the importance of considering both individual and collective forms of nostalgia and the moderating role of political ideology in shaping how people perceive and respond to ideological threats. While the results partially support the proposed hypotheses, they also highlight the complexity and context-dependence of these relationships.

The theoretical implications of this research are significant, particularly in political and organizational psychology, where understanding nostalgia's emotional and cognitive underpinnings can inform more effective strategies for engaging diverse audiences. By demonstrating the differential effects of individual and collective nostalgia on threat perception, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how nostalgia functions within the broader context of ideological and crisis-related concerns.

Practically, the findings offer valuable insights for political communication and public relations, where tailored messaging strategies that account for the nostalgic sentiments of target audiences can enhance engagement and influence with these parties. By recognizing the dual-edged nature of nostalgia - its ability to mobilize and dampen perceptions of threat - strategists can better navigate the complexities of public opinion in polarized environments.

Future research should continue to explore these dynamics across different organizational and cultural contexts using varied methodological approaches. By doing so, scholars can build a more comprehensive understanding of nostalgia's role in contemporary political and organizational life, ultimately contributing to more informed and effective communication strategies in an increasingly polarized world.

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## APPENDIX 1

### SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. Threat Drivers: Your opinion on the current state of the US: We are interested in your opinion on the current state of the US. Please express to what extent you disagree or agree with each statement using a 7-point scale ranging from “Very Strongly Disagree” to “Very Strongly Agree.”
  - a) The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is a serious threat to our country.
  - b) Radical far-left groups such as Antifa are a serious threat to our country.
  - c) White supremacist groups are a serious threat to our country.
  - d) Ultraconservative militia /vigilante groups are a serious threat to our country.
  - e) Domestic voting fraud in this election (e.g., through mail-in ballots) is a serious threat to our country.
  - f) Foreign interference in this election (e.g., by Russia) is a serious threat to our country.
  - g) I feel threatened that my loved ones or I could become infected with COVID-19
  - h) Wearing face masks and practicing social distancing represents government intrusion into our personal lives, threatening our individual rights.
  - i) China’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak continues to be a serious threat to our country.
  - j) People’s jobs and economic security are currently being threatened in our country.
  - k) COVID-19 is currently a serious threat to our country.
2. Temporal focus threat (social welfare): In your opinion, how serious is the threat to social welfare posed by the following items?
  - More police reform.
  - Stricter gun control
  - Limiting abortion rights
  - More education reform.
  - Climate change
  - “Zero tolerance” approach to illegal immigration
  - Keeping Obamacare
  - Foreign countries interference with domestic affairs
  - Women’s right movements (#MeToo, Time’s up)
  - The Black Lives Matters movement
  - Voting fraud
  - Current economic policies
  - Police brutality

3. Temporal focus threat (past vs future): Based on your personal opinion, categorize the item below based on the threat that they pose to the PAST or the FUTURE (Threat to the PAST: established system, traditions, old values; threat to the FUTURE: change and progression)
  - More police reform.
  - Stricter gun control
  - Limiting abortion rights
  - More education reform.
  - Climate change
  - “Zero tolerance” approach to illegal immigration
  - Keeping Obamacare
  - Foreign countries interference with domestic affairs
  - Women’s right movements (#MeToo, Time’s up)
  - The Black Live Matters movement
  - Voting fraud
  - Current economic policies
  - Police brutality
4. Perception of Crisis: Please express to what extent you disagree or agree with each statement using a 7-point scale ranging from “Very Strongly Disagree” to “Very Strongly Agree.”
  - The US is currently in a state of crisis.
  - The problems facing America are severe.
  - Swift decisions must be made to resolve the current state of affairs in the US.
  - It is unclear how to solve the current situation in America.
5. Intention to vote: Do you plan on voting or have already voted in the 2020 US Presidential Election? Yes, No N/A
6. Vote preference: Between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, who do you prefer as the next US President? Joe Biden Donald Trump
7. Holbrook Nostalgia Index (1994 for products, used by Lammer & Baldwin, 2018)  
The following questions are about your feelings toward changes in society. Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following:
  - They do not make them like they used to
  - Things used to be better in the good old days.
  - Products are getting shoddier and shoddier.
  - Technological change will ensure a brighter future.
  - History involves a steady improvement in human welfare.
  - We are experiencing a decline in quality of life.
  - Steady growth in GNI (Gross National Income) has brought increased human happiness.
  - Modern business constantly builds a better tomorrow.
8. Zimbardo & Boyd, 1997 => PastNeg, PastPos, Future: Please read each item and, as honestly as you can, express how characteristic or true are the following statements to you?
  - I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past.
  - I think about the good things that I have missed out on in my life.
  - I often think of what I should have done differently in my life.
  - Painful past experiences keep being replayed in my mind.
  - I’ve taken my share of abuse and rejection in the past.
  - The past has too many unpleasant memories that I prefer not to think about
  - I’ve made mistakes in the past that I wish I could undo.
  - It’s hard for me to forget unpleasant images of my youth.
  - Even when I am enjoying the present, I am drawn back to comparisons with past experiences.

- I find myself turning out when family members talk about the way things used to be.
  - It gives me pleasure to think about my past.
  - I enjoy stories about how things used to be in the “good old times.”
  - Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind.
  - I get nostalgic about my childhood.
  - Life today is too complicated; I would prefer the simpler life of the past.
  - I like family rituals and traditions that are regularly repeated.
  - Even when I am enjoying the present, I am drawn back to comparison with past experiences.
  - Familiar childhood sights, sounds, and smells often bring back a flood of wonderful memories.
  - On balance, there is much more good to recall than bad in my past.
  - I believe that a person’s day should be planned ahead each morning.
  - Thinking about the future is pleasant to me.
  - When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means of reaching those goals.
  - Meeting tomorrow’s deadline and doing other necessary work comes before tonight’s play.
  - It seems to me that my future plans are pretty well laid out.
  - I think that it’s useless to plan too far ahead because things hardly ever come out the way you plan anyway.
  - It upsets me to be late for appointments.
  - I tend to lose my temper when I am provoked.
  - I get irritated at people who keep me waiting when we’ve agreed to meet at a given time.
  - I complete projects on time by making steady progress.
  - I make lists of things to do.
  - I keep working on a difficult, uninteresting task if it will help me get ahead.
  - I am able to resist temptations when I know there is work to be done
9. Collective Nostalgia (Baldwin et al., 2018): How nostalgic do you feel for each of the following aspects of the past?
- The way society was.
  - Morals and values society had
  - The way people were.
  - The way the social system worked.
10. Partisanship: I consider myself:
- Democrat
  - Republican
  - Independent
  - Other
11. Political ideology: How would you describe your political ideology?
- Very liberal
  - Moderately liberal
  - Somewhat liberal
  - Neutral
  - Somewhat conservative
  - Moderately conservative
  - Very conservative
12. Strength of identification with their political party: The following items assess your identification with your political party.

- How important to your identity is being a(n) (selected group choice)
  - How often do you think of your identity as a(n) (selected group choice)
  - To what extent do you think your identity a(n) (selected group choice) influences your life choices?
  - To what extent does your identity as a(n) (selected group choice) influence your daily decisions?
13. Demographics = gender, age, ethnicity
- Gender: male, female, other, prefer not to say
  - Age: What is your age?
  - Ethnic: What is your ethnicity? White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaii or Pacific Islander, Other

## APPENDIX 2

**TABLE 5**  
**SUMMARY OF MODEL 1 RESULTS**

Predicting Perceptions of Multidimensional Crisis (CP)							
Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	$\beta$
Collective Nostalgia	0.107	0.028	3.875	0	0.053	0.161	0.189
Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.005	0.041	-0.125	0.9	-0.087	0.073	-0.007
Collective Nostalgia * Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.041	0.017	2.377	0.017	0.007	0.076	0.102
Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology	0.533	0.042	12.656	0	0.45	0.615	0.612
Collective Nostalgia * Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology	-0.038	0.024	-1.612	0.107	-0.084	0.008	-0.076
Age	-0.003	0.003	-1.035	0.301	-0.01	0.003	-0.037
(Conservativeness of) Political Ideology	-0.029	0.032	-0.904	0.366	-0.091	0.035	-0.048

Predicting Perceived Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology

Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	β
Collective Nostalgia	0.422	0.031	3.666	0	0.361	0.481	0.55

Predicting Perceived Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology

Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	β
Collective Nostalgia	-0.13	0.03	-4.396	0	-0.188	-0.072	-0.201

Conditional Direct Effects on Perceptions of Multidimensional Crisis

Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	β
High Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.068	0.046	1.473	0.141	-0.023	0.158	0.095
Main Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.005	0.041	-0.125	0.9	-0.087	0.073	-0.007
Low Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.078	0.056	-1.391	0.164	-0.19	0.03	-0.109
High Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.465	0.058	8.066	0	0.356	0.58	0.536
Main Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.533	0.042	12.655	0	0.45	0.615	0.612
Low Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.6	0.061	9.881	0	0.479	0.719	0.688



Conditional Direct Effects on Perceptions of Multidimensional Crisis

Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	β
High Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.068	0.046	1.473	0.141	-0.023	0.158	0.095
Main Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.005	0.041	-0.125	0.9	-0.087	0.073	-0.007
Low Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.078	0.056	-1.391	0.164	-0.19	0.03	-0.109
High Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.465	0.058	8.066	0	0.356	0.58	0.536
Main Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.533	0.042	12.655	0	0.45	0.615	0.612
Low Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.6	0.061	9.881	0	0.479	0.719	0.688

Conditional Indirect Effects of Collective Nostalgia on Perceptions of Multidimensional Crisis

Parameter	B	SE	Z	p	95%CI <sub>L</sub>	95%CI <sub>U</sub>	β
High Collective Nostalgia: Conditional Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	0.029	0.02	1.444	0.149	-0.009	0.068	0.052
Main Indirect Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.002	0.017	-0.125	0.901	-0.037	0.031	-0.004
Low Collective Nostalgia: Conditional Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Conservative Ideology	-0.033	0.024	-1.378	0.168	-0.081	0.013	-0.06
High Collective Nostalgia: Conditional Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology	-0.061	0.015	-3.98	0	-0.092	-0.032	-0.108
Main Indirect Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology	-0.069	0.017	-4.175	0	-0.103	-0.038	-0.123
Low Collective Nostalgia: Conditional Effect via Seriousness of Threats to Progressive Ideology	-0.078	0.02	-3.934	0	-0.119	-0.041	-0.139

Note: High Collective Nostalgia Conditional Effect: +1 Standard Deviation; Low Individual Conditional Effect: -1 SD. 5% Confidence intervals were computed with reference to unstandardized B coefficients and are not included in-text.